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CIA PUBLICATIONS AND STUDIES

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 20-22CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS
15 January 1979

CIA eyes growing Soviet trade in chemicals

Central Intelligence Agency report says Soviet purchases of western technology are responsible for growth, sees market disruptions in 1980's

The Central Intelligence Agency has things to do besides spy on Americans (a crime) and topple foreign governments (a practice said to be unpopular and now largely abandoned). Although it has done both, its main business remains the gathering of intelligence and informing the President when, where, and how the "Russians are coming."

In one of its more recent reports to the President, the CIA analysts see looming on the distant commercial horizon a chemical cloud in the shape of a Russian bear. It is neither big nor ominous, but it is there and growing. The Soviets are importing substantial western chemical technology, adding to it some of their own, and in the 1980's could do some mischief in such commodities as ammonia and methanol.

Little of this is news to those who routinely follow East-West trade in chemicals and must keep track of this particular brand of commercial metabolism. But the CIA study does gather the data into a neat little ball, assesses the consequences, and even invites comment in a note in the back if the reader will call (703) 351-7676.

The report says that Soviet orders for western chemical equipment amounted to at least \$5 billion between 1961 and 1975, with more than 70% of that coming during the ninth five-year plan that ran from 1971 to 1975. In the Soviet Union's current five-year plan, orders now exceed

\$3 billion. The result will be high capacity and high productivity in key world chemicals.

Western-equipped chemical plants in the U.S.S.R., the report says, accounted for:

- 40% of multnutrient fertilizers produced in 1975.
- 60% of polyethylene production in 1975.
- 75 to 85% of polyester fibers in 1975.
- 72% of new ammonia production capacity in 1971-75 and 85% of that scheduled in 1976-80.

"Moreover," it continues, "because most of the purchased capacity of recent years is not yet in production, many benefits lie ahead." The analysts don't assess the national security implications of such developments, leaving it to the readers to make their own conclusions.

There is no reason to panic. As chemists well know, Soviet catalysis is many reaction-rate units behind U.S. research and technology. Soviet biochemistry is well known to be primitive alongside western accomplishments. And in the design and building of chemical factories, the Soviets likewise don't have it. But they want it, and are moving to get it, through barterlike deals with many western countries.

For example, in 1976 the Soviets bought from France a 75,000 metric-ton-per-year plant for the production of bisphenol A, important for the manufacture of several types of resins. This will be one of the largest such plants in the world and probably the most modern.

In the same year it bought from the U.S. two identical *p*-xylene plants that are said to lower markedly production costs and increase yields. *p*-Xylene is used to produce polyester fibers, films, and resins. The report lists several such purchases from western countries and in an appendix gives a rundown by country and firm

of all significant chemical plant purchases by the Soviets from the West between 1971 and 1975.

Chemicals have high priority in Soviet economic development (C&EN, Dec. 18, 1978, page 51), not only because of their basic importance to Soviet industrial autonomy but also because the Soviets do want to export. Hard currency is still the rarest commodity in the Soviet Union, and to get it the Soviets know they are going to have to compete on a par with western industrial nations.

Thus the report concludes that Soviet orders of chemical equipment placed between 1974 and mid-1977, which often were associated with long-term product buy-back agreements, will contribute to a sharp increase of Soviet chemical exports in 1980 and beyond.

During the current five-year plan (running from 1976 to 1980), chemical output is slated to rise 63%, according to Soviet Minister of the Chemical Industry, L. A. Kostanov. Major Soviet equipment needs from the West are for petrochemicals, tires, glass fibers, pesticides, potash, pesticides, and herbicides.

U.S. participation, the report says, is expected to be slight because of U.S. preference for hard cash rather than the barterlike buy-back agreements the Soviets prefer. Italy apparently has no problems dealing with the Soviets that way, however, and is accordingly the Soviets' biggest trading partner.

The major growing Soviet exports to the West, the CIA says, will be ammonia, methanol, polyethylene, and polystyrene. Ammonia in particular should be interesting to watch. The report says that Soviet sales of ammonia resulting from many buy-back agreements as well as a separate exchange agreement with Occidental Petroleum Co. could average 3.15 million tons annually in 1978-87 if agreements are implemented.

But the agency analysts doubt that world markets could absorb that much, as total world exports have averaged only 3 million tons in recent years. What Soviet ammonia will likely do is to force the closing of outdated ammonia plants around the world through price competition with cheap Soviet ammonia.

Methanol could be fascinating to watch, too. The report says Soviet methanol capacity will double as a result of a 1977 order for two plants that will add 15% to world methanol capacity. The buy-back deal for the methanol project involves the purchase of 300,000 tons per year of Soviet methanol. "The impact on western markets," the report says, "will largely depend on how rapidly new uses

Italy was the top western chemical supplier to the Soviet Union in 1971-75

\$ Millions	Total orders* 1971-75	% of total	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Italy	\$958.8	26.4%	0	\$ 68.0	\$ 45.0	\$192.0	\$655.8
France	799.1	22.0	\$ 2.7	23.3	98.4	352.5	322.2
West Germany	635.5	17.5	16.9	132.1	122.0	182.2	202.3
U.S.	519.6	14.3	4.8	12.1	67.8	353.4	81.4
Japan	445.7	12.3	46.6	21.1	12.9	69.8	295.2
U.K.	252.8	7.0	16.6	0.5	82.3	110.1	43.1
Others*	20.5	0.6	0	7.1	0	0	13.4
TOTAL	\$3631.7	100.0%	\$87.8	\$282.2	\$429.4	\$1240.1	\$1813.4

* Mainly for know-how and plant equipment. It includes Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria.

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development for methanol as a fuel or fuel additive or as feedstock for artificial protein petrochemicals."

The chemical industry in the U.S.S.R. has mainly civilian, as opposed to military, applications. And this always means problems in the Soviet Union because of the favoritism military technology enjoys. Commercial technology is beset with problems, as the CIA notes in all its reports on Soviet science and technology, and chemicals are the quintessential example.

The Soviets invariably have startup problems with plants, whether built by westerners or by themselves. Shortages of equipment are chronic. Labor is inefficient, unhappy, and in short supply. Management is uncoordinated within itself and especially so in its relationships with the various ministries that set goals and oversee production quotas.

"Poor workmanship and carelessness," the report reveals, "frequently cause delays during the precommissioning stage of chemical projects. Shortcomings include poor-quality welding by Soviet workers, errors in the installation of equipment and insulation, and improper operation and servicing of machines and instruments. The persistence of such construction and preoperational problems indicates that the Soviets could have trouble meeting at least initial chemical export commitments under compensation agreements."

But for all that—and the report lists much more in the way of deficiencies—Soviet chemical research and technology is moving ahead. In the 1980's and 90's things likely will change drastically since Soviet scientists are as bright as their colleagues anywhere. In a footnote, the report notes technologically important research on protein derived from hydrocarbons, high-temperature plastics, high-performance composite materials, and "plasmachemical processes that may offer more economical routes to production of acetylene, nitrogen fertilizers, and other products."

And it mentions recent Soviet technology licensed in the West as an indicator of Soviet technological potential. Such licenses have included processes for manufacture or use of polyethylene, polycarbonate resins, polyisoprene, rubber, butylated hydroxytoluene, an anti-cancer preparation it labels FTOROFUR, and methods for the disposal of industrial wastes.

Thus, despite all the problems inherent in centralized industrial planning, the U.S.S.R.'s chemical industry is moving ahead on the back of Western developments. In the 1980's a vastly different pattern in the global flow of chemicals likely will emerge because of this growing Soviet maturity.

Copies of the report, ER 78-10554, are available from the Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505. Its title is "Soviet Chemical Equipment Purchases from the West: Impact on Production and Foreign Trade." □

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)

Article appeared 26 January 1979

on page A-3

China Curbs Arms Spending While Facing Soviet Buildup, CIA Says

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

On the eve of Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit, two estimates from the CIA say China is restricting its military spending to only the most essential modernization while facing a significant Soviet military buildup on its border.

A CIA study dated last month and just made public says China's drive to modernize its economy has caused some military resources to be transferred to building a strong industrial base. Defense spending was cut in the early 1970s and has not been increased substantially since then.

But in recent years the Soviet Union has continued to strengthen its armed forces on its long border with China and in Mongolia, which lies between the two big Communist powers.

The CIA reported to a subcommittee of Congress's Joint Economic Committee that "the number of Soviet military personnel assigned to forces with missions against China grew from about 400,000 in 1969 to between 500,000 and 600,000 in 1973 and about 650,000 in 1978."

THE INFORMATION, provided in connection with an appearance before the subcommittee last June of the director of central intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, was made public today. It was in a version of hearings

last summer on Soviet military priorities from which secret information had been censored.

China's efforts to build up its economy and Chinese concern about the Soviet military posture will be among the main topics to be discussed during Teng's visit here, according to administration officials.

Teng, the effective head of China's government, arrives Sunday for extensive talks with President Carter and other senior officials. He also will visit some of the industrial plants that are selling modern technology to Peking.

Under the pragmatic policies instituted in Peking since Teng moved into control after the defeat of the

ideologically oriented "Gang of Four," China is turning to the Western world for help in modernizing its economy. Carter has been receptive. A science and technology agreement will be signed during Teng's visit.

CHINA'S MILITARY leaders and its economic planners have been competing in recent years for limited resources. The debate was resolved by Teng and his nominal boss, Premier Hua Kuo-feng, in favor of giving first priority to building up the economic base. They used the justification that long-term military strength depends upon economic strength.

The new CIA study says: "The debate apparently ended with a consensus

(1) to hold military spending at a level which allows for the most essential aspects of defense modernization, and (2) to make underutilized resources controlled by the military partially available for civilian industry."

This background to Teng's economic discussions in the United States is not likely to be discussed openly, officials here say. And the administration is wary of antagonizing Moscow by appearing to be too sympathetic to Peking's loudly voiced suspicions about Soviet aggressive intentions.

THE UNITED STATES has taken the public position that it will not sell to China the specialized weapons that Peking wants to fill gaps in its defenses. But the administration has given a green light for its West European allies to sell them.

The CIA study of China's "pursuit of economic modernization" says that, despite the flexibility of Teng's pragmatic leadership, "economic realities still pose formidable obstacles to modernization" of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense.

"China's nearly one billion people, an agricultural sector technologically so backward that it employs 70 percent of the labor force, a 'modern' industry using techniques that are 10 to 30 years out of date and with operations presently most inefficient."

CHICAGO DEFENDER
30 December 1978

China booming: CIA

China's international trade is rising dramatically as its government puts into practice the new pragmatic ideas of the post-Mao leadership, a CIA study shows. The unclassified report by the CIA National Foreign Assessment Center went beyond the usual scholarly language contained in such studies, reporting, "imports are taking off" and "exports are up across the board." The study said China's financial situation remains healthy with an outstanding debt of \$1.3 billion which, the CIA said, "does not constitute a heavy burden for the Chinese economy."

THE WASHINGTON POST

23 January 1979

Article appeared
on page A-7

Soviets' Defense Outlay Estimated

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency estimates the Soviet Union spent the equivalent of \$146 billion for defense last year, 45 percent more than the United States' \$102 billion.

A CIA analysis released yesterday estimates the Soviets spent twice as much for strategic nuclear forces and twice as much for nonnuclear war forces.

The Soviets spent more for nuclear land missiles, short-range nuclear bombers, land forces, naval forces, and for tanks and other mobility forces, charts in the analysis indicate.

The United States spent more for long-range nuclear bombers and tactical jet fighters, the charts indicate.

However, the analysis said that while the higher Soviet military spending is "obviously related to capability," the spending alone does not mean the Soviets are superior.

It said that assessment would have to compare defense strategy, battle scenarios, tactical readiness, weapons effectiveness, supply, morale and a number of other considerations.

The CIA also said U.S. spending was higher for support forces: primarily for the U.S. Coast Guard, headquarters personnel, supply units and foreign military aid.

Article appeared
on page C-9

21 January 1979

Bound for China? CIA can help

Penny-wise traveler

By JANE MORSE

Like a mushrooming number of curious travelers, she was gearing up for a trip to the People's Republic of China. But where do you go for background information on "unknown" areas? How do you get briefed on communist countries so long out in the cold?

Being a reasoner, she reasoned. And came to a perfectly obvious conclusion: Ask the people most likely to be keeping track of "mystery" spots, the Central Intelligence Agency.

So she did. And it worked. Among the many things you may never have guessed about America's superspies is that they're into producing "traveler's aids" — so far, some 50 maps, six atlases, and, for who knows what reasons, a street guide to Leningrad.

Now, thanks to China's latest leap forward in the tourist business, the CIA may even have a semi-best seller on its hands. The "Atlas of the People's Republic of China" (\$6.50) is an uncommon atlas and a fascinating work. It offers 82 pithy pages of smoothly and clearly presented material that graphically summarizes China's geography, economy, history and culture.

You like pictures — it's got pictures. Lots of maps, of course, one marking premier sightseeing spots in Peking. Interspersed are to-the-point analogies that put the information into terms immediately comprehensible to Westerners.

What else the intelligence community has done for you lately includes producing another intriguing work, the "Indian Ocean Atlas" (\$5.75). This one is for far-out adventurers, of course, since Zanzibar, the Laccadive Islands, Mauritius and the rest are not yet places that rival Las Vegas and New Orleans as tourist draws.

Stay-at-homes who are also die-hard romantics ought to eat it up anyhow. Few if any guide books or other atlases so explicitly answer unspoken questions and explain, for instance, that "Under these conditions (temperatures in excess of 100 degrees), the body's

cooling mechanism is disrupted: the body sweats, but the sweat does not evaporate, and thus cool; any strenuous activity increases the danger of heatstroke."

Of course, the CIA is not alone among U.S. government agencies in publishing what every tourist might conceivably want to know. The Defense Department, in fact, does some of the most in-depth "guide books" around, an "area handbook" series, 105 volumes covering Afghanistan to Zambia.

These are really for serious travelers as opposed to fun-in-the-sun seekers, since they deal with each nation's history, politics and culture, not "Where the Discos Are" or "How to Live in Style on 4 Cents a Day." They are nonetheless a good read and don't require true grit to get through.

If you secretly like short cuts, though, you can still consult the Defense Department. It's also done a group of pocket guides that do get to tourist tips but summarize the rest of what you need to know in order not to appear too stupid. They were written for service people, of course, so they cover mainly areas where we have troops stationed, include some useful phrases, a reading list in case you're up to more, and (the best part) lots of basic material that sophisticated guide-book writers forget that first-timers would like — and need — to know.

And whereas the area handbooks have real book prices (averaging \$6-\$8), the pocket guides, which really are pocket size and no thicker than a checkbook, cost 55 cents to \$1.80.

There's also a series of inexpensive phrase books from the same folks. Again, they're conveniently pocket-sized, range in cost from 75 cents to \$1.90, and easily cover the most vital areas of tourist-to-local conversation in a dozen languages, French to Malay.

The quasi publisher-distributor of all these works is the U.S. Government Printing Office, and it aims to please travelers who stay closer to home, too. Noteworthy is its hard-cover book "Presidents" (\$8), which should be a boon to history-minded tourists. It's just what they need to plan a Lincoln Trip or a Truman Trip or even a Presidents' Boyhood Homes Trip, since it's full of "this is where it happened" and "this is how it is

"Soldiers and Braves" (\$7.10) is a similar work in that it narrates the sad yet stirring story of the Indian Wars, with detailed attention paid to pointing out the now-historical places associated with it.

Of course, if you're planning the See the Indians Trip, the Government Printing Office is a prime source of help, from three publications in particular: "The American Indians" (subtitled "Answers to 101 Questions"), "The Calendar of Indian Events," and the map of Indian lands.

Unfortunately, lots of what the government prints is neither as good nor as useful as the works mentioned. That's why your best bet is to look first, buy later. You can do it two ways. If you're on the road somewhere and suddenly get an itch to see if the GPO can contribute to your knowledge, there are bookstores in 20 cities that you can drop in on. One is in Philadelphia.

Alternatively, you can check your local libraries. A growing number are now "federal depository libraries," meaning they should have lots of GPO's publications or can arrange to borrow what you want from the regional library.

Actually, your first move might best be to write for the free "Consumers Guide to Federal Publications" (from the GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402), which gives titles of subject lists, explains all about ordering and tells about federal publications (mainly maps) that are available from other government sources.

Someday maybe the GPO will even publish "Untold Spy Stories" and provide the government with a real best seller. Meanwhile, though, keep an eye out for more good atlases.

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PAISLEY

WE'VE GOT TO CAP THIS OFF PRETTY SOON!!

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25 January 1979

Article appeared
on page 9

Panel asks FBI probe in CIA death

United Press International

WASHINGTON — Citing "troubling questions" about the case, the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday asked the FBI to look into the material it has compiled on John Paisley, a CIA consultant who disappeared last fall.

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) the committee chairman, sent the material to Attorney General Griffin Bell, telling him "a number of troubling questions remain" and to keep the committee informed of developments.

Bayh released no other information, saying the FBI should have a chance to investigate first.

Paisley disappeared last September after sailing out on Maryland's Chesapeake Bay in his 31-foot sloop, "Brillig." The boat ran aground with no one aboard. A week later, a body — shot behind the ear and weighted down with diving belts — was found.

The body was officially identified as Paisley's, but his estranged wife and others have expressed doubts, because none of the family saw the corpse before cremation.

A source close to the intelligence committee investigation said the panel is satisfied that the body was Paisley's but has not drawn a conclusion on how he died.

Although Paisley, 55, had retired as a CIA agent in 1974, he was still working as a consultant on the important job of analyzing Soviet military capabilities — meaning he had access to top secret information.

A number of theories have been advanced in the case — that Paisley was a troubled middle-aged man who committed suicide; that he was a Soviet spy for the Kremlin and was knocked off by the CIA or spirited away by Kremlin agents after his real role was discovered; that he was caught in the war between the old guard and new guard at the CIA.

Justice drawn into inquiry on Paisley

By RICHARD SANDZA
and JOE TRENTO

The U.S. Senate intelligence committee yesterday decided to ask the U.S. Justice Department to join in its investigation into "troubling questions" about the disappearance and possible death of CIA official John A. Paisley.

The case goes to the Justice Department with explosive national security questions attached to it, including the possibility that Paisley was a KGB double agent who left the CIA with valuable secrets or that he was murdered because he discovered who had penetrated the CIA as a "mole," or double agent.

Paisley's total access to the CIA computer system and the most important agency secrets also has raised questions about the successful enforcement of upcoming SALT agreement with the Soviet Union.

Committee chairman Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., yesterday called Attorney General Griffin B. Bell to tell him of the committee's request, a source said. It is not known whether Bell will agree to do the investigation for the committee.

If the Justice Department starts an investigation, the committee will close down its probe and turn any new leads over to the agency.

The FBI has jurisdiction over counterintelligence matters.

Sources close to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said the decision came under extreme pressure from members of Congress and the press who have raised questions about Paisley, a retired senior CIA official who disappeared Sept. 24.

Much of the pressure has been generated by articles in the News-Journal papers that reported Paisley's role in the nation's intelligence network and later revealed discrepancies in the methods used to identify a body believed to be that of Paisley. Other news organizations have picked up the story and begun hounding the Senate committee, the source said.

The committee decision to call on Bell to help in the probe, the source said, came because the press has been "beating down our door in the past few days."

The committee yesterday asked Bell to help clear up loose ends related to the Paisley case.

The committee wants to monitor the Justice Department investigation to make sure the committee "doesn't leave the fox in the hen house totally unguarded," as put by a source privy to the committee discussions.

Such a cooperative arrangement is considered unique since the FBI is part of the executive branch and the General Accounting Office normally investigates for the congressional or legislative branch.

The committee's probe came at the urging of Sen. William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., who cited the News-Journal articles.

The committee agreed to have its staff turn over the material discovered since its investigation began in October, a few days after a body was found floating in Chesapeake Bay near the site where Paisley was last seen sailing his sloop Brillig. The man had been killed by a single, close-range gun shot to the head.

The body was identified as Paisley's, and Maryland State Police ruled he probably committed suicide.

The committee investigation was aimed at looking into whether there was a connection between Paisley's death and a series of security breaches related to the K-11 spy satellite system. Paisley was one of the men who was involved in the development of that system, the keystone of the nation's strategic surveillance system.

Since the investigation began, the Senate committee has had problems handling the investigation. "We are not police

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investigators," committee spokesman Spencer Davis said in December. "We keep learning more about this guy."

Sources on the committee have spoken about the CIA lack of cooperation with the committee's probe. "They just don't want to tell us anything about this guy," one source said.

The Paisley affair began with the CIA refusing to identify Paisley as anything more than a low-level analyst. Actually, Paisley, 55, retired in 1974 from the CIA as deputy director of the office of strategic research — one of the CIA's top 100 posts.

Earlier this month, however, the CIA told a reporter that Paisley was a "brilliant analyst."

In a short time after he retired, Paisley was back working for the CIA, this time as a contract employee. When he disappeared, Paisley was preparing a highly sensitive report about the strategic capability of the Soviet Union.

At the time he vanished, Paisley was working for the Washington office of the international accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand. He was about to finish a six-month contract when he vanished in the Chesapeake Bay.

The committee is disturbed about several discrepancies in the

identification of the body: That identification was done by the FBI and the Maryland State Police. The FBI did the fingerprint identification because the Maryland State medical examiner, Dr. Russell K. Fisher, couldn't get prints off the body so he amputated the hands and sent them to the FBI.

The FBI took dermal prints — from a lower layer of skin — and matched them to the what the FBI said were the only set of Paisley prints available in the country, obtained in 1940 when he mailed them to the FBI office in Phoenix, Ariz. Other Paisley prints had been inadvertently destroyed by the FBI.

Two months later, the News-Journal papers discovered a full set of Paisley prints in the records of his days in the Merchant Marines.

The other part of the identification was done by checking an upper dental plate found in the body. That plate was identified when Paisley's dentist "eyeballed" it because he didn't have any dental records for Paisley. In November, the dentist, Dr. Albert Brendes, said the plate "could have been a million people's denture."

Paisley's death believed linked to CIA, major security breach

Washington (NYT)—Authoritative government officials believe the mysterious death last September of John Arthur Paisley, the retired Central Intelligence Agency nuclear arms expert, may be linked to a major internal security breach affecting the CIA.

This conclusion is based to a significant extent on the discovery that "current" top secret CIA documents—and not two-year-old papers of a lower classification, as believed earlier—had been found, after Mr. Paisley's disappearance, at three places: aboard his sloop, the Brillig, in his Washington apartment, and in his office at a public accountant firm where he had held an administrative post in the last five months of his life.

Mr. Paisley, 55, disappeared September 24 and his diving belt-laden body, with a bullet wound to the head, was discovered October 1 in the Chesapeake Bay near the mouth of the Patuxent River and about 15 miles north of where the Brillig was found off Point Look In.

The fact that Mr. Paisley had access to super-secret intelligence data for years after his formal retirement from the CIA and a year after he was said to have completed a sensitive consultative assignment for the agency was disclosed privately yesterday by government sources.

It also was learned that Col. Norman Wilson, a retired Air Force intelligence official and the last man to have talked with Mr. Paisley before his disappearance, left Monday for Australia with his wife.

An unidentified man answering the telephone at the Wilson home on Chesapeake Bay described it as a three- or four-month-long trip that had been planned for some time. But government sources expressed surprise at his departure while the investigation of Mr. Paisley's death is being expanded.

The new information came to light as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take over, in effect, its three-month inquiry into this latest CIA mystery.

The committee said it had taken the action Wednesday because it had come across "a number of troubling questions," and because the FBI has "primary jurisdiction

over counter-intelligence matters within the United States."

Government sources said it is not possible to rule out the theory that the Paisley affair touches on the existence of a Soviet "mole"—a deep-cover Soviet agent planted inside the agency—and the dead officer's knowledge thereof. The theory has been the subject of speculation for years inside and outside the intelligence community.

At first, the CIA claimed the documents in Mr. Paisley's possession were relatively unimportant papers classified "for internal use only."

Later it acknowledged that Mr. Paisley had kept materials pertaining to the top secret comparative study of Soviet nuclear capabilities conducted in late 1977 by a CIA group and an outside panel of experts known as "Team B."

The CIA also admitted that Mr. Paisley had served as coordinator of "Team B."

The agency, including its director, Stansfield Turner, also was said to have initially misinformed the White House and the Senate committee concerning Mr. Paisley's actual importance during his formal CIA career and afterward. It was called an effort to portray Mr. Paisley as simply a CIA analyst while, in reality, he had participated in numerous top-level clandestine intelligence operations.

Government sources said specifically that Mr. Paisley's documents were "over and above" the "Team B" papers that were also found aboard the sloop. They said that the CIA was unable or unwilling to explain to the Senate panel why Mr. Paisley had the documents for so long after his formal retirement as deputy chief of the Office of Strategic Research.

Normally, the sources said, documents of this nature would never be removed from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

The committee, according to its chairman, Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.), had interviewed CIA officials along with others in the course of its investigation. But, sources said, the CIA had been less than forthcoming. This may have been one of the reasons for turning the inquiry over to the Justice Department.

The committee has an oversight function in intelligence matters, but it is not equipped to undertake an in-depth investigation such as in the Paisley case.

Most investigators now accept the fact that the body recovered from the bay was actually that of Mr. Paisley, a point that earlier had been in doubt.

They said that by peeling off a second layer of skin from the fingers of one of Mr. Paisley's hands the FBI was able to establish his identity after matching it with a set of fingerprints taken in 1941.

However, the mystery remains as to the circumstances of his death. While it was first described as a suicide, the Maryland State Police subsequently concluded he died of "undetermined causes."

Many investigators tend to believe that Mr. Paisley was murdered, but there appear to be no clues so far as to by whom and why.

Among the troubling questions in the Paisley case is the relationship he had with Yuri I. Nosenko, the highest-ranking officer of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, ever to defect to the United States.

Mr. Nosenko, whose status as a real defector remains controversial 15 years after his arrival in the U.S., had been interrogated by Mr. Paisley among other CIA officials. Subsequently the two men became friends; and gov-

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ON PAGE AbTHE BALTIMORE SUN
26 January 1979

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The committee said it had taken the action Wednesday because it had come across "a number of troubling questions," and because the FBI has "primary jurisdiction over counter-intelligence matters within the United States."

Government sources said it is not possible to rule out the theory that the Paisley affair touches on the existence of a Soviet "mole"—a deep-cover Soviet agent planted inside the agency—and the dead officer's knowledge thereof. The theory has been the subject of speculation for years inside and outside the intelligence community.

At first, the CIA claimed the documents in Mr. Paisley's possession were relatively unimportant papers classified "for internal use only."

Later it acknowledged that Mr. Paisley had kept materials pertaining to the top secret comparative study of Soviet nuclear capabilities conducted in late 1977 by a CIA group and an outside panel of experts known as "Team B."

The CIA also admitted that Mr. Paisley had served as coordinator of "Team B."

The agency, including its director, Stansfield Turner, also was said to have initially misinformed the White House and the Senate committee concerning Mr. Paisley's actual importance during his formal CIA career and afterward. It was called an effort to portray Mr. Paisley as simply a CIA analyst while, in reality, he had participated in numerous top-level clandestine intelligence operations.

Government sources said specifically that Mr. Paisley's documents were "over and above" the "Team B" papers that were also found aboard the sloop. They said that the CIA was unable or unwilling to explain to the Senate panel why Mr. Paisley had the documents for so long after his formal retirement as deputy chief of the Office of Strategic Research.

Normally, the sources said, documents of this nature would never be removed from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

The committee, according to its chairman, Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.), had interviewed CIA officials along with others in the course of its investigation. But, sources said, the CIA had been less than forthcoming. This may have been one of the reasons for turning the inquiry over to the Justice Department.

The committee has an oversight function in intelligence matters, but it is not equipped to undertake an in-depth investigation such as in the Paisley case.

Most investigators now accept the fact that the body recovered from the bay was actually that of Mr. Paisley, a point that earlier had been in doubt.

They said that by peeling off a second layer of skin from the fingers of one of Mr. Paisley's hands the FBI was able to establish his identity after matching it with a set of fingerprints taken in 1941.

However, the mystery remains as to the circumstances of his death. While it was first described as a suicide, the Maryland State Police subsequently concluded he died of "undetermined causes."

Many investigators tend to believe that Mr. Paisley was murdered, but there appear to be no clues so far as to by whom and why.

Among the troubling questions in the Paisley case is the relationship he had with Yuri I. Nosenko, the highest-ranking officer of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, ever to defect to the United States.

Mr. Nosenko, whose status as a real defector remains controversial 15 years after his arrival in the U.S., had been interrogated by Mr. Paisley among other CIA officials. Subsequently the two men became friends; and gov-

CONTINUED

... further explored by the FBI.

Another puzzling point is information obtained by investigators that Mr. Paisley had often sailed from the Brillig's mooring on Colonel Wilson's property in Solomons, Calvert county, to sparsely inhabited Hooper Island on the bay's Eastern Shore.

Some government officials think there could be considerable significance in this regular sailing pattern but would not elaborate on it further.

Among the coincidences involving Mr. Paisley is that Coopers & Lybrand, the public accountant firm that employed him in the last months of his life, had acted for 20 years—until 1973—as auditors for Air America, Inc., the secretly owned CIA airline that had operated in Indochina and elsewhere.

In 1974, when the CIA divested itself of Air America, Coopers & Lybrand, one of the largest in the country, performed the evaluation of the airline's assets.

A spokesman for the firm said yesterday that the company had been unaware until about 1973 that Air America was a CIA front. Such ignorance was common among the numerous organizations dealing with the agency's secretly owned property.

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ON PAGE A-21NEW YORK TIMES
22 JANUARY 1979

ESSAY

Slithy
Toves
Of C.I.A.

By William Safire

*'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.*

Lewis Carroll

An empty sloop named "Brillig," under full sail, was washed up on the shore of Chesapeake Bay four months ago. Coast guardsmen found documents aboard analyzing Soviet military strength, along with boxes of sophisticated electronic gear.

The boat belonged to John Arthur Paisley, a Soviet analyst for the C.I.A. A week later, a waterlogged body was found with a bullet in the back of the head; the corpse was hastily identified as Paisley's, and cremated.

Stanfield Turner, the former Naval person now running the C.I.A., put out word that Paisley possessed no secrets and his death was a simple suicide: "I'm standing on the fine statement by the Maryland State Police," he said, "that they see no evidence of foul play here."

But Paisley was a man in the middle of the great question that divides the U.S. intelligence community: Is there now a "mole" — a Soviet penetrator — high in the C.I.A., who was responsible for last year's incredible leakage of our satellite secrets?

The background: Soon after the assassination of President Kennedy, a K.G.B. officer named Yuri Nosenko defected to the West and assured the C.I.A. that Lee Harvey Oswald had not been trained as an assassin during his stay in the U.S.S.R. But the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence chief, James Angleton, believed Nosenko to be a "plant"; with the tacit approval of Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, Nosenko was confined and interrogated for years. Unconvinced of the defector's bona fides, the old guard at the C.I.A. finally gave him a new identity and let him go.

Came the mid-70's revolution at the C.I.A., a group of not-so-Young Turks took over, led by William Colby, determined to salvage the agency by vilifying its old guard and making them scapegoats for "dirty tricks." The Helms-Angleton types were labeled "paranoid" — and part of the besmirching of their reputations was the charge that Nosenko had been harassed cruelly rather than welcomed.

The old guard lashed back: In "Legend," by Edward J. Epstein, the case was made that Nosenko was part of a K.G.B. coverup for assassin Oswald. The old guard man who interrogated Nosenko refuted the highly publicized charges made recently by a representative of Director Turner, but his testimony was suppressed by the House Assassinations Committee.

As the battle raged, with media champions being fed by both sides, Mr. Turner brought defector Nosenko into the bosom of the C.I.A. and made him a top analyst. There, the defector was befriended by John Arthur Paisley, who was originally recruited by hard-liner Angleton; now Paisley is dead.

The Senate Intelligence Committee wants to know whether Paisley was the mole, or whether Paisley learned who the mole was — and was killed before he could pass it on. Senators are furious at Mr. Turner's attempt to minimize Paisley's agency significance. An intelligence boss may have to issue a false cover story publicly, but it is against the law for him to mislead an oversight committee in secret session. (Tad Szulc, in the New York Times Magazine, revealed that Paisley was the man who drafted the controversial "Team B" report warning of Soviet buildups and expansionism.)

This schism in the world of U.S. intelligence — where only the hardliners have been getting fired, indicted or rubbed out — is no mere settling of intramural scores. Either view may be mistaken, but if it turns out that the old-line doubters are right — and not the "paranoids" they are depicted as being — then our national security has been seriously weakened.

"The concrete suspicions of Nosenko have never been resolved," says Tennant Bagley, former deputy chief of the C.I.A.'s Soviet bloc division. "It is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual." The current top brass are taking unnecessary chances to demonstrate contempt for their predecessors.

Since the possibly murdered Mr. Paisley appreciated the Wonderland wordplay of Lewis Carroll, let us go looking through a glass, darkly:

*Beware the Family Jewels, my son
The looks that spring, the tips from
Smersh —**Taste not Nosenko's Plant, and shun
The myriad Seymour Hersch!**Galitzen to the Bagley man
Go find who serves another shipper;
Promotion lies with those who can
Win one for the Double Dipper.**But high in Langley's ranks he stands,
The Jabbermole, untouched is he —
Kampiles' heel, a friend of Stan's,
He smuckles in his glee.**'Board Brillig did the bearish spies
Snatch Paisley's prints before he blabbed;
All flimsy were the alibis.
While the mole laughs, ungrabbed.*

14 January 1979

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on page A-1, 7

FBI used mailed-in 'prints' to identify Paisley

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By JOE TRENTO and
RICHARD SANDZA

WASHINGTON — The FBI has changed its story about the origin of the fingerprints used to identify the body of John A. Paisley, a veteran top CIA official.

FBI spokesman Thomas Harrington said Friday the fingerprints used to identify the body found in Chesapeake Bay — and identified as Paisley — were mailed to the FBI by Paisley when he was 17 years old. In several earlier statements the FBI said that Paisley came to the FBI in Phoenix, Ariz., and asked to be fingerprinted.

If the prints were in fact mailed to the agency, there is no way of being certain that they were really Paisley's.

Asked why Paisley would mail in his own fingerprints, Harrington drew a parallel to his two sons who are fingerprinting each other as work on the Boy Scout "fingerprint merit badge."

Paisley disappeared while sailing in his sloop Brillig on Sept. 24. The boat washed ashore — without Paisley — the next day. The body identified as Paisley was found floating in the bay on Oct. 1.

After the body was identified as Paisley's the Maryland State Police said his death probably was a suicide.

Trying to sort out the confusion is the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has asked for all available sets of fingerprints attributed to Paisley, including sets discovered in the Merchant Marine files by the News-Journal papers.

An additional identification problem has been created by the statements of Dr. Russell S. Fisher, the Maryland state medical examiner, who signed the autopsy report and death certificate. He has offered several versions on the exact size of the body identified as Paisley's.

When the CIA was first asked about Paisley's connections to the agency, it described him as a

"low-level employee." This week the CIA said Paisley was a "brilliant analyst." Before he retired in 1974 Paisley served as deputy director of strategic research, one of the top people in the U.S. intelligence community.

Paisley's fate could have considerable impact on the effectiveness of a U.S.-Soviet SALT agreement. A man who had access to the nation's top secrets and helped in the development of the U.S. KH-11 spy satellite system, Paisley or his knowledge would be welcome in the Soviet Union.

Doubts about Paisley's identification were first raised by his estranged wife, who never saw the body fished from the bay. The body was later cremated. She hired a lawyer and an investigator to look into the case.

Medical examiner Fisher's autopsy report said that the corpse was 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 144 pounds. An FBI report to the medical examiner stated that the corpse's prints matched those on file for a Jack Paisley, 5 feet 7 inches tall.

Fisher told United Press International last week that he was angry about News-Journal stories about the size difference. He explained, "Some flunky measured it (the body) in the bag and said it appeared to be 5-7, I laid him out on the floor and measured him myself and damn it, he was 5 foot 11. Anybody who says he is 5-7 is . . ." UPI reporter Daniel Gilmore says a series of obscenities followed.

Fisher told Sunday News Journal reporters in November that he corrected the FBI's report that Paisley was 5-7. He said the body was definitely 5-11.

Records Fisher made available to a Sunday News Journal reporter at the time of the interview showed the only mention of 5-7 was on a letter to Fisher from the FBI identifying the prints as those of Jack Paisley.

Fisher said at the time that "Paisley was slight, a little guy."

Muddying the waters further about Paisley's size is the last man to see Paisley the day he disappeared, State Department official Michael V. Yohn. Yohn and his now-estranged wife Gretchen first met Paisley in 1972 when they bought a sailboat from him. Yohn said Paisley "was a slight man, no more than 5-8 and very slender. I am 6-2 and he was a lot shorter than I was. I don't understand Fisher's statements."

Fisher could not be reached for additional comment.

FBI spokesman Harrington said no other prints could be found for Paisley anywhere in the government except the "do-it-yourself" prints Paisley sent in.

Harrington asked a News-Journal reporter to send the FBI a copy of the Merchant Marine prints because "we still haven't been able to find our own copy." The Sunday News Journal obtained its copy through a routine information request from the Coast Guard records just three blocks from the FBI building.

On another front, Harrington expressed doubt about the CIA's contention that it does not maintain fingerprints on agency employees. Harrington explained that not only are prints taken and filed for agency employees but since many CIA staff member are assigned to other government agencies, multiple sets of prints are made to be forwarded.

Justice Department gets data on Paisley death

By THOMAS B. EDSALL
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Prompted by the discovery of new and apparently "troubling" evidence, the Senate Intelligence Committee has turned over to the Justice Department all information on the death of John A. Paisley, the former CIA official whose body was found October 1 in the Chesapeake Bay.

In a letter to Griffin B. Bell, the Attorney general, Senator Birch Bayh (D., Ind.), the Intelligence Committee chairman, pointedly noted that the decision to turn the information over to the department was made because the FBI has "primary jurisdiction over counter-intelligence matters."

Mr. Bayh and another committee official refused to elaborate. But the implication is that the new evidence in the investigation of the one-time deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research may point to foreign spy activity within the United States.

Sources said the new evidence centers on documents found on Mr. Paisley's boat in the Chesapeake Bay and at his apartment.

Mr. Paisley, 55, was found shot in the head a week after his boat, the Brillig, ran aground with no one aboard at Point Look In.

After a lengthy investigation, Maryland State Police decided that Mr. Paisley, who died from a 9-mm. bullet wound behind the left ear, probably committed suicide, but reached no firm conclusion.

Although Mr. Paisley was known to

keep a pistol aboard his sloop, no gun was ever found. His body was weighted down with 38 pounds carried on a diving belt.

The CIA initially attempted to downplay Mr. Paisley's activities with the agency, although it was later disclosed that he had retired in 1974 only to be hired as a consultant to work on analysis of Soviet nuclear activities.

Yesterday, a spokesman for the CIA refused to comment on the action of the Senate Intelligence Committee, except to say: "We will be delighted if they get to the conclusion" of the investigation into Mr. Paisley's death.

In a prepared statement, the committee said:

"Based on available information, [Mr. Bayh] told Bell that a number of troubling questions remain.

"He added that because of the FBI's primary jurisdiction over counter-intelligence matters within the U.S., he had instructed the Intelligence Committee's staff to see that all information gathered by the committee is made immediately available to the Justice Department."

There have been a number of reports that in his work for the CIA, Mr. Paisley participated in the development of a secret manual on the U.S. spy-satellite called KH-11.

The KH-11 document was a key part of the espionage trial of William P. Kampiles, a former CIA employee sentenced to 44 years in jail. Kampiles was convicted of stealing the manual and selling it to a Soviet agent in Athens for \$3,000.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 JANUARY 1979ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10

Panel Urges Investigation in C.I.A. Officer's Death

By ANTHONY MARRO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — The Senate Intelligence Committee today asked the Justice Department to investigate a number of "troubling questions" that it had been unable to answer in its own investigation into the death of John A. Paisley, the former Central Intelligence Agency analyst whose body was found floating in Chesapeake Bay last autumn.

A spokesman for the committee, Spencer Davis, said he could not discuss what sort of "troubling questions" the committee wanted answered, but he said that the committee and its staff felt the questions were such that a referral of the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation was "a legitimate course of action."

The body of Mr. Paisley, who had been shot in the head with a 9-millimeter bullet, was found in the bay one week after his boat, the "Brillig" had run aground on the western shore of Chesapeake Bay. The Maryland state police concluded after an investigation that he probably had committed suicide.

Since Mr. Paisley's death, however, a number of news organizations have raised questions about the apparent suicide, noting that Mr. Paisley had continued to do sensitive work for the Central Intelligence Agency after his retirement from the agency in 1974, and suggesting that perhaps Soviet intelligence agents were somehow involved.

As a result of a number of problems concerning identification of the body, which was badly bloated and decom-

posed, questions were also raised about whether it actually was the body of the former C.I.A. officer.

Although no one connected with the Senate committee would openly discuss the matter, one Government source said that the committee did not doubt that the body recovered was that of Mr. Paisley. "We don't think that he's going to show up in Red Square," he said.

Because of the sensitive nature of Mr. Paisley's work for the agency, which involved assessments of Soviet strategic strength, and because there were no witnesses to confirm that he had committed suicide, the Senate committee began an inquiry of its own last October.

Yesterday, Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana Democrat who heads the committee, told Attorney General Griffin B. Bell

in a telephone conversation that some questions still were unanswered, and that he wanted the F.B.I. to take another look at the case.

A spokesman for Mr. Bell, Terrence Adamson, said there was some question about whether the F.B.I. has jurisdiction in the case, but that it might be able to investigate the matter as a crime on the high seas or as a possible counterintelligence matter.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 JANUARY 1979

Asks FBI probe of dead CIA aide

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington (News Bureau) — Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that "troubling questions" remain about the death of retired CIA official, John Paisley. He asked the FBI to investigate.

It was thought that Paisley either committed suicide or was murdered on his sloop, the Brillig, while he was sailing in Chesapeake Bay last September.

But it is not the circumstances of his death — Maryland medical examiners ruled it was suicide — as much as Paisley's activities with the CIA that interest the committee.

"In view of the FBI's primary jurisdiction over counterintelligence matters with the United States, I've instructed our staff to see that all our information is made immediately available to your people," Bayh told Attorney General Griffin Bell.

'Consultant' for CIA

Paisley, a top expert on Soviet military matters when he retired in 1974, was portrayed merely as an analyst by CIA officials when he died. The agency later conceded that he had continued on the CIA payroll as a "consultant."

In the intervening months, the Wilmington (Del.) News Journal reported that Paisley was a pioneer in planning the U-2 spy plane program and had worked on the KH-11 spy satellite system — a key tool in verifying the number of Soviet strategic missiles. Paisley also had worked in recent years on a top priority CIA study evaluating the Soviet missile threat.

A key question raised in various news accounts, but not confirmed by any investigators, is that Paisley may have been cooperating with the Soviets on sensitive strategic arms matters. The U.S. and the Soviet Union hope to complete a new strategic arms agreement in the next few months.

A second theory is that Paisley, while working on the highly-classified material, may have discovered someone else high up in the CIA who was a "mole" or double agent for the Soviets.

The concept that the Soviets obtain information from high CIA sources has been a popular theory among some elements in the CIA for decades.

25 January 1979

Article appeared
on page C-5

Troubling Questions' Seen in Paisley's Death

By Blaine Harden

Washington Post Staff Writer

The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee told the Justice Department yesterday that "a number of troubling questions remain" in the death of former CIA official John A. Paisley, whose body was found last October in Chesapeake Bay with a bullet in his head.

Committee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), said in a letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell that the FBI should begin an immediate investigation into Paisley's death. Bayh ordered that the findings of the committee's own investigation be given to the Justice Department.

The senator said, however, that it would be "premature" to disclose any of the findings until the FBI has looked at the case. He said the information was given to Bell "because of the FBI's primary jurisdiction over counterintelligence matters within the United States."

Paisley disappeared Sept. 24 after setting sail alone in his 31-foot sloop, the Brillig. Although the boat was found aground the next day, Paisley's bloated body, weighed down by two diving belts, was not recovered until a week later.

Maryland police still classify the death of the former director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research as "undetermined." Paisley's estranged wife Maryann, also a former CIA employee, has said she doubts that the body found in the bay was that of her husband. She has hired Bernard Fensterwald, a Washington attorney, to investigate her husband's disappearance.

Justice Department spokesman

Terry Adamson said Bell has ordered the FBI to examine the Senate committee's findings and the bureau's own information on Paisley's death. An assessment will be made "reasonably promptly" of the need for a full-scale FBI investigation, Adamson said.

Sen. William V. Roth (R-Del.), who first called for an investigation into Paisley's death, said yesterday that "a cloud of suspicion" still surrounds the case.

"The Paisley affair was all set to be swept under the carpet; fortunately it didn't sweep too well," Roth said.

Roth said he is concerned by "inconsistencies" in the way the CIA has answered questions about Paisley's access to classified information, including his knowledge of a top secret manual on the KH11 reconnaissance satellite

— which can monitor foreign troop and equipment movements by photographing them from space.

"The CIA said at first that Paisley had no access to sensitive documents. Of course he did," Roth said. Roth also said it was "inconsistent" that the CIA should claim that a high-level official such as Paisley would have nothing to do with the KH11 satellite.

Roth said that if a "junior watch officer" such as William P. Kampiles, convicted last November of selling satellite secrets to the Russians, had access to the KH11 information, then Paisley also would have had access.

Roth and some other senators have asked publicly if there is a link between Paisley's death and the theft from CIA headquarters in Langley of 14 top secret manuals describing the satellite system. The theft was discovered last August.

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501340001-8

IRAN

SOMEBODY HAS TO BE BLAMED!!

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501340001-8

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-3

THE WILMINGTON JOURNAL
23 January 1979

CIA Misread Iranian Mood, Critics Charge

By JAY BUSHINSKY
Chicago Sun-Times Service

TEHRAN — A colossal U.S. failure to gather accurate intelligence — coupled with gross misjudgments — has increased the danger that Iran may be lost to the West as a steady source of oil.

From the quiet element of Iranians who do not subscribe to the widely held view of the Central Intelligence Agency as the cause of all domestic evil, one hears grave criticism of the CIA's excessive reliance on its "brainchild" — the Savak security service.

"Instead of verifying Savak's assessment of the domestic political trends," a responsible Iranian charged, "the CIA tended to accept the Iranian secret service findings as accurate and well-based."

Otherwise, according to this line of reasoning, how could the CIA, and by extension the State Department and White House, have been caught so unaware of the burgeoning opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime?

The emergence of Islamic activists campaigning for a new regime under exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seems to prove this

critique. Their numbers alone are astounding and it is a puzzling fact that a large percentage of the student contingent consists of recent returnees from abroad.

Evidently, Iran's secret service and the CIA were unable to penetrate the widespread international anti-shah network built up in recent years.

Although an eventual reckoning surely will be made in responsible U.S. circles, this cannot take priority over the current effort to prevent a total collapse of the American position in Iran.

Future events depend on whether Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar will be able to rally enough civilian and military support to fend off the massive Khomeini fundamentalist Moslem movement.

Bakhtiar's immediate challenge is in the economic sphere. He is faced with crippling strikes in vital industries and services, including international telecommunications, rails, civil aviation, banks and mails.

The strikes are one of the most effective expressions of Khomeini's remote political control (from France). Their persistence is interpreted as proof of his authority over the nation's workers. "Only he can get the strikers back to work," a local observer said.

Bakhtiar has started to move cautiously on this crucial front. he has issued a warning that wages will no longer be paid to strikers as of Saturday, the start of the new Iranian calendar month.

If this threat is implemented, it could mean that much of the public's income might dry up.

Khomeini's position has been anything but conciliatory.

He is holding to his demand for the replacement of the regency council by a revolutionary Islamic council.

Khomeini's ultimate goal is to draft an Islamic constitution to replace the constitutional monarchy and to bring to an end the dynastic rule Iran has had for more than 2,500 years.

An Associated Press report from Marrakech, Morocco, said the shah decided to postpone indefinitely his planned visit to the United States because of President Carter's apparent support for Khomeini.

The shah and Empress Farah arrived in Morocco's winter capital yesterday to a low-key welcome from King Hassan II. Moroccan officials said at the time the shah intended to remain in Morocco for about three days and then fly directly to the United States.

Members of the shah's entourage said there has been a change of plan.

ernment officials believe that this relationship should be further explored by the FBI.

Another puzzling point is information obtained by investigators that Mr. Paisley had often sailed from the Brillig's mooring on Colonel Wilson's property in Solomons, Calvert county, to sparsely inhabited Hooper Island on the bay's Eastern Shore.

Some government officials think there could be considerable significance in this regular sailing pattern but would not elaborate on it further.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-24NEW YORK TIMES
26 JANUARY 1979**Topics****Unofficial Sources****Public Secrets**

The idea has gotten around that American unpreparedness for events in Iran was "an intelligence failure," and blame is being placed on those who have allegedly "tied the hands" of the C.I.A. That strikes us as silly. The ingredients of the Iranian uprising against the Shah were public; they hardly required smoking out by spooks.

Still and all, there was an intelligence failure — of a different sort. It was rooted in the blindness of thousands of Americans, official and unofficial, who have worked, lived and visited in Iran for years. And not only in Iran. We tend to be overly attracted by another country's elite; after all, we speak the same language — literally as well as figuratively. We do not go behind the curtain of diplomacy.

American intelligence in World War II was successful largely because it relied on great numbers of refugees who knew the enemy at first hand, down to the dating and mating habits of field commanders. Before the war, American diplomats, businessmen and visitors to Nazi Germany spoke little German and knew little of German history, psychology and ideology, and they saw and heard no evil. The failure in Iran was that our representatives dealt mainly with those in power and ignored the equivalent of Germany's refugees — those who are now taking power.

Iran — CIA let out of doghouse?

Washington

The House Intelligence subcommittee on evaluation has taken some of the heat off CIA director Stansfield Turner for what Carter administration officials and others have labeled the agency's failure to provide President Carter with adequate intelligence on Iran. In fact, the subcommittee concluded after reviewing intelligence reports and interviewing intelligence and State Department officials that the US intelligence community was not as guilty as others.

"Policymakers must assume responsibility, perhaps to a greater degree than the intelligence community, for the unwritten considerations which restricted both open and clandestine field collection on the Iranian internal situation," the subcommittee said.

The panel quoted one intelligence analyst as saying, "Until recently, you couldn't give away intelligence on Iran."

The panel noted that longstanding attitudes toward the Shah "inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetite for analysis of the Shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence."

"Policymakers were not asking whether the Shah's autocracy would survive indefinitely. Policy was premised on that assumption."

THE WASHINGTON POST

26 January 1979

Article appeared
on page A-14

Iran: Intelligence and Policy

THE REPORT on the performance of American intelligence in Iran, by the staff of a House Intelligence subcommittee, is as useful on one level as it is superficial on a second.

On the first it is an insider's study of what is assuredly an intelligence failure. There was not a full and timely warning of the crisis. Whether, if it had been alert, American intelligence might have picked up the signals is more evident to the writers of the report than to us. There is a certain arrogance in assuming that American agents and analysts should be able to know more about the most intimate social and political facts of a country than people in that country themselves. Nonetheless, the report contributes to the continuing inquiry into how to get good intelligence from the intelligence community. That the Iran intelligence failure occurred on President Carter's watch should add a certain urgency to the quest.

On the second level, however, the report is an outsider's comment on what is only allegedly a political failure. Warning against a "simplistic" blaming of the intelligence community, the report declares that "long-standing U.S. attitudes toward the shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policy-makers' appetite for analysis of the shah's position, and deafened policy-makers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence."

The authors based their report on interviews with "analysts and managers" at the intelligence agencies. What might they have found had they interviewed the "users" whose "attitudes" they indict? They might have developed a somewhat more sophisticated understanding of some of those attitudes. They might also have discovered a considerable and pained awareness of the trouble the United States was getting into by sticking close by an exceptionally helpful friend and ally during difficult times over a period of many years, and of the further trouble it would get into by seeming to abandon him in mid-ordeal. The House report indicates, with an indifference to the difficulties of the interventionist policy they commend, that with an early warning the United States might have gotten the shah to tuck the opposition into his government. It seems to us at least as likely that an early warning would only have sharpened the dilemma of what to do.

The country has still to square away its intelligence. The House report helps there. But the report also feeds what would surely be, if it got up speed, a misguided and distracting debate on "who lost Iran"—misguided in its premise that the United States rather than the shah "lost" Iran (if, in fact, it has been lost), distracting in its effect of drawing attention away from the question of what to do now.

Fumbling the Crisis?

Was the Carter Administration's Iran policy so mismanaged that the U.S. was unable to prevent the overthrow of an important ally? Or was the popular uprising against Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi so deeply rooted that Washington could never have blocked it? Or does the truth lie somewhere in between: did the U.S. exert what influence it could in Iran—only to find that it did too little, too hesitantly, too late?

Carter Administration strategists insist that their policy of supporting the Shah until the bitter end was the only practical course of action open to them. Despite America's considerable economic and military involvement in Iran, they say, Washington was never in a position to dictate orders to the Shah—or to undercut his opponents. They point out that post-Vietnam Congressional strictures have limited the power of the executive

Shah's precarious state, the critics charge that the U.S. advised the Shah to leave too late to give the moderate Bakhtiar regime any credit—or much chance of survival.

There seems little doubt that the U.S. underestimated the gathering storm in Iran from the beginning. Despite warnings from some lower-level U.S. officials that the Shah's support was eroding, the President himself proclaimed Iran "an island of stability" when he celebrated New Year's Eve of 1978 with the Shah. In August, months after the first riots had broken out, the CIA in a top-secret intelligence assessment advised the White House that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation." As late as September, Rep. Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said that the U.S. ambassador to Teheran, William Sullivan, "viewed the disturbances in Iran

and agreed to let Iran buy more than \$20 billion worth of the most sophisticated U.S. equipment, including 80 F-14 jet fighters. U.S. companies, among them General Motors, Kaiser Engineers, Inc., and Starrett Housing Corp., contracted with the Shah to provide more than \$12 billion worth of plants and hardware. The Shah's modernization program suited America's geopolitical and economic purposes, and the U.S. soon based its policy on one tenet—"give the Shah everything he wants," as one U.S. diplomat in Teheran put it.

Upheavals: As a result, top U.S. policymakers apparently failed to consider that the rush to modernization might cause the social upheavals that it did. American diplomats had few lines of communication to Iran's middle class, its intellectuals, students or its religious leaders. The embassy did not have a single specialist in Iranian religious affairs on its staff until last November, and the U.S. had virtually no contact with the Shah's foremost political opponents, Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini or National Front leader Karim Sanjabi.

The embassy's weaknesses severely handicapped Ambassador Sullivan, who took up his post in June 1977. An expert on Southeast Asian affairs, Sullivan had close contacts with the Shah, but little knowledge of Iran, as he himself admitted. He told a fellow diplomat: "I make no pretense of understanding these people. I find the Iranians a lot more inscrutable than Asians."

National-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski also may have made Sullivan's job more difficult. During the crisis, Brzezinski talked frequently by phone with the Shah's closest adviser, Ardashir Za-



The Shah with (from left) State's Alfred Atherton, Sullivan, Vance, Carter, Brzezinski in 1977

branch to act abroad and restrained the CIA's covert-action capability. And they maintain that the Shah's track record in weathering previous political challenges was a valid reason to believe he could survive one more assault. As Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders told a House subcommittee last week, "Very few people would have foreseen that the difficulties could have come about at the pace they have."

Misjudgment: But the Carter Administration's critics, including a former top CIA specialist on Iran, believe that the U.S. badly bobbled the crisis. They argue that the CIA and the State Department misjudged the depth and the velocity of the anti-Shah forces. The critics contend that Carter and his key aides sent a series of conflicting signals during the crisis—undermining the Shah, worrying U.S. allies in the Gulf and conveying a dangerous image of indecisiveness to the Soviets. Finally, even after Carter had grasped the

as a fairly minor matter. He did not convey to me any sense at all that the Shah's future was in jeopardy."

The reasons for the Administration's confidence in the Shah were not hard to find. For more than three decades, he had proved to be a steadfast ally on Russia's sensitive southern flank, allowing the U.S. to set up sensitive electronic monitoring stations on the border. Iran also provided much of Western Europe's oil and 60 per cent of Israel's—making it the only Islamic country even willing to sell the Israelis oil.

The Shah's importance—and the U.S. myopia toward him—grew in the wake of the Arab oil embargo. Bolstered by oil revenues that more than quadrupled in a year, the Shah grandly announced his plans to become the policeman of the Persian Gulf and to make Iran "the world's fifth big, industrial power" by the year 2000. Starting with the Nixon Administration, the U.S. embraced the Shah's plans

hedi, in Teheran. Brzezinski says he informed the State Department of the phone calls, but the back channel between the palace and the White House may have undercut the advice Sullivan gave the Shah.

Off-Target: Even with perceptive intelligence, it is doubtful that the U.S. could have kept the Shah in power, given the depth of the resentment and resistance to him. But the Administration's tactics appear to have been as off-target as its overall strategy. Part of the reason for this lapse was the fact that the Administration's top decision makers were preoccupied with other foreign policy problems—Carter and Vance with Camp David and Brzezinski with China. Brzezinski and Vance did not really focus on the Iranian crisis until early November, only two months before the Shah's ouster. Vance did not form a special interagency action group until late December, when he called Under Secretary of State David Newsom to

Washington from a holiday in California. The Administration's attempts to cope with the crisis also seemed to suffer from a lack of coordination. The aircraft carrier Constellation was ordered to steam from the Philippines to the South China Sea as a warning to the Soviets not to interfere; but the Administration—worried that the carrier might further inflame the mobs—never gave the follow-up orders to enter the Indian Ocean. The State Department publicly proclaimed that the Shah would outlast his opponents. A day later, when Carter was asked if that would be the case, he first criticized the Shah's human rights failings, and then said: "I don't know; I hope so." Brzezinski dispatched Gen. Robert Huyser, the deputy NATO commander, to Teheran to warn Iran's military leaders against a coup—but the Administration failed to inform Sullivan that Huyser was coming.

Split: Given that apparent confusion, some analysts suggested that a policy split had developed between Brzezinski and Vance. They maintained that Brzezinski's decisions were influenced by concerns about Soviet adventurism and his theory that an "arc of crisis" exists in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. Vance, who had cautioned against "accepting oversimplified generalities," was said to consider the crisis the result of purely indigenous dissatisfaction.

The critics contend that the two advisers' contradictory views over the cause of the disturbances crippled attempts to define American policy. But U.S. officials deny that was the case—and some say that the consensus of views added to the problem. "For better or for worse, there are no differences within the Administration on how to handle the Shah," said a senior State Department official. Then he added: "I think it has been for the worse."

Damage Control: For a variety of reasons, the U.S. found itself locked into a course of action over which it had seemingly little control. Washington stuck with the Shah long after Western European ambassadors in Teheran wrote him off. By the time the U.S. moved to endorse Bakhtiar, his government was already in danger of collapse. The U.S. finally failed to establish anything approaching a workable relationship with the man who probably will determine Iran's future, Ayatollah Khomeini. At best, it appears that the Administration was trying to do all it could to practice damage control in Iran. As it turned out, that was not enough.

—RICHARD STEELE with LOREN JENKINS in Teheran and LARS-ERIK NELSON in Washington

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CIA Will Survey Moslems Worldwide

By Jim Hoagland

Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House has ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to produce a worldwide study of Moslem religious movements in the wake of the Islamic revolt that helped drive the shah of Iran from his country this week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was told yesterday.

Administration officials disclosed at a closed-door committee hearing that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, ordered the study. These officials emphasized that the existence of the request was considered highly sensitive by the administration, because of the growing political impact of Moslem fundamentalism in many areas of the world.

The Carter administration is being charged in Congress and elsewhere with a major intelligence failure in discounting the strength and importance of the Iranian protest, which was spearheaded by Moslem religious leaders.

In other testimony at the hearing, the State Department's top Middle East expert, Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders, was reported by participants to have voiced what is believed to be the administration's first direct criticism of Saudi Arabia for not supporting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's effort to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

Under questioning from the committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), Saunders reportedly said that the administration was dissatisfied with an ambiguous attitude in the Saudi royal family toward Sadat and voiced hope that it would change.

After being told of the summary of Saunders' statement obtained by The Washington Post, Church said: "I would hope the administration is beginning to take the blinders off. We have tiptoed around Saudi Arabia long enough."

At the same time, the administration is pushing ahead with plans for a visit here next month by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, who led the Saudi delegation to the Baghdad Arab summit in November. The Egyptian media have portrayed Sadat as feeling "betrayed" by Fahd's performance at Baghdad.

State Department spokesman Tom Reston said yesterday that a standing invitation for a visit by Fahd exists

but no definite date has been set.

Members of the Senate committee echoed a concern raised Thursday in a House International Relations subcommittee. The potential loss of two Central Intelligence Agency listening stations in northern Iran that monitor Soviet ballistic missile tests, they said, could harm the administration's chances of Senate approval for a strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) with Moscow.

The head of the CIA's analysis division, Robert R. Bowie, confirmed at the House hearing that one of the stations has been dismantled, but said the other is still functioning, according to subcommittee members. Loss of both stations would "lower confidence" in U.S. intelligence on Soviet missile launches, Bowie said, but would not be a crucial loss since the information obtained by the stations was already being gathered by other means.

The Senate and House panels concentrated much of their questioning on the reported failure of the CIA and U.S. diplomats in Iran to make contact with members of the shah's political and religious opposition because of the monarch's sensitivities.

In testifying before the House subcommittee Wednesday, Saunders said that restrictions on contact with the Iranian opposition would have come from the U.S. ambassadors in Tehran and not from the State Department. He acknowledged, however, that there were relatively few contacts with religious elements in Iran.

Brzezinski is reportedly determined not to allow the political impact of Moslem fundamentalism in such potential crisis points as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and the Philippines to go unreported in the future. He has formally directed the intelligence community to produce an in-depth study of this phenomenon.

The leading symbol of opposition to the shah throughout the past year of protests has been the exiled religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He is now seen as representing the major threat to the government of Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar that the shah installed before leaving

Saunders and Undersecretary of State David Newsom made more explicit at yesterday's hearing than they have in public the administration's evident decision to try to shore up Bakhtiar's government but not to become so identified with it that Khomeini's followers will seek revenge against the United States if the ayatollah eventually wins the power struggle.

The administration's position "seemed realistic," Church said. "They seem prepared to roll with the punches and hope that our influence can contribute to the emergence of a government prepared to follow a reasonably moderate course in its relations with the West and its neighbors." Another source who heard the presentation said the administration has decided "to go with the flow of events."

Asked about the report of the White House ordering an intelligence study of Moslem fundamentalism, Church said that after "the intelligence failure" in Iran, "I have to wonder if we are competent to manage an intelligence gathering program on anything."

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the Iranian embassy in Washington said that Iran's new foreign minister, Ahmed Mir Fendereski, cabled the embassy yesterday with a denial of statements made in Tehran and here that Ambassador Ardeshtir Zahedi has resigned.

The telegram confirmed Zahedi in his post, according to the spokesman, who said that Zahedi had left Washington yesterday without telling his staff where he was going.

Zahedi has been in Texas and California for much of this week, visiting members of the shah's family and preparing for the Iranian monarch's expected arrival in California next week. The shah remained in Egypt yesterday.

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Iranian Babel

FRANCES FITZGERALD

The White House analysis of the Iranian crisis over the past few months may go down in history as one of the great failures of American intelligence—not in the technical but in the general sense of that word. So concentrated have Zbigniew Brzezinski and others been on their own policy of support for the Shah that they did not consider the possibility of an anti-Shah movement before it began and then, once it had started, failed to take it seriously enough. Even now their analysis has not apparently improved very much. Recently, when the Shah came to the American Embassy for advice about whether or not to go on "vacation" abroad, American officials reportedly told him they had no idea what he should do. "The decision on whether it would be better if he remained or left is a very complicated one," an official said. "Therefore we have decided to tell the Shah: when you're King of Kings, this is what you're paid to do, make your own decisions." Poor Shah! Poor King of Kings! The attempt of White House officials to lay the blame on C.I.A. intelligence in the technical sense only shows how deep their ignorance goes. For to suppose that the C.I.A. could have predicted the time and place of the first demonstrations and identified the masterminds behind the uprising is to misunderstand the whole nature of the anti-Shah revolt.

In the first place the uprising in Iran was almost entirely spontaneous. The Shiite religious leaders—the *mujtahids*—provided some tactical management, but they did not control the rebellion: they could not have, for in the cities at least it was so general as to leave almost no one on the side of the Shah. After some months of demonstrations the Shah was asked what his political base was and he replied, "Damned if I know." The revolt was not masterminded by the *mujtahids*, nor was it even really of their inspiration. The revolt was in fact much like the Buddhist uprising against Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963: a groundswell of resentment against a corrupt, incompetent and isolated dictatorship supported from abroad coalesced around the leaders of the majority religion. The Iranians, like the Vietnamese of the cities, looked to the religious leaders not merely for the negative reason that the dictatorship had silenced the political opposition. The *mujtahids* represented firm moral standards, tradition—or the attachment of the society to its own past—an ideal of brotherhood, and thus a means to cooperation, and finally the spirit of Iranian nationalism.

All these things were important in 1978 since what the city people had suffered under the Shah was not totalitarian order but anarchy and lack of control over their own lives as well as over the society. The tide of new money had broken up the traditional social order and cut its ties with the past; it had pushed the country people into the cities and left them to a frantic, lawless competition for survival. While the Shah, unable to manage his own society, had brought foreigners in to run the key sectors of the economy, the *mujtahids* had found and created a mass following. They were sensitive to public opinion in the way that the Shah was not because, financially and otherwise, they depended on the people for their survival.

What will happen next in Iran is not an easy question to answer, for beyond the current uncertainties about the Shah's vacation plans, the ranking officers have not declared themselves and the rebellion has yet to take on a solid political shape. The new Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, has promised elections and a constitutional monarchy in which the power rests with a national legislature. It would be ironic if the anti-Shah forces created what the American supporters of the Shah from President Carter to Senator Moynihan claimed to want for Iran and all third-world countries: democratic institutions. But there is some possibility they may succeed in doing that, whether it is with Mr. Bakhtiar or someone else. Iran, after all, has had a Constitution since 1904, and, previous to the 1953 coup that brought the Shah to power, it had mass-based political parties and a national legislature that governed the country.

Then, too, the country has been politically mobilized for many months now; the hundreds of thousands of strikers and demonstrators have shown a degree of discipline that would be remarkable in any "developed" country that had strong unions and political parties. The civilians who have brought one military Government to a standstill could do the same for another. Also the rebellion has not yet created or shed light on any serious social divisions between, say, rich and poor, city and country, or one region and another. The Shah's forced-march "modernization"—or urbanization—policy may have worked to grind down those class and regional differences that did exist. Finally, many Iranians have, through experience, come to understand a fact of practical politics that American policy makers never seemed to grasp: one-man rule is an unstable form of government even by the laws of probability.

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The difficulties Mr. Bakhtiar or any other civilian Prime Minister will face in trying to create a representative Government are, of course, formidable. In the foreground the obstacles are the generals currently in power, who under a civilian Government could never have the power, the array of military machinery or the license to steal that they had under the Shah. These gentlemen will not happily preside over their own disestablishment. Here the American Embassy could be of some use, for while its intelligence operatives may not know any religious dignitaries, they know the generals extremely well. They apparently brought the most trigger-happy of the generals to the United States. In the end they might bring them all. That would at least have the effect of repatriating a good many millions of dollars spent in bribes and kickbacks.

Another order of difficulty for Mr. Bakhtiar, or any civilian Prime Minister, lies in the incoherence of Iranian political life. For the past twenty-five, but particularly for the past fifteen, years there has been no political discourse in Iran except for the Alice-in-Wonderland rhetoric of the Shah and People's Revolution. Now that the censorship has been removed, the Iranians have found themselves with no common language to discuss the state of the nation. The language of the *mujtahids* has—demonstrably—a great deal of resonance in Iran; but it refers to a sphere of reality quite different from that of Eurodollar credits and communications satellites. Ayatollah Khomeini and others have made an effort to bring the two worlds together. But if Khomeini believes Bakhtiar is Satan, they have clearly not succeeded.

Twenty-five years ago the secular interests of the Moslem leaders and their urban faithful were represented by Mossadegh's National Front Party. A number of the National Front leaders have emerged during the current uprising, but they no longer have any organization or mass following. Their nationalism has not gone out of date, but they are men of a certain age who speak the old-fashioned language of the *bazagris*—the shopkeepers—and not that of the oil cartels. The children of these shopkeepers, on the other hand—and particularly the thousands upon thousands of them who have studied abroad—speak every conceivable international tongue from the language of the Harvard Business School to that of the Palestinian guerrillas. The middle class has become a Tower of Babel, and these children resent it. While they speak to the modern world, they feel a sense of guilt at their alienation from their own country. These days the women students in Teheran universities put chadors over their short skirts, unable for the moment to decide which one is real.

A civilian Government may in the end forge a common language, or allow the country to settle upon one, but it is a long process. There will thus be no "stability" of the sort favored by American companies for some time to come, unless the turmoil becomes so acute that it makes a military strong man promising order and social justice seem preferable to the majority. Not the politics of Iran but the structure of the economy will continue to tempt Iranian officers to make a coup, for while oil remains the revenue-producing industry and while the oil revenues flow straight into the national treasury, those guarding the treasury will always have a huge advantage over everyone else.

The United States cannot control events in Iran, but it can influence them, if only negatively. At the moment the most positive thing foreign policy makers might do is nothing: that is, stop backing and filling around the Shah and the "formula" of a constitutional monarchy and come out for an Iranian Government chosen by the Iranian people. If they did this, they would not only be breaking the long tradition of hypocrisy vis-a-vis American dependencies in the third world but they would be serving the national interests of the United States. Iran needs the United States and the rest of the industrialized West to buy its oil, to provide development technology and to insure its long border with the Soviet Union, and only a regime that believes it has come to power in spite of the United States could possibly think otherwise. □

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Failure of Intelligence

NORMAN BIRNBAUM

The failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to predict the upheaval in Iran prompted the President to send handwritten notes of complaint to national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and Secretary of State Vance. The agencies headed by each proceeded to demonstrate that, however limited their view of the world, they were unerring analysts of one another's mistakes. The C.I.A.'s explanation for reporting that all was for the best in the Shah's best of all possible worlds was that it had been ordered by the White House and the State Department to talk only to the Savak. The State Department grumbled that the White House had rejected its warnings about growing political unrest in Iran. Dr. Brzezinski, apparently recalling that December is term-paper time, gave the State Department's research failing marks. Then, to close the circle, the President himself was held by *The New York Times* to be not entirely blameless on the ground that he had seen in Iran only what he wanted to see.

The President, at least, should console himself; the failure of our national security apparatus to provide Presidents with adequate intelligence is hardly new. I recollect a chat in John Kennedy's White House with a distinguished member of that Administration. It was in July of 1961, and he produced that day's *Washington Post*, with a headlined report by the late Isaac Deutscher on an alleged conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Was Deutscher, he asked, to be taken seriously? Deutscher, I replied, was a Marxist working alone in Hampstead, London, and occasionally talking to East Europeans. You, I continued, have the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State Department, electronic eavesdropping and much, much more. Precisely, was the reply, that is why I need Deutscher.

The "intelligence" failure in Iran is, of course, a failure of policy. A decision having been made to back the Shah, the very attempt to establish alternative sources of information became an implicit disavowal of him. In a world in which appearances ("signals" is the customary word, with its original denotation of a very primitive mode of communication) are everything, ignoring questions of substance is not an oversight: it is an imperative. Dr. Brzezinski is said to have argued that the question of human rights was

important, but secondary to the necessity of maintaining a friendly Iranian Government in a very strategic country. He did so despite the growing evidence that his adherence to a supposedly pragmatic position required a very large leap of faith. The purchase of friendship from an Iranian Government opposed by the nation assured the primacy of the issue of human rights in Iran. With friends like the Shah, his generals and policemen, we clearly do not need enemies.

Familiar themes, which hardly bear repeating—but for a terrible suspicion. Suppose our elites actually take the anti-world of appearances, messages, signals, and international gamesmanship for the real one? Elites, after all, suffer alternately from two severe disorders. One is their conviction of omnipotence. The other is their panicked sense of helplessness. Bureaucrats long for a predictable world in which even (or above all) enemies stick to their (the bureaucrats') scripts. The world's stubborn refusal to conform to position papers is a constant disappointment—and, worse, a source of endless anxiety. Fantasies of total order ward off fears of complete catastrophe but, since order inevitably breaks down, also generate them. Bureaucratic inventiveness is, however, limitless—when the problem is staying on top. The doctrine of "crisis management" was invented to circumvent these difficulties. It offers surcease from the dreadful cycle to which reality condemns those who would rule. It obviates the necessity for that vision of history, or knowledge of history, which contemporary elites so conspicuously lack. The doctrine is fraudulent. Like the legendary generals fighting the last war, most elites manage new crises with techniques learned in old ones. Most crises, in any event, will not respond to technique alone.

It is unfair to depict our elites as entirely devoid of thought. They possess a philosophy of history, in the form of the doctrine of "modernization," most recently applied to Iran. The Shah, we are assured, was "modernizing" Iran. The notion of "modernization" was developed by academic social scientists anxious to explain and justify our postwar empire. The world was bound to become like the United States, if not more so. Nations once backward would attain that secular utopia, a society of consumer-citizens. Indeed, in truly modern nations citizens would consume more, and think less. Politics would be the reserved domain of technocratic elites, subject to occasional approbation by grateful publics—whose maturity could be measured by the intensity of their gratitude.

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It is most "unmodern" of so many West Europeans, for instance, to take ideas of socialism seriously. As for those Iranians who still are Islamic, they are clearly in the way of universal progress. The apologists for "modernization" are indeed haunted by the specter of populations who refuse those sequences of development designed for them by American professors. The professors' fear of the destabilization of the world is, of course, an expression of their incapacity to understand it. Indeed, their dread of loss of control is so pervasive that some now see parliaments and a free press as possible obstacles to effective modern government. (The experts who told the Trilateral Commission that an excess of democracy was dangerous were certified exponents of "modernization.") Little wonder that our Government's apologies for the Shah convey intellectual impoverishment and unreal abstraction. Terrible waste, wholesale thievery and systematic butchery are difficult to portray as historically progressive—even with Stalinist precedents for this abuse of language.

Our rulers are young and provincial. The Soviet leadership is quite different. It is old and provincial. It, too, is disturbed by a world which does not exemplify the stupefying deformation of Marxism that passes for official Soviet thought. Soviet society itself resists the ineluctable "laws" promulgated by successive generations of stone-bottomed hacks at the Academy of Sciences. The Soviet rulers are as frightened of disorder in Iran as are our own. Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to Soviet Asia. To ordinary perception, the Shah is a corrupt megalomaniac. To the Soviet crisis managers, he is for the time being a representative of a "national bourgeoisie." The bourgeoisie, the Soviets know, only wish to buy and sell. It follows that they too can do business with them.

Doing business, of course, is what they all want—West and East. The crisis managers, in the last analysis, are managers. Dreams of omnipotence and impotence trouble the world's elites by night. By day, the seemingly rational forces of the market take over—and calculation replaces ideological frenzy. Reason seems to dictate no less. In a world in which economics and politics are inextricable, the languages of the market and of the state increasingly resemble one another. We have "invested" in the Shah and not in the opposition. The Soviets consider that their "costs" would be increased should the Shah disappear. The image of the world as a market is a response to the failure of notions of total control. The world is too vast, too polycentric, to be ruled from one capital—or two. The Emperor in Franz Kafka's story, "The Great Wall of China," was forever dispatching orders to the limits of his empire—which arrived only after he had expired. Our contemporary emperors think that they know how to avoid his fate. By treating the world as a market, they do business to stay in business. Is "intelligence" then, another form of market research?

Matters would be simpler if it were. Market researchers, however, do not blame the customers when goods fail to sell. Perhaps some "intelligence," (for example, the "disinformation" sometimes purveyed by the C.I.A.) resembles the manipulative kinds of market research. The hidden persuaders in advertising, however, aren't very hidden. A more accurate analogy might liken political intelligence to research and development in industry. Industrial scientists and technologists have no say about what should be produced. Larger issues of economic and social policy are not within their competence. They are free, however, to pursue their researches—and their employers are free to decide how to use their work.

Perhaps I can cite an authority in the matter. Addressing the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.) in June, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner likened his agency to an institution of learning. Both of us, he told the professors, are processing information. But information processing in the national interest is an idea whose time has come—and gone. Conflicting views of the national interest clearly generate very different kinds of "information."

Admiral Turner himself has not been faithful to his epistemological precepts. He has acknowledged rewriting his agency's reports to meet the requirements of policy. Information processing, in other words, does not precede policy. Policy legitimates information—even brings it into being. The essential element in Admiral Turner's thought lies elsewhere. He told the A.A.U.P. that we were, after all, virtually at war. Pedantic concern for the niceties of open academic discourse had to give way in the circumstances, he said, to the sterner demands of historical emergency. Admiral Turner's totally technical notion of intelligence is at bottom totally political. The two are bound to each other like partners in a sadomasochistic liaison.

"Intelligence," then, fails because it rests on erroneous ideas of the relationship of thought to power. Power invariably invades the sphere of thought. It does so the more insidiously and effectively when thought claims to be beyond power. The systematic blindness of our "intelligence" results from its implicit subservience to our policy. George Kennan wrote that our Foreign Service was more effective when it was much smaller and far more homogeneous. The 800 officers who constituted it had a clear conception of the world. In an epoch before our nation had a grand design for everybody and everything, the Foreign Service could actually acknowledge that other nations and peoples had their own lives. Despite our limitless production of review memorandums, commission reports, books, monographs and papers—inside and outside the foreign policy apparatus—we seem forever overtaken by events.

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Consider the recent past. The Poznan rising in 1953, the revolution in the German Democratic Republic later in that year, the Polish October of 1956 and the Hungarian Revolution which followed it were not predicted. Our intelligence failed to anticipate de-Stalinization. To this day, the C.I.A. has the effrontery to boast of its success in obtaining a copy of Khrushchev's famous speech, when it should be apologizing for its failure to have foreseen that it was coming. The C.I.A., like Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles (and hundreds of supposedly detached scholars), cultivated images of the state socialist regimes so one-dimensional, so monolithic, that conflict and change within them seemed impossible. Despite the Yugoslav precedent, the Sino-Soviet conflict came as a huge surprise.

Our capacity to understand and deal with Western Europe has been greater, but still rather limited. The beginnings of the Italian version of Eurocommunism, in Togliatti's doctrine of polycentrism, went unremarked by our elites. The incorporation of the Italian Socialist Party in the Government was imposed by the White House on a resistant foreign policy apparatus, which viewed the Socialists as dangerous. West German negotiations with the Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, initiated in 1969 by the Social Democrats and Free Democrats, had been long in preparation—by the parties in question and in the German national political tradition. Kissinger, of course, had some empathy with matters German, but many sectors of the national security apparatus are still surprised—a decade later. We depicted de Gaulle as an idiosyncratic old man, virtually a crank, for most of his reign—and failed to see the European significance of Gaullism. That France, despite the events of 1968, might actually go to the left is not a real possibility to be prepared for but a nightmare for which we allow Giscard to administer soporifics. We persist in a half-patronizing, half-resentful attitude toward the West Europeans, about whom, if truth be told, many in our foreign policy apparatus know little and (protestations of Atlantic solidarity to the contrary) care less.

The list could be extended. In the Bay of Pigs invasion the C.I.A. sent its Cuban Brigade to an area where the peasants were particularly attached to the regime, and the expected uprising in the cities failed utterly to materialize. The Portuguese Revolution, South Vietnam's collapse, the success of the Parti Quebecois, Begin's electoral triumph, Mrs. Gandhi's defeat, black resistance in the Union of South Africa, the persistent strength of dissent in the Soviet Union, have nothing in common—except that they surprised American political intelligence. Occasionally, junior officers in the C.I.A. and the State Department are acute analysts and observers. When their reports prove disturbing, however, they rarely find their way

to the top. The intelligence functions of government cannot be isolated, then, from the conduct of foreign policy in its entirety. The assumptions of our policy determine the selective interpretation (and sometimes the simple manufacture) of evidence. We may recall Admiral Turner's efforts in June to convince a skeptical Congress that he had evidence of Cuban involvement in the Shaba episode in Zaire.

A particularly absurd criticism of our world role holds the C.I.A. responsible for every cruelty and disaster occurring anywhere. The world is quite capable of going to hell without the C.I.A.'s help. The C.I.A.'s critics, however, have simply taken our intelligence officers at their word. The latter believe that nothing can happen without their knowledge (and, ideally, consent). A possibility unacknowledged by the C.I.A. cannot exist—and if it does, it presumably has no right to exist. The regimes we maintain seem, somehow, more real than the forces opposing them—unless, of course, the latter have to be depicted in monstrous terms, the better to frighten us.

Demonological accounts of world politics depict our foreign policy apparatus as engaged in the ruthless manipulation of events. (Those who deplore our alleged weakness, and see the hand of the Soviet Union everywhere, think similarly—and no doubt would wish us to manipulate events if we could.) We should be cautious, however, about attributing too much foresight to those at the top of the apparatus. They hardly control it, for one thing. For another, the severest criticism we can make of them is that they actually believe in the world picture they promulgate. The paradox is that our nation surely does not lack resources of intelligence in the ordinary sense of the word. Our culture and our science, after all, are flourishing. Why should a problem of political technique, dealt with reasonably well by other nations, prove so difficult?

One answer is that we suffer from the weakness of our principled opposition. In no Western nation is a rift in political consensus more anxiously feared, and less threatened. It is quite true that since Vietnam, a sporadic debate about foreign policy has been taking place, but those who systematically criticized the assumptions that led to Vietnam have not made their way into the foreign policy apparatus. Our elite is divided between those who think previous politics entirely correct and those who think them mainly correct.

CONTINUED

The Vietnam War was the result of the obsessions of the decade 1950-60. Kissinger was lucid enough to rationalize these to discard surplus ideology, to think in terms of pure power. The members of the Trilateral Commission were shocked by so much frankness—and thought it bad for multinational business. In any event, they did not think our society capable of bearing Kissinger's burdens, and proposed that these be shared. In principle far more aware of complexity than the theorists of American empire, the Trilateralists in practice revert to rigidity when confronted with loss. How else explain their unseemly retreat from the human rights policy, when it became clear that Iranians and Nicaraguans were taking it literally? In any event, the range of public debate about our foreign policy is so narrow that it encourages those in power to constrict their thought and vision.

Does the limited experience of our elite also endow it with tunnel vision in matters of political intelligence? Blacks, Catholics, Hispanics, Jews and women have now made their way into the foreign policy agencies—as white Anglo-Saxons without Ivy degrees did before them—but the apparatus still sets the terms of discussion. Those who join it no longer think of themselves as beholden to outside groups, and most of these groups lack coherent foreign policy ideas anyhow. The new recruits are assimilated into an American elite that is remote from many of the problems of our own society—and that views other societies through lenses doubly clouded.

There are, no doubt, organizational changes in intelligence that should be made. The C.I.A. should be abolished, for a start, and its functions distributed among other agencies. The original rationale for a separate intelligence agency was that it would be independent of the bureaucratic interests of the other departments. The agency promptly developed its own interests, and much of its activity now is aimed at self-aggrandizement. Political intelligence should be the responsibility of the State Department. We might even, one day, hold ambassadors responsible for accurate reporting about the countries in which they serve.

Organizational change, however, has limits. Bureaucracy—hierarchy in general—have been conspicuously unsuccessful in developing the sort of open discussion that is an indispensable component of the search for knowledge. (The Soviet Union has the equivalent of a brigade of specialists on the United States at the Academy of Sciences. When some Soviet leaders received a group of American Senators recently, they put on a cretinous display of ignorance by rebuking the Democratic Party for its failure to impose a uniform foreign policy upon the Congress.) In its present forms, "intelligence" is bound to be unintelligent. Intelligence—discriminating historical judgment, a large vision, sympathy for the world's peoples, a sense of our own nation's moral responsibilities—would be better. That, however, waits upon a very different politics. □

Norman Birnbaum is professor of sociology at Amherst College.

THE WASHINGTON POST

23 January 1979

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DUNAGIN'S PEOPLE / by Ralph Dunagin



*"There's a rumor that news of the
trouble in Iran has leaked out
to the CIA."*

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS

14 January 1979

A Giant Problem

RICHARD NIXON, trying to rally support for his Vietnam policies, once admonished against this nation's ever giving the impression that it was "a pitiful, helpless giant." It is easier, some years later, to see what he meant.

With respect to at least two current international traumas, the U.S. image has in truth been one of helplessness, whether of pitifulness or not. Neither in Iran nor in Cambodia has the United States had any leverage to exert. It has been reduced to hand-wringing, hardly an edifying exercise for one of the globe's two superpowers.

In Cambodia, the problem is twofold. It is not just that there was little we could do about Vietnam's successful invasion of its communist neighbor. We actually got on the wrong side — that of Cambodia and its genocidal rulers — by publicly protesting the invasion, although it was Cambodia that commenced hostilities in the first place.

In Iran, we announced early on (and correctly, in *The News*' view) our support for the embattled shah. But as it developed, our support meant nothing. The CIA had lost touch with the opposition and, as it now appears, had failed to apprise Washington of how really desperate was the shah's plight. Adjustments that might have been made in our policy years back went unmade.

So now the United States has been obliged to backpedal, making known that it thinks its old friend the shah — so Jimmy Carter has often enough denominated him — should clear out for a while. It is a prudent policy, perhaps, given our dependence on the good will and the oil of the new Bakhtiar

government. But how it makes us look in the world's eyes is only to be imagined.

Some of this is the Carter administration's fault, but not all. The administration's lack of a coherent foreign policy, its inability to articulate clear international aims — such things have hurt. But in fact a sense of purposelessness has afflicted our foreign policy for the past decade. We cannot seem to make up our minds what our interests abroad are. The old Dulles-Eisenhower policy of opposition to communist expansion had its drawbacks, but at least it was coherent. It provided the rationale for the beefing up of our defenses and the extension of U. S. influence throughout the globe. But detente and "the China card" have canceled out anti-communism as the basis of our policy.

We still feel vaguely that there are causes we should be promoting around the world — such as human rights — but with Realpolitik out the window we have cut back our armed forces, mangled the CIA and withdrawn from many of our advanced outposts. We lack not just the motivation but the means to make as big an impact as we formerly made in foreign affairs.

And as if all this were not damaging enough, we have begun to make a name for ourselves when it comes to sabotaging allies. First Cambodia, then Vietnam. (Is it any wonder we lack leverage in Southeast Asia?) Most recently the Republic of China on Taiwan.

A pitiful, helpless giant? More confused than helpless; in our view. But the time has come for clearing up the confusion. Just what is it after all that we stand for? And what are we going to do about it?

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Joseph C. Harsch

What went wrong?

The sudden collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran is a misfortune for the United States. The departed Shah was a loyal friend of the United States. He was the keeper of the peace and protector of the oil routes in the Gulf. He was a presumed rock of stability in the shifting sands of Middle East politics. Washington gropes for a substitute. None is immediately or conveniently at hand. Much improvising will have to be done.

When things like this happen questions are in order. What went wrong? Should someone have seen it coming and taken evasive or corrective action in time? Are there any lessons to be learned?

It seems perfectly clear that not enough people in high enough places in Washington saw it coming in time. On New Year's Day a year ago President Carter was praising the Shah and calling him "an island of stability." Eight days later, on Jan. 9, the Shah's soldiers were firing on demonstrators in the streets of Qom, an Islamic "Holy City." That in turn touched off other demonstrations in every other important city in the country. There have been repeated troubles in Iran ever since.

As late as August, after hundreds, some say thousands, had been killed in street rioting, the American government was still operating on the assumption that "the Shah, who firmly holds the reins of power, will preside over a peaceful and prosperous Iran for the next ten or 15 years."

By September outside experts on Iran were saying that the Shah's days in power were numbered, that he probably could not last out the year. In September the optimism which prevailed officially through August was finally discarded. The memorandum quoted above was "withdrawn." The office of the national security adviser at the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency were blaming each other. On Nov. 11, the President sent a joint notice to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser, saying, bluntly: "I am dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The three were told to correct the condition.

It seems to be a fair conclusion from the publicly known facts that wishful thinking kept the President from knowing in time to act correctly just what was going on in Iran. CIA apologists say they were forbidden by the Brzezinski office to raise any doubts about the Shah's tenure. Brzezinski office defenders say the CIA was slow in its appraisals. Outsiders cannot be sure where the greater blame lies.

The impersonal fact is that as late as August the government in Washington was operating on the assumption that the Shah would weather the storm in Iran, whereas several outside experts had gone to Iran, seen for themselves, and concluded that the Shah was politically finished and would have to go.

Supposing more people in Washington had been more perceptive, sooner, what could have been done? By August of last year probably not much. As late as that anything done to disassociate the United States from the Shah could have hastened his downfall. The United States was so deeply committed to the Shah, and so closely associated with him, that American prestige in Iran could no longer be separated from him.

The lesson would seem to be that it is risky, indeed dangerous, for a great power such as the United States, to base its policies in a country such as Iran on a single person. As a matter of policy, Washington had avoided contact with the political opposition. Its people in Iran itself did not know the leaders of the opposition, hence had no way of measuring the degree of dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime or the political prospects of the dissidents.

A second lesson would seem to be that it is risky, indeed dangerous, for a great power to rely so heavily on another country to look after American interests in a part of the world where those interests are of first importance.

American interests in the Middle East are of first importance to the welfare of the United States and its people. Unless or until Americans find a substitute for Middle East oil the American economy, and a very large number of American jobs, will be dependent on the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf. Isn't this an interest too important to be left in the hands of anyone else? Who can look after such important American interests as well as Americans themselves?

When the British pulled their Navy out of the Gulf in 1969 the United States could perfectly well have put an American squadron in its place and based it there permanently. This was not done partly, one presumes, because it was cheaper and easier to let the Iranians do it with their rapidly expanding naval force which had been provided by Washington and was trained by Americans. Why not let the Iranians be the policemen of the Gulf?

We know the answer now. No one can be counted on to do your own work except you, yourself. If Washington wants its oil supply line protected it had best protect it with American ships and American crews.

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH

12 January 1979

NEWS FOCUS**Prelude to a Showdown
For Control of the Gulf**

By Cord Meyer

WASHINGTON — There are disturbing signs in the Iranian oil fields that the revolution has already spun beyond the control of its Moslem instigators.

Communist influence among the Iranian oil workers seems to be much greater than originally suspected. When the exiled religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, dispatched a delegation to the oil fields to persuade the workers to resume production for domestic needs, he drew a flatly negative response. The assumption now is that "Khomeini's writ does not run in the oil fields" because the radical left has taken over.

Carter's Iranian experts are convinced that no single event has done more to destabilize the shah's regime than the highly professional assassination in late December of Paul Grimm, the American general manager of the oil company consortium that produces Iran's oil.

Foreign technicians had earlier tended to ignore threats to their safety, but Grimm's dramatic shooting provoked a mass flight and now none of this talent remains behind. Oil production, which has been gradually rising, fell abruptly, putting decisive pressure on the shah's tottering regime.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS do not believe the assassination team came from the local area. The cool competence of this astutely timed political murder bore the mark of one of the two Iranian terrorist groups, either the Marxist "People's Sacrifice Guerrillas" or the extreme Islamic "People's Strugglers." Both groups have received arms and training from the Palestinian terrorists, which draw support in turn from the East Germans and the communist regime in South Yemen.

The KGB is not accused, within the government, of having directly masterminded the Grimm assassination, but it is clear that without communist support the Palestinian guerrillas could not have equipped the local terrorists to be as formidable as they are.

Carter officials see no idle boast in the recent claim of an exiled communist that "our organizations inside Iran itself are growing fast." The underground communist organization in Iran, the Tudeh Party, has led an illegal existence for years inside the country, but its exile leadership has been funded by Moscow and maintains its headquarters in East Berlin. In international communist meetings, it has

demonstrated its consistent loyalty to the Kremlin. There is a disturbing lack of intelligence on the size of its secret membership and the extent of covert Russian support.

Further evidence of indirect Soviet intervention is found in reports from Western European intelligence agencies that the French and Italian Communist parties have channeled substantial funds into Khomeini's Paris headquarters. There is a strong presumption that the Kremlin knew about and approved this covert funding as a way of getting the revolutionary bandwagon rolling.

THE MOST TELLING PROOF of direct Soviet intervention is a clandestine radio station which calls itself "The National Voice of Iran" but is transmitting from Baku, well inside Russia. Plainly controlled by the Soviets, it purports to be the true voice of the Iranian people and pretends to be broadcasting from inside Iran, referring to Russia as "our friendly northern neighbor."

Broadcasting at the peak evening-listening hour in Persian and Azerbaijani, this radio has been monitored by American officials, and the translations make grim reading. On December 5, just before the massive religious demonstrations, this Soviet-controlled voice advised Iranian soldiers and officers not "to protect this foul, traitorous, corrupt U.S. puppet regime" and called on the troops to mutiny against the "black generals."

On December 30, the broadcasts accused the United States of intervening to protect the oil cartels and thundered, "The primary motto of our people at this stage of their revolutionary struggle is: Down with the shah's regime and out with the Americans."

The interception of these broadcasts gives Brezhnev's public protestations of non-involvement a hollow ring of hypocrisy. Privately, the Soviets make no secret of their eagerness to see the shah replaced by a government that will be far more cordial to them.

The rebuff of Khomeini's agents, like the slaughter of Paul Grimm, points to a future in which Western access to Iran's oil will be hotly contested by local communists. And the jousting for influence in Iran after the shah leaves is apt to become the prelude to a showdown struggle for control of the Persian Gulf.

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22 January 1979

Article appeared
on page 23

Iranian Intelligence

Washington—President Jimmy Carter, asked if there is danger of the U.S. losing its intelligence stations that monitor Soviet missile activity from northern Iran, replied: "There's obviously, in any country where we have intelligence sources, a danger for those sources to be modified or lost. We had this occur, as you know, a few years ago in Turkey, when we had an embargo against the sale of military weapons to Turkey. And this has happened from time to time.

"We have constantly been able and determined," he added, "to provide increasing capability for surveillance which would allow us to compensate for those changes that are inevitable in any changing society. So I can assure the public and the Congress, that no matter what happens to specific intelligence sources in Iran, we can adequately compensate for their change and provide adequate verification for compliance by the Soviet Union with SALT agreements."

Carter aides, intelligence agencies faulted for not foreseeing shah's fall

Washington (AP)—Presidential advisers and intelligence agencies were to blame for failing to foresee that the Shah of Iran would be forced from power, a House subcommittee said yesterday.

The House intelligence subcommittee issued a report saying that longstanding United States support for the shah dampened the appetite of administration policymakers for analyzing the shah's position and deafened them to the dangers suggested by intelligence reports.

U.S. policy supporting the shah prohibited intelligence contact with dissidents and other Iranians who might have supplied information making it clear that the shah could not retain control of his country, the subcommittee said.

The report said the U.S. policy toward the

shah was unwritten. The panel did not give the names of those it considered to be at fault.

As a result of this policy toward the shah, the subcommittee concluded, intelligence collection was weak and U.S. analysts would have had to challenge high-level policymakers to suggest that the shah might fall.

The report added: "Those who challenge conventional wisdom have little to look forward to in their intelligence careers."

The subcommittee said: "The attention of top policymakers was not brought forcefully to bear on Iran until October, 1978," but by then

U.S. policy options which might have existed earlier—such as encouraging the shah to bring opposition elements into his government—no longer held promise."

The subcommittee said it found no evidence of deliberate manipulation of intelligence to support a position taken by President Carter, although senior intelligence officials resisted addressing the possibility of the shah's being ousted. The panel said that raised the suspicion that the officials resisted because a pro-shah policy was being developed.

"However, after careful review, the staff finds no evidence of such deliberate manipulation," the report said.

The subcommittee also said it found that an effort by all intelligence agencies to draft a single assessment of Iran dragged on nearly a year and "bogged down" in disputes between the agencies.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-15**

House Panel Blames Intelligence Agencies and Policy Makers Over Iran

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — A House committee said today that both the American intelligence community and Carter Administration policy makers had to share blame for the failure to perceive the depth of the crisis in Iran and to forecast that it could lead to Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi's departure.

In a detailed report on the Government's handling of the Iranian situation, the committee staff said there was clearly "a warning failure" in that top policy makers' attention was not drawn forcefully to Iran until last October, when it had become nearly impossible for the United States to do anything about the deteriorating situation.

The 11-page report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence said that "weaknesses in the intelligence community's performance in this case are serious." But it said that to blame the intelligence community alone

was "simplistic" because "such charges blind us to the importance of user attitudes in any warning process."

"In the case of Iran, longstanding United States attitudes toward the Shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policy makers' appetite for analysis of the Shah's position and deafened policy makers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence," the report said.

Fear of Political Repercussions

Ever since the Shah's inability to retain power became evident, there has been concern in the Carter Administration that if events in Iran adversely affected the United States, the Administration might be accused of having "lost Iran."

The report was sharply critical of the Administration's performance and found little positive to say about the intelligence agencies. It noted that the Pentagon's intelligence arm was predicting as late as last Sept. 28 that the Shah would remain in power for 10 more years.

Although Administration officials have

been questioned by Congressional committees about the intelligence failures, there has been no apparent drive to turn the Iranian situation into a major political issue.

A basic problem, the report said, was the dual function of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the one hand, it said, "the C.I.A. had historically considered itself the Shah's booster." But "on the other hand, it was supposed to provide sound intelligence analysis of the Iranian political situation," the report said.

Policy Makers Blamed

Without mentioning individuals, the report said that the policy makers' attitudes had probably been more critical than the weaknesses of the intelligence.

As the American policy in the Persian Gulf "became more dependent on the Shah," the report said, "risk of offending the Shah by speaking with the opposition became less acceptable."

It said that the C.I.A. produced no reporting based on sources in the opposition for two years ending in November 1977 and produced none in the first quarter of 1978.

"And embassy political reporting based on contacts with the opposition was rare and sometimes contemptuous," it said.

'Narrow and Cloudy Window'

"In sum, intelligence field reporting from Iran provided a narrow and cloudy window through which to observe the sweeping social and political changes under way" since late 1977, the report said.

It said that a senior C.I.A. analyst in Washington had appealed last August for more sophisticated reporting from the field, complaining that more was known of key Iranians' views on the monarchy 15 to 20 years ago than today. "Neither the C.I.A. nor the embassy political section was very responsive to these requests," it said.

"The critical weakness in intelligence collection on Iran has been the lack of widespread contact with Iranians of various persuasions," the report said.

Carter aides get blame for Iran shocker

By BRUCE DRAKE

Washington (News Bureau)—The United States was caught flatfooted by the rapid turn of events in Iran because senior policy-makers in the Carter administration compounded weaknesses in intelligence-gathering with an unwillingness to hear bad news about the shah, a House subcommittee said yesterday.

In an 11-page report, the evaluation unit of the House Select Committee on Intelligence labeled as "simplistic" frequent charges that U.S. misreading of the Iran situation should be laid only to "intelligence failure." President Carter himself has expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of U.S. political intelligence.

"Clearly," the report said, "there was a warning failure in that the attention of top policy-makers was not brought forcefully to bear on Iran until October 1978. By then the degree of dissidence there had made orderly transition away from the shah's autocratic rule nearly impossible."

They turned a deaf ear

But while finding "weaknesses" in the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies, the subcommittee staff concluded that policy-makers' confidence in the shah, which intelligence did not challenge, in turn, skewed intelligence.

"In the case of Iran, long-standing U. S. attitudes toward the shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policy-makers' appetite for analysis of the shah's position and deafened policy-makers to the warning implicit in current intelligence."

The subcommittee issued yesterday's report after staff members interviewed officials at the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and Intelligence analysts at the Defense Department and National Security Agency.

Article appeared
on page A-1,20

25 January 1979

Will Report on Iran Faults Carter, Top Aides

Reactions to Shah's Crisis Called a Broad Failure

By Jim Hoagland

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter and his top foreign policy advisers must share responsibility with the Central Intelligence Agency and others for the U.S. failure to assess accurately the rising political challenge that drove Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from Iran this month, a congressional investigating panel charged yesterday.

"U.S. policy options which might have existed earlier no longer held promise" by the late autumn, when top policymakers for the first time began to realize the shah would not survive.

The upheaval, the House subcommittee on evaluation of intelligence asserted in an 11-page staff report issued yesterday.

The report portrays the administration's reactions to Iran as a broad failure involving the entire policymaking system. Previous comment, including a secret memorandum from Carter to his advisers, had focused on an isolated intelligence failure being at the root of the sluggish U.S. reactions to the apparent downfall of a highly valued strategic ally.

In other developments yesterday:

- Iran's ambassador to Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi, said the shah does not plan to come to the United States now, but will stay in the Middle East.
- The State Department said that the United States is arranging the shipment of 200,000 barrels of gasoline and diesel fuel to Iran to keep military and government vehicles running. Until strikes shut down Iranian oil fields last month, Iran was the world's second largest crude oil exporter.

- The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research spotted the strength and depth of the opposition before the CIA, but evidently did not press strongly enough to get that view to higher policy levels. As a whole, "intelligence community production on Iran can be judged no better than fair."

- Even if the reporting had been better, it may well have had no impact on a president already under pressure to make a policy decision to express firm support for the shah.

The shipment of 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel and 50,000 barrels of gasoline in an undisclosed Persian Gulf port later this week will be financed by U.S. military sales credits.

In issuing the subcommittee report yesterday, Rep. Charles Rose (D-N.C.) disclosed that his staff investigators at one point suspected that criticism of the shah had been deliberately suppressed "by intelligence officials who did not want to be bearers of bad news."

The subcommittee turned up no evidence "of such deliberate manipulation," Rose said, but the report asserts that "U.S. policy toward the shah prevented direct contact with opposition elements" inside Iran.

"Long-standing U.S. attitudes toward the shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetite for analysis of the shah's position and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in current intelligence," the report says.

While not naming President Carter, his national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and other policymakers, the report's stress on the failure of "users" of intelligence to ask the right questions and to pay attention to events in Iran at critical points is clearly intended for them.

Based on a month-long review of classified documents and interviews with CIA, State Department, Pentagon and other agencies, the report concludes:

- The CIA for two years produced no intelligence based on sources within the religious opposition that led the revolt against the shah. U.S. embassy political reporting from contacts within the opposition "was rare and sometimes contemptuous."

- The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research spotted the strength and depth of the opposition before the CIA, but evidently did not press strongly enough to get that view to higher policy levels. As a whole, "intelligence community production on Iran can be judged no better than fair."

- Even if the reporting had been better, it may well have had no impact on a president already under pressure to make a policy decision to express firm support for the shah.

The intelligence agencies and the embassy evidently restricted their contacts with political opponents in Iran because they feared displeasing the shah and losing his agreement for what are termed higher priority intelligence tasks, according to the report. The CIA's main target from its operations in Iran is reported to have been the Soviet Union.

Intelligence field reporting from Iran "provided a narrow and cloudy window through which to observe the sweeping social and political changes underway," the report states.

In August 1977, the CIA concluded that "the shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into the 1980s" and "there will be no radical change in Iranian political behavior in the near future." The opposition was still seen as being little more than "troublesome" by early 1978.

Even as recently as last Sept. 28, the report continues, the CIA concluded that the shah "is expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."

But the report states that "policymakers must assume responsibility, perhaps to a greater degree than the intelligence community, for the unwritten considerations which restricted both open and clandestine intelligence field collection on the Iranian internal situation."

The White House and other "consumers did not demand analysis of the shah's stability. Large arms transfers and other major policies in the region were pursued without the benefit of in-depth analysis of the Iranian political scene," the subcommittee concluded.

CRITICISM FROM CONGRESS

By Bernard Gwertzman
New York Times News Service

The American intelligence community and Carter administration policymakers have to share blame for the failure to perceive the depth of the crisis in Iran and to forecast that it could lead to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's departure, a House committee has concluded.

In a detailed report on the government's handling of the Iran situation, the committee staff said there was clearly "a warning failure" in that the top policymakers' attention was not drawn forcefully to Iran until last October, by which time it had become nearly impossible for the United States to do anything to alter the deteriorating situation.

The 11-page report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence said that "weaknesses in the intelligence community's performance in this case are serious." But it said also that to blame the intelligence community alone was "simplistic" because "such charges blind us to the importance of user attitudes in any warning process."

"IN THE CASE of Iran, longstanding United States attitudes toward the shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetite for analysis of the shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence," the report said.

The report was released by the House intelligence subcommittee on evaluation, headed by Rep. Charles Rose, D-N.C.

Ever since the shah's inability to retain power became evident, there has been concern in the Carter administration that if events in Iran adversely affected the United States, the administration might find itself accused of having "lost Iran."

The report as a whole was sharply critical of the administration's performance, and found very little positive to say about the various intelligence agencies. It noted that the Pentagon's intelligence arm as late as last Sept. 28 was predicting that the shah would remain in power for 10 more years.

A BASIC PROBLEM, the report said, was the dual function of the CIA.

On the one hand, it said, "the CIA had historically considered itself the shah's booster." But "on the other hand, it was supposed to provide sound intelligence analysis of the Iranian situation," it said.

Without mentioning individuals, the report said the policymakers' attitudes probably were even more critical than the weaknesses of the intelligence.

As the American policy in the Persian Gulf "became more dependent on the shah," the report said, "risk of offending the shah by speaking with the opposition became less acceptable."

It said that the CIA had produced no reporting based on sources within the religious opposition for a two-year period ended in November 1977.

"And embassy political reporting based on contacts with the opposition was rare and sometimes contemptuous," it said. "United States policy toward the shah also affected intelligence analysis and production — not directly, through the conscious suppression of unfavorable news, but indirectly."

THERE WAS LITTLE interest in reports on developments leading up to the current crisis, and policymakers refused to ask whether the shah would survive indefinitely, the report asserted.

"In sum, intelligence field reporting from Iran provided a narrow and cloudy window through which to observe the sweeping social and political changes under way" since late 1977, the report said.

"The critical weakness in intelligence collection on Iran has been the lack of widespread contact with Iranians of various persuasions," the report said.

"Yet this sort of collection, at least as much the job of embassy political reporting as of the CIA, could not be performed effectively by United States officials as long as United States policy toward the shah prevented direct contact with opposition elements," it said.

An important factor, the committee report continued, was a concern that the shah might suspect a CIA conspiracy against him and deny the United States access to the technical intelligence-collection sites aimed at the Soviet Union.

AS TO THE VARIOUS agencies, the report said the Defense Intelligence Agency produced five reports on Iran in the first nine months of 1978, containing some accurate predictions, but concluding as recently as Sept. 28 that the shah "is expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."

It said the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, lacking a full-time Iran analyst, produced no special reports on Iran last year, but did have some accurate analysis in its daily "morning report."

The CIA produced two major long-term analyses last year that contained some "valuable insights" into what was happening, "but they failed entirely to prepare consumers for the gravity of recent popular disturbances."

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MISCELLANEOUS

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The admiral and his new-look CIA

Stansfield Turner after the first 20 months

by Stu Cohen

The ad in *Juris Doctor*, a respected journal for young lawyers, could have been placed by any government agency. It sought "people-oriented individuals with drive, enthusiasm and motivation for public service." The employer put a premium on foreign-language training and an understanding of international affairs.

There was one caveat: Potential applicants were advised, "Duties require living abroad and working in a foreign environment, at times under hardship conditions." And it was clear that more than amoebic dysentery was at stake. The advertiser was the Central Intelligence Agency.

The public search for new officers represents a significant departure for an agency that has traditionally done its recruiting with considerably more discretion. But the ad does not indicate that the CIA is at a loss for good applicants; indeed, in the economic hard times of late, the agency has been able to pick and choose from among highly qualified and committed prospective employees, a spokesman told the

Phoenix. And CIA press chief Herbert Hettr said at a recent luncheon in Boston, "In the last year we had 30,000 serious applications for 13,000 jobs."

No, the understated ad was simply an example of the new way of doing business at the "born-again" Central Intelligence Agency. Its new director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, has been in power for 20 months, and the changes he has wrought have been both dramatic and intensely controversial within the intelligence community. If only the outlines of those changes are clearly visible to the public, it is nonetheless obvious that the CIA under Turner's direction is a very different agency from the one previous spymasters ran.

One such change was implicit before Turner's name was painted on the office

door. The new director was hired with a new title — not merely Director of the Central Intelligence Agency but Director of Central Intelligence, honcho of all of the spy agencies, including the FBI, the National Security Agency, the individual military services' intelligence outfits and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. For the first time in a generation, the US has a spymaster in the true sense of the term. Below the president, where intelligence matters are concerned, the buck stops at Stansfield Turner's desk.

The last individual to hold an analogous position was also the first to do so, Allen Dulles. In the period immediately after the passage by Congress of an "Intelligence Charter" in the early '50s, Dulles coordinated the work of all existing intelligence-gathering agencies, then separate groups. Indeed, between the Dulles brothers — Allen and Secretary of State John Foster — the entire conduct of American foreign policy, open and covert, was the province of one family in the post-war years.

That control, and the tight ship run by Allen Dulles, so infuriated the chiefs of the other intelligence units that Dulles's successor, General Walter Bedell Smith, was chosen from among the disaffected. At the same time, his position was redefined to take control over other agencies from him and his successors. Until now.

In a recent *Phoenix* interview, Turner diplomatically played down the idea that he controls other agency chiefs. "I'm really just the first among equals," he said, using the words he has repeated in virtually every interview over the previous 20 months. It's one of the admiral's favorite stock phrases; another is his description of the new, streamlined covert-operations division as "an

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essential arrow in our quiver.

But there are only a handful of canned phrases in statements by this refreshingly candid public speaker. His volubility — indeed, his very presence on the lecture circuit — is an astonishing change. Richard Helms and William Colby, his predecessors, were given to public statements that were clipped, oblique and few: mostly, one imagines them in conspiratorial gatherings of four or five insiders. Turner is out there taking the shots as they come, from audiences fair and foul (by his lights). And while he may be only the first among equals, he is definitely the only one of the equals who has taken to the public podium. He is, in effect, the government's "point man" on all intelligence matters.

While he was in Boston, he taped a *Good Day!* show, held private meetings with the editorial boards at the *Globe* and *Monitor*, spoke before a World Affairs Council luncheon (read fair), addressed a forum at Harvard's Kennedy School (read potentially foul), met privately with graduate students at the JFK School and ate dinner with their dean, Graham Allison — and started early enough the next morning to have breakfast with Harvard President Derek Bok before

returning to Washington. Moreover, Turner made room for additional discussion with other journalists, including this reporter.

Although Turner extemporized at each public gathering and fielded a wide range of questions, there was a single theme that ran through all of his public utterances in Boston. There has been "too much secrecy in the past," on the other hand, there is an irreducible quotient of "security" that the agency (and government in general) must maintain in order to work effectively. His most novel argument draws an analogy between the CIA's role in the government's ITT bribery and perjury case and that of *New York Times* reporter Myron Farber in the recently concluded New Jersey murder trial of "Doctor X." It is an interesting and provocative analogy, logical and tightly reasoned. If you agree with the premises, the argument is irrefutable; if you disagree, it falls flat.

Public appearances aside, what is the shape of Turner's born-again CIA?

To begin with, it's a lot leaner. Turner's major activity has been described officially as "necessary personnel readjustments." To those

readjusted, the process amounted to a purge, one which was particularly effective at rooting out the old boy's network in covert operations that had dominated the dark side of the agency for the last 25 years. Judging from the names of those officers forced into retirement when Turner started making the cuts, covert operations was the preserve of those whose careers stretched back to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (the "honorable men" of William Colby's recent best-seller). What's more, Turner is correct in his contention that these men's dominance of covert operations created a unit mentality, encouraging undercover operations even when they were unnecessary. (This is also the outline of his argument against taking covert operations away from the CIA and vesting that responsibility in another agency — that doing so would create in the new unit a predisposition toward secret operations to safeguard the agency's appropriations and *raison d'être*.)

At the same time, Turner very clearly states in public that covert operations are not part of the CIA's intelligence-gathering function. "It is an attempt to influence the political climate in another country, without the source of that influence becoming known." That we have a right (indeed, a duty) to do so at times is one of those first premises the admiral relies upon when building his case.

It is not known exactly how many former spooks were given their walking papers upon Turner's accession, but the number is conservatively estimated to be in the range of 300 to 500, many of them on the covert side. Significant "adjustments" were also made in the counterintelligence branch, the unit that spies on spies. Cuts and personnel shifts in counterintelligence are regarded as particularly important because of the controversy that has grown up in the last few years around the branch's long-time head, James Angleton, who was fired by Turner's predecessor, William Colby. Angleton contended (openly and through a myriad of leaks to the press) that the US government had been penetrated by the Soviets at a very high level. He also said that the identity of the KGB "mole" would have been discovered if he had not been fired. According to recent reports, Colby himself has taken to saying, with no intent to be funny, "I am not a mole."

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Turner decided not to rehire Angleton, who had been compromised by the public debate. But the new director did move a man he calls "one of my oldest and most trusted aides," Tom Williams, into the counterintelligence slot. Do the reports of a mole give him pause? Turner said he's "convinced" the stories are false, but feels that the public debate they've caused justifies an increasingly important and visible role for counterintelligence. There will be, he made clear, no let-up in spying on the spies.

Turner must have known he would be facing a decidedly mixed reception at the Kennedy School. His open feud with Harvard President Bok over the university's guidelines for faculty contracts with the CIA, virtually guaranteed him some hostile questions. (In the event, several observers noted, there were fewer than expected.)

The argument between Turner and Harvard is simple. The university requires that any faculty member who engages to do work for the agency report this fact to the dean of his or her faculty (public disclosure is not an issue, only notification with the Harvard community). Turner contends that this rule is clearly discriminatory, since it applies to no other agency, and refuses either to ratify the guideline or to enforce it from his end. "If a Harvard professor chooses to keep his CIA contract secret from the university, we will not require him or her to abide by the guideline as a prerequisite for doing the job contracted for," he told the Kennedy School audience. In answer to a related question, he replied testily, "We have our rules and you have yours; you wouldn't want — believe me — to be bound by ours; and we refuse similarly to be bound by yours." Although this was evidently the matter under discussion at the Bok-Turner breakfast, neither side was issuing any communiques, and it is reasonable to assume that no agreement was reached. It is clear, however, that Turner's real objection is not to the guidelines as they stand but to possible later versions that

would force the university to publicize the faculty-CIA work.

This sort of trouble with one academic community is, of course, not to be compared with the storm of criticism faced by Turner's predecessors. That's what being born again is all about. In the time since Turner was chosen to head the CIA, we can point to no new scandal, no new abuse of power like the ones revealed by Sen. Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence. Which does not mean that none has occurred, just that none has come to light.

Turner, for one, refuses to state categorically that no covert operations have been conducted recently. He would say that the relevant committees of Congress would have been notified, in accordance with the proposed (but not yet passed) legislative charters for intelligence agencies, if any had been undertaken.

Turner may be the most open and "accessible" Director of Central Intelligence in more than a generation, but openness is not enough to prove that the bad old days are gone. This is the fundamental question that comes out of any assessment of Stansfield Turner's first 20 months: given the CIA's history, why should we believe what we are being told, no matter how candid it seems? It will take more than good faith and public lectures to persuade America that the CIA has truly been born again.

THE NEW LEADER
15 January 1979

Perspectives THE LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE

BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE INTELLIGENCE community in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular are being criticized for not warning policy makers of the disturbances that have rocked the Shah of Iran's throne. President Carter himself has taken the unprecedented step of publicly reprimanding the highest intelligence authorities for their lack of foresight, in spite of all the recent investigations and reorganizations. Columnists have asked for the resignation of the CIA Director. Mutual recriminations are shaking the intelligence community.

I know nothing other than what I read in the papers about the performance of the intelligence agencies. But I know that even the best organized, most competent agency and the wisest, best informed statesman are up against the impossibility of knowing the future. History abounds with proof.

- In 1776, Washington declared that "the Fate of our Country depends in all human probability, on the Exertion of a Few Weeks." Yet it was not until seven years later that the War of Independence came to an end.

- In February 1792, British Prime Minister Pitt justified the reduction of military expenditures and held out hope for further reductions by declar-

ing: "Unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country when from the situation of Europe we might more reasonably expect 15 years of peace than at the present moment." Only two months later the Continent was engulfed in war; less than a year later Great Britain was involved. Thus was initiated a period of almost continuous warfare that lasted nearly 25 years.

- When Lord Granville became British foreign secretary in 1870, the permanent undersecretary reported that "he had never, during his long experience, known so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he was not aware of any important question that he [Lord Granville] should have to deal with." On the same day, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen accepted the Crown of Spain, an event that three weeks later led to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

- Two days before the outbreak of World War I, the British Ambassador to Berlin cabled his government that war was out of the question.

- Six weeks before the Russian Revolution of March 1917, Lenin told a group of young Socialists in Zurich: "We old people will probably not live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution." Within the year, the deci-

sive battles of the Russian Revolution began under his leadership.

The fallibility of prophecies in international affairs is strikingly demonstrated, too, by the fantastic errors of experts who have tried to forecast the nature of the next war. The history of these forecasts, from Machiavelli to General J. F. C. Fuller, is the story of logical deductions, plausible in themselves, that had no connections with the contingencies of actual developments. So esteemed a military analyst as General Fuller, for instance, predicted in 1923 that the decisive weapon of World War II would be gas.

If the intelligence community has failed to foresee what a competent and alert intelligence agency could have foreseen, it ought to be held responsible. But if it has failed where nobody could have succeeded—except perhaps by accident—it ought not to be made the scapegoat, burdened with the responsibility for a dangerous situation beyond anyone's knowledge and control.

What accounts for the failure of foresight on the part of otherwise bright and responsible men? The answer lies in the nature of the empirical material they have to deal with. A multitude of factors form the totality that shapes the future. To make an accurate prediction, an intelligence observer would have to know all these factors as well as their dynamics, their mutual actions and reactions, and so forth. Yet what he actually can know is merely a small fragment of the total. The rest he must guess, and a priori his guess is not very much better or worse than anybody else's. Only the future itself will show who chose, among the many possible guesses, the right one.

Thus with regard to Iran, the intelligence community guessed wrong. Before blaming it indiscriminately, however, one should ask the following question: Assuming the outbreak of popular discontent could have been pinpointed, what could the United States have done about it? The answer is at best: very little. This is probably why, in the first place, the intelligence community paid less attention to Iran than it might have otherwise.

THE BALTIMORE SUN
24 January 1979

In the nation

***CIA recruiter doused
with paint at Ohio State***

Columbus, Ohio (AP)—A Central Intelligence Agency recruiter was splattered with red paint during a demonstration at Ohio State University yesterday.

The recruiter, a woman whom Ohio State police refused to identify, was doused with paint but not injured as she worked in the placement office of the College of Engineering.

DES MOINES REGISTER
5 January 1979

CIA, FBI accountability

It was only a few years ago, during the turbulent 1960s and early '70s, that government intelligence agencies rampaged out of control, opening mail, breaking into homes and offices, illegally tapping telephones, infiltrating community organizations, planning murder, overturning governments.

Thousands of innocent American citizens became victims of these rogue agencies. The public is potential prey today, because Congress has failed to enact a comprehensive law governing operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency.

The legislation is foundering because of an increasingly conservative Congress, the opposition of many intelligence officials, fading interest by the public and the inherent difficulty of drafting a workable, fair law.

Failure to enact such a law would be disastrous. The CIA, the FBI and the NSA have demonstrated devastatingly for many years that they cannot be trusted to operate effectively and honorably outside the law, and Congress cannot be trusted to perform its oversight functions.

Such a law should require the CIA to restrict its activities to the collection of intelligence. That's what it was created to do. It was not created to plan the assassination of foreign leaders, or play assorted dirty tricks.

Those tricks have consistently

backfired in the faces of their planners: the phony revolution in Chile; the planned murder of Fidel Castro; and the installation of and support for Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran.

The FBI should be required by law to restrict itself to the investigation of actual or suspected crime. It must not be allowed to pervert the criminal law by using it to harass political dissidents or spy on community groups or commit burglary. Similar restrictions must be placed on the NSA.

These organizations have operated for years on the basis of vague laws and, in the case of the NSA, a secret executive order. Admittedly, it will be difficult to write a law tight enough to protect the privacy and security of Americans and flexible enough to enable the intelligence community to do its job.

But it surely is not impossible, and various independent groups that have investigated intelligence abuses have urged that it be done, including the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee.

Without public clamor, it will be easy for Congress to evade its responsibility and permit the intelligence community to go its own way, accountable to no one but itself. Before that happens, the Congress and the electorate should remember the wisdom of philosopher George Santayana: Those who forget the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them.

DETROIT NEWS
9 January 1979

Wrong Again

For the second time in only a few weeks, the U.S. intelligence community has egg on its face.

First, the Central Intelligence Agency misread conditions in Iran so badly that President Carter was moved to write a letter of complaint to the agency's director, Admiral Stansfield Turner.

Now it turns out that in January, 1977, when Mr. Carter was making his decision to withdraw American ground forces from South

Korea, Army intelligence fed Mr. Carter information that was three years old and dangerously wrong.

President Carter should suspend troop withdrawal until he reviews the policy which obviously was influenced by erroneous information. Meanwhile, he owes Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub an apology. Gen. Singlaub was removed as chief of staff in South Korea by Mr. Carter and later forced to retire when he tried to tell his country that estimates of North Korean forces were far too low.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C7THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
25 January 1979

Spy Case Judge Criticizes CIA's Lax Satellite Security

By Robert Pear
Washington Star Staff Writer

The judge in the Kampiles espionage case has privately reprimanded the CIA for its lax security around secret information pertaining to an American spy satellite.

The judge's concern was disclosed yesterday at a congressional hearing during an exchange between CIA General Counsel Anthony A. Lapham and members of the House Intelligence Committee.

Rep. Morgan F. Murphy, D-Ill., chairman of the legislation subcommittee, said the judge had "scolded" CIA Director Stansfield Turner for the government's "lax procedures."

Turner apparently sent a reply to the judge's letter, but details of the correspondence were not released. A CIA spokesman later said the agency had no further comment because the exchange was "private correspondence between the director and a judge."

U.S. District Judge Phil M. McNaghy Jr., who presided over the Kampiles trial, likewise declined to comment.

WILLIAM P. KAMPILES, 24, a former CIA clerk, was sentenced to 40 years in prison after being convicted last Nov. 17 in federal court in Indiana of selling top-secret satellite plans to the Soviet Union.

He has filed a notice of appeal with the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago.

Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, who heads the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, is reviewing the manner in which national security information was handled in the Kampiles case.

He has asked the CIA to suggest steps that might be taken to improve the handling of such information in future espionage prosecutions.

David T. Ready, the U.S. attorney for Indiana who prosecuted the case, said yesterday he was unaware of the judge's letter.

During the trial, Ready said, it became clear that the CIA didn't know the document in question — a technical manual on the KH-11 spy satellite — was missing until Kampiles told the FBI he had sold it to the Russians.

"IT WAS GONE for almost a year without the CIA knowing it," Ready said.

Kampiles' attorney, Michael D. Monico, said he had raised CIA security procedures as an issue during the trial.

"Just because something is missing doesn't mean that anybody stole it or that my client stole it," Monico said.

During the committee hearing yesterday, Lapham, the CIA lawyer, said that the leak of classified information to the press probably is not a criminal act, and that publication of such information by the press probably is not a criminal act under present law.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Keuch quickly said he disagreed with Lapham. Keuch said that current laws forbid disclosure to the press and publication of classified information.

"Congress never intended that by going through the charade of publication, you could protect yourself from prosecution for unauthorized disclosures," Keuch said.

The law clearly forbids disclosure of national security secrets to a foreign power, but disclosure to the press is a more complicated question, witnesses said.

The laws stand idle and are not enforced at least in part because their meaning is so obscure. . . . Lapham testified. "These laws are so vague and opaque as to be virtually worthless."

Week of
28 January 1979

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Miscellaneous

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WASHINGTON STAR
28 JANUARY 1979

CIA Tales of 'Lost' Uranium Seem to Conflict

By John J. Fialka

Washington Star Staff Writer

CIA officials, who may be sitting on one of the best espionage stories of recent years, have apparently told officials of other government agencies conflicting versions of how it came to suspect that Israel obtained A-bomb material from the United States during the 1960s.

According to government sources, a retired Air Force general, Alfred Starbird, recently told investigators that a CIA official told him that the CIA had obtained a sample of highly enriched uranium from Israel and that it bore the chemical "signature" of material that had originated at the U.S. uranium enrichment plant at Portsmouth, Ohio.

In a sworn statement to investigators of the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General,

Starbird reportedly identified Theodore Shackley, deputy director of the CIA for intelligence collection tasking, as the source of the information. If the information is true, this would amount to scientific proof of the first known diversion of the nation's most heavily guarded nuclear material by persons acting as foreign agents.

STARBIRD, ACCORDING to the sources, learned of the CIA's evidence while acting as deputy assistant administrator for national security of DOE's predecessor, the Energy Research and Development Administration.

Asked about the case, which is considered top secret at both the CIA and the DOE, spokesman for both agencies said they could neither confirm nor deny the report. Starbird, who now works for a private company, could not be reached for comment.

DOE's inspector general is investigating a series of public statements by present and former energy agency officials — including Starbird — to the effect that they had seen "no evidence" of any diversion of bomb-grade nuclear material.

Other government investigators recall hearing that the CIA may have obtained a sample of Israeli bomb material, but not enough to determine its origin.

Still others, including some investigators on Capitol Hill, say that CIA officials have professed "no knowledge" of any sample of material.

THE POSSESSION of an identifiable sample of U.S. highly enriched uranium found in Israel would be evidence of the theft of nuclear material, a capital offense and one of the most serious crimes under U.S. law. Whether the theft occurred within the United States or as a diversion from exports sent lawfully to some third nation has been the subject of considerable speculation.

The prime suspect in most diversion scenarios is the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC), an Apollo, Pa., company which fabricated a variety of nuclear fuels out of the government's enriched uranium, including large quantities of fuel for the Navy's nuclear submarines. NUMEC received uranium shipments from the Portsmouth plant.

In 1965 government investigators reported that they could find no way to account for the loss of at least 206 pounds of highly enriched uranium at the NUMEC plant, enough for the manufacture of at least 10 small atom bombs.

Highly enriched uranium is a man-made material, an artificial concentration of the volatile isotope U-235. Natural uranium contains less than 1 percent of U-235. Uranium that is used for weapons is "enriched" to around 90 percent U-235.

According to Charles Keller, assistant manager of DOE's uranium enrichment program, the Portsmouth facility is the only one of the nation's three enrichment plants that produced highly enriched uranium after 1964.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 7

WASHINGTONIAN
FEBRUARY 1979

CAPITAL COMMENT

HOTLINE

EXCERPT:

Spook Beat: Although the formal communiqués are silent on the point, the Carter administration assured the Communist Chinese that no CIA agents will be sent to Peking under embassy cover when full relations begin this spring. Thanks, said the Chinese. They said nothing about whether the Chinese "Social Affairs Department"—equivalent to a combined CIA and FBI—will keep out of the United States. According to intelligence sources, much Chinese spying legwork is done by "correspondents" of the official New China News Agency, several of whom are now accredited to the Chinese mission to the United Nations in New York. After "normalization" is complete, the State Department expects NCNA to ask permission to open an office in Washington—which means a lot of nighttime tail work in store for the FBI's Washington field office.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
22 January 1979

—THE INTELLIGENCE WAR— CARTER CHARTER FOR THE CIA

By ROBERT MOSS

WITHOUT reliable intelligence, says Mr Jack Maury, a former top CIA officer, a major power is reduced to a blind giant stumbling through an uncharted minefield.

A question that is now being asked urgently in Washington is whether the CIA, in its present state, is capable of supplying the quality of intelligence required to shape policy decisions.

President Carter has rebuked the CIA in public for allegedly failing to discern the true proportions of the upheavals in Iran.

He is said to be thinking of removing the present CIA Director, Adm. Stansfield Turner (who has come under fire from veteran case officers because of his insensitivity to the needs of "human intelligence") in favour of a corporation man—the present chief of AT&T.

Post-Watergate

What Mr Carter has not been prepared to admit openly is that the American intelligence community as a whole has been dangerously weakened and demoralised as a result of the post-Watergate witch-hunts.

It is still being forced to deliver up its secrets under laws like the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, which some British politicians would like to copy.

How has this affected the CIA's ability to do its job? West European observers point to the following examples:

1—Because of the fear of leakage, friendly intelligence services are more cautious than before about sharing sensitive information with the CIA.

One West European secret service chief who had good relations with the Americans in the past now refuses to have direct contact with the CIA station chief in his capital.

2—Because of the sacking of trusted veterans, it has become much more difficult for the CIA to maintain valuable sources abroad.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the CIA was able to run important agents inside Soviet intelligence — Perre Popov and Oleg Penkovskiy. Those days seem to be over.

'Hands of stranger'

Mr Maury cites the case of an agent in a Communist country who broke off relations with the CIA after his case officer was fired. "I am not prepared," he said, "to place my life and the freedom of my family in the hands of a stranger."

3—Because of the loss of senior staff and the paperwork involved in fielding Congressional investigations and requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act, the CIA is badly behind schedule in completing vital analytical tasks like the preparation of its annual national estimate on the Soviet military threat.

This is normally supplied to the Secretary of Defence every December, as background for his beginning-of-year policy statement. But the CIA's last national estimate on the Soviet threat, due in December, 1977, was not completed until March, 1978—far too late to be of use.

4—There are multiple pressures on the CIA to tailor intelligence assessments to the prevailing White House policy line.

These led to the controversial departure last August of David Sullivan, a senior CIA analyst whose conclusions about Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and intentions reportedly contradicted the

Carter Administration's arms control policies.

5—With embittered ex-intelligence officers being pushed out into the street, there is no prospect that the flood of Agee-style disclosures will cease.

The FBI has now produced its own "ideological defector": a senior agent who returned from the Los Angeles field office in 1977, after 25 years' service, and now plans to publish the names of former colleagues allegedly involved in illegal operations.

Jonestown find

His story is bizarre, since he has links with the Scientologists, and some of the raw material for his book — including top secret FBI documents on agent infiltration techniques — was discovered at the scene of the Jonestown massacre.

Against this backdrop, it would be less than astonishing if the CIA slipped up on Iran, even though that was the scene of one of its major triumphs in 1953, when it helped to restore the Shah to his embattled throne.

What is Mr Carter doing to put the CIA's house in order?

Despite Mr Carter's expressed concern about intelligence failures, his Administration still seems to be wedded to a proposal that would have the effect of weakening the CIA still further.

Vice-President Mondale, in particular, is said to be an enthusiast for new legislation to impose crippling new restrictions on the intelligence services and subject their every move to Congressional scrutiny.

Early last year, the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee (with advice from outsiders like Morton Halperin) produced a 263-page Bill, known as S2525, and intended as the basis of a comprehensive law to regulate the intelligence community.

An Administration team is working towards an agreed text for presentation to Congress during its current session.

Mondale pressure

While officials are deeply divided over the contents of this intelligence charter, Congressional sources believe that, under pressure from Mr Mondale, the Administration will consent to most of the key proposals in S2525.

If so, the consequences would be far-reaching. Under S2525, the Congressional oversight committees would assume authority co-equal to the President in supervising the intelligence services.

The CIA would even be obliged to report all contacts with foreign services to Congress — not exactly an inducement to Western co-operation in this most sensitive area.

The oversight committees would have to be told in advance of any important operation that was being contemplated — guaranteeing leakage.

Put out eyes

It adds up to a programme for putting out the eyes of America's intelligence community.

Whether Congress, in its present mood, will consent to such a law is uncertain.

What is certain is that, if Mr Carter wants a CIA that works, he should be trying to legislate in precisely the opposite direction, in order to ensure the secrecy that must protect intelligence work and the flexibility required to meet the challenges of the KGB and other hostile services.

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USA

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ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
1 FEBRUARY 1979

Security Agency Plays Major Role in Policies On Communications

By DAVID BURNHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 — For the last quarter-century, one of the Government's most secret agencies has played an important, largely undisclosed role in shaping the nation's privately owned communications network of microwave towers, underground cables, satellites and computers.

Because of the intense secrecy that surrounds the National Security Agency and its surveillance activities, the agency's full influence on the development and operation of United States communications cannot be precisely measured.

The mission of the agency is to protect the security of United States communications and collect intelligence.

Powerful Role in Policy

According to knowledgeable authorities and several unclassified reports and documents obtained by The New York Times, the agency, in pursuit of its mission of improving security, has had a powerful role in setting policies affecting communications links between individuals, businesses and governmental agencies in a variety of ways, including the following:

9A few months ago a classified briefing by agency officials helped persuade the Federal Communications Commission to reverse itself and permit construction of a \$200 million trans-Atlantic cable.

9Two years ago the agency was the principal advocate of the Carter Administration's decision to encourage American businesses to spend millions of dollars to make it harder for anyone to intercept their communications.

9For many years the agency has been a major source of research funds for the computer and telecommunications industries. As a result, it has helped shape a series of technological advances that have had vast impact on American society.

"The N.S.A. is an entirely different animal than the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation," said a former White House official who requested that he not be identified by name. "The C.I.A. and the F.B.I., after all, are mostly super-detective agencies. The N.S.A., because of its special assignments, has a voice in setting communication policies that touch every American."

Pentagon officials familiar with the N.S.A. readily acknowledge its broad influence. But they contend that this influence has largely been a result of the agency's vigorous pursuit of its mission, laid out in a series of secret instructions from the National Security Council when the N.S.A. was established by President Truman in October 1952.

The agency's mission has two major elements, the first being the gathering of all possible intelligence about military forces, political developments and economic conditions in nations around the world by such means as long-distance listening devices and satellites. The N.S.A.'s sources of intelligence are extremely broad: radar signals given off by Soviet test missiles, routine radio traffic at important airports, telexed orders from foreign buyers of such American goods as computers, bulldozers and oil-drilling equipment. The data the N.S.A. collects are then sorted by computer and passed on to the C.I.A. and other users.

The agency's other job is to protect sensitive domestic communications from intrusion by foreign powers. The Government's definition of information that needs protection has gradually expanded from specific defense secrets to include a broad range of economic data — such as crop yields, machine tool orders and oil production — that the Russians are believed to have begun using for strategic assessments of the American economy.

Changes in Supervisory Control

Until last year the agency carried out these functions under only indirect supervision by the Secretary of Defense. In January 1978, however, President Carter signed an executive order transferring some authority over N.S.A. operations to Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Carter order was intended to centralize authority over intelligence gathering and to provide Americans greater protection against Government snooping. One White House official said in a recent interview, however, that the move made the agency less tightly supervised than it had been because authority over it is now divided between two overseers.

Neither the agency's budget nor the number of its employees is made public, and its funds, like those of other intelligence services, are concealed within the budgets of other agencies. However, an authoritative Pentagon source said that the agency controlled the largest single part of the nation's \$6 billion annual intelligence budget and had at least 20,000 employees. Its headquarters are in a closely guarded nine-story building in Fort Meade, Md., 23 miles northeast of the capital.

One of the few public challenges to actions of the N.S.A. involved an agency official's attempt to restrict the sale abroad of privately financed code research con-

ducted at universities and in industry. People involved in the research, which devises ways of protecting against intrusion into information during its transmission, have charged that the restrictions not only threaten First Amendment rights and academic freedom but also hamper the ability of private concerns to develop and sell a product. There is a growing private demand for code research as businesses, for example, seek to protect trade data.

The White House, prompted by this criticism, last spring asked the Justice Department to examine whether such limits violated the First Amendment. The department concluded, in a confidential 18-page memorandum prepared last May, that the restrictions were "unconstitutional insofar as they establish prior restraint on disclosure of cryptographic ideas and information" developed privately.

In a rare public statement, the head of the N.S.A., Vice Adm. Bobby Inman, said recently that critics' allegations concerning the restrictions "paint a false picture of N.S.A. as exerting some kind of all-powerful secret influence from behind closed doors. The truth is that the legal resources of the Federal Government to control potentially harmful nongovernmental cryptologic activity are sparse."

New Restrictions Sought

Admiral Inman then called for consideration of a new system of restrictions that would give his agency authority to prohibit domestic or foreign dissemination of nearly all such research, on the ground that it could be used by foreign powers against the United States.

Virtually the only public examination of the agency in its 26-year history was made about two years ago in a report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after its investigation of the operations of all major branches of the intelligence community.

The committee concluded that, because of the agency's ability to monitor almost any electronic communication

CONTINUED

that travels through the air, "the N.S.A.'s potential to violate the privacy of American citizens is unmatched by any other intelligence agency."

The committee report further said that the agency's pursuit of international communications resulted in "the incidental interception and dissemination of communications which the American sender or receiver expected to be kept private."

Concern over the what the committee found led former Attorney General Edward H. Levi to establish a secret set of guidelines that reportedly sharply limit the information about individuals that the N.S.A. can disseminate to other intelligence agencies but do not restrict the acquisition of information itself.

The Senate committee has never publicly raised the question of the N.S.A.'s influence on United States communications policies. Authorities in the Pentagon, the White House, Congress and the communications industry, however, said in recent interviews that the N.S.A.'s assignment to protect American communication links had inevitably given it a secret role in setting such policies.

Less than three months ago, for example, the Federal Communications Commission voted to support construction, by a consortium of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and foreign concerns, of a seventh trans-Atlantic telecommunication cable, reversing an earlier decision that the new link was unnecessary.

National Defense Cited

According to officials in both industry and government, the commission approved construction of the new cable, starting in 1983, after the N.S.A., in a classified briefing, said the link was essential for national defense.

One Government official with knowledge of the case noted that 40 percent of the installation and maintenance costs of the cable would be added to the telephone bills of all Americans. The cable would carry ordinary telephone calls by individuals, as well as business and government communications.

The N.S.A. has also played a key role in the development of the modern computer. According to an N.S.A. history of itself, a copy of which has been obtained by The Times, the secret research funds the agency provided to such companies and

institutions as the Radio Corporation of America, the International Business Machines Corporation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology "hastened the start of the computer age" and fed a stream of research and design advances.

The history does not mention specific sums, but authorities in the field agree that the agency's contributions to the computer industry have been substantial.

Another important long-term policy matter in which the N.S.A. was directly involved was the Carter Administration's decision to route all Government telephone calls in the Washington, New York and San Francisco areas through underground cables of the Bell Telephone System, which are considered more secure from eavesdropping than microwave transmissions.

As a result of two other, related decisions by the Carter Administration, the N.S.A. assisted several specialized communications companies in improving their security and was responsible for increasing the number of extremely expensive "scrambler" telephones used by companies doing defense work.

All three decisions were based on judgments of the Ford Administration, ac-

ceded to by President Carter, that the Soviet Union and possibly other countries had undertaken a large-scale effort to gain economic intelligence and that these efforts should be blocked.

Issues Not Discussed Publicly

The question of whether such intelligence was actually being sought was not discussed publicly. Neither were the costs of possible technical countermeasures nor the impact on society of increased security measures.

While no Congressional committee has publicly commented on the questions raised by the N.S.A.'s broad influence on policy, legislation proposed last year by the Senate intelligence committee and still pending would establish a charter for each of the intelligence agencies that would deal with the questions.

The charter legislation would require that the President's advisers on communications security include, in addition to officials in the intelligence community, the Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and Energy and the Attorney General.

The Administration is now preparing its version of the legislation and hopes to submit it within a few months.

NSA SAYS CRYPTOLOGY SCIENCE MUST BE LIMITED

The director of the National Security Agency said last week that private work in the United States on telecommunications cryptology -- the science of devising and breaking secret codes -- must be limited in order to maintain the nation's capability of monitoring the communications of adversary nations.

NSA Director Vice Adm. B. R. Inman, in the first public talk by an NSA chief since the agency was established in 1952, told the Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association that "a new and unprecedented non-government interest" in telecommunications cryptology could result in the world-wide dissemination of cryptological information, particularly through academic exchanges.

"The Government can prevent the export of cryptological equipment," he said, but there is no restriction on the publication of details or techniques. He said that controls should be strengthened because "the national security mission entrusted to NSA is imperiled."

At the same time, Inman said that NSA is willing to talk with industry to work out guidelines to protect its secrets while ensuring that U.S. data banks could not be exploited for other purposes or tapped by foreign governments.

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CIA Studies

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Inside the news—briefly

Soviets rip CIA report of defense spending

Moscow

Tass news agency Thursday re-
jected as "crude falsification" an
estimate by the US Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) that So-
viet defense spending was run-
ning 45 percent ahead of that of
the US. A Tass commentary said
CIA estimates given to the US
Congress disregarded official So-
viet statistics which list the de-
fense budget for 1979 at \$26 bil-
lion.

THE WASHINGTON POST

2 February 1979

Article appeared
on page A-24

Around The World

Soviets Attack CIA Report

MOSCOW — The official news agency Tass said a CIA report placing Soviet defense spending far above U.S. levels is filled with "crude falsifications" to mislead congressmen into approving a record Pentagon budget.

The House Armed Services Committee released the CIA estimate last week showing 1978 Soviet defense spending at the equivalent of \$146 billion, compared to \$102 billion by the United States. The official Soviet figure for defense spending this year, as last, is \$26.4 billion — a figure that U.S. analysts say is only partial.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D-1NEW YORK TIMES
29 JANUARY 1979

China Seen Facing Bar To Growth

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — The Central Intelligence Agency says that "economic realities" in China pose "formidable obstacles" to the country's plans to modernize its economy and that Peking's ambitious goals can be reached "only under the most auspicious conditions."

A C.I.A. report dated December 1978 cited basic economic difficulties that "would impose strict limits on the pace of modernization," including:

¶ A population of nearly a billion people, with a current per capita income of only \$343. The C.I.A. report says that the population is likely to approach 1.5 billion by the end of the century, but that the per capita gross national product would be less than \$1,000.

¶ Agriculture "technologically so backward that it employs 70 percent of the labor force."

¶ Industry "using techniques that are 10 to 30 years out of date and with operations presently most inefficient." The steel, electricity, coal and transport industries were cited as particularly weak links.

Improvement Said to be Possible

The report says, however, that the difficulties do not "deny the possibilities for substantial improvement in economic performance." It points to Chinese ability and cultural strengths and the determination of leaders to modernize as ameliorating "the limits set by basic economic conditions."

The December report, entitled: "China: In Pursuit of Economic Modernization," reached newspapers only

a few days ago, just before today's scheduled arrival of Teng Hsiao-ping, the senior Deputy Prime Minister, in the United States. An agency spokesman said the report "had no political overtones" and was in a routine cycle of publications.

Even so, the report is the first comprehensive official assessment of the Chinese economy to be made public since the President announced on Dec. 15 that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with China. It further discloses the basic information on which United States officials will be making policy decisions in coming months.

It also seems to put a damper on prospects for increased American exports to China, an objective of the Carter Administration's new China policy, as it says that there are technical and financial constraints on any drive to expand Chinese imports of technology.

'Crisis in Education and Science'

For the future, according to the C.I.A., a "crisis in education and science is perhaps the major obstacle to the fulfillment of China's goals."

The analysis by the C.I.A. asserts that Peking's success in achieving economic goals would depend heavily "on its ability to improve work incentives and boost labor productivity." But the

document says that Chinese leaders recognize "the need for a comprehensive wage reform" in which wages are raised and bonuses for extra production allowed.

In the vital sector of agriculture, Peking has set a target of increasing grain production by 4.3 percent annually through 1985, compared with a 3.6 percent average in earlier years. "Realistically," the C.I.A. says, "output is likely to fall somewhat short of these goals."

In oil production, on which the Chinese appear to be counting both for domestic use and for export to earn foreign exchange, the outlook is a bit more optimistic but at the price of large investments and advanced technology.

For the Chinese people, the C.I.A. foresees "substantially improved living standards and real incomes." But even that progress, the agency says, "could hardly create, in a single generation, anything resembling an affluent society."

The production of consumer goods in China has grown 7 to 8 percent annually since 1957, the report says, while the new plan calls for a 12 percent increase each year. That rise is so great, the agency concludes, "that one has to be skeptical of Peking's ability to achieve its goal without massive additions to capacity."

29 January 1979

Article appeared
on page A-8But Many Problems Remain

China Able to Carry Out Modernization, CIA Says

United Press International

China "seems able" to resolve its formidable difficulties and carry out its dramatic modernization program in ways that permit gains in consumption and allow investment and industrial growth, a new CIA report says.

Issued shortly before Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's arrival in the United States yesterday, the unclassified analysis by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center said, however, the problems facing Teng and the post-Mao leadership are immense.

It indicated Peking will be "faced with labor problems and lagging production throughout its 10-year plan" which ends in 1985 and predicted investment in heavy industry will be the first area to be pared back.

But because of the flexibility and determination shown by the new

leadership, the report concludes, "the 10-year plan is likely to be a successful first step toward the modernization of China's economy."

Here are the major problems listed in the report:

- **Worker unrest.** "Peking not only has to face up to the problems of lost purchasing power and wage reform, but it must also convince the worker that this government is fair and can be trusted. It must come up with a package of wage increases and bonuses and . . . ensure the availability of goods at prices that leave the worker with real gains."

- **Management.** It is unlikely the political and technical leadership will be able to solve management problems quickly and efficiently and without making serious mistakes that will hamper programs.

- **Shortage of resources.** As agriculture becomes increasingly mechanized, it will be necessary to increase petroleum consumption to meet new goals. Demand is outstripping the oil output, meaning shortages will occur that could cripple parts of the economy.

- **Mechanical.** These problems include "poor machine quality, lack of standardization and a limited range of equipment" in such areas as farm machinery.

- **Financing.** "A major financial constraint is China's limited capacity to earn foreign exchange." China may have to accept foreign loans and credits, and even cooperative ventures in such areas as oil exploration. Until now, the Chinese have refused on ideological grounds, but the study predicts that exceptions will be made when the leadership finds them necessary.

Success of Teng's Visit to U.S. Tied To How 3 Crucial Audiences React

By BERNARD GWERTMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — Administration officials say that the success of the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping to the United States may depend on how its results are judged by at least three crucial audiences.

In interviews in advance of the Chinese leader's arrival this afternoon, officials said that this may turn out to be one of the most decisive weeks for the Carter Administration's foreign policy. They said Mr. Teng's visit could be as much a test of President Carter's adroitness as was the Middle East summit meeting at Camp David, which he seemed to pass with high marks.

The first audience is the American public, in particular the Congress. So far, the Administration's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Peking and sever them with Taiwan is believed to have produced much less support in this country and on Capitol Hill than the Administration had hoped.

Key members of Congress, including many Democrats who in principle favor normalization with Peking, have said in recent days that they were upset by the Administration's secrecy in the negotiations leading up to the announcement Dec. 15 of diplomatic relations.

Backing Sought for Taiwan

A number of senators and members of the House of differing political outlooks have favored a strong Congressional statement binding the United States to continue to support Taiwan's security even after the mutual defense treaty is terminated at the end of this year.

Administration officials have expressed the hope that Mr. Teng, in his public comments during the nine-day visit and especially in his meetings with members of Congress on Tuesday, will produce more public enthusiasm for the new relationship.

They expect that Mr. Teng will repeat his previous assurances that Peking much prefers a peaceful unification with Taiwan and that it is willing to wait a long time to accomplish this, thereby easing immediate concerns.

The second audience is the Chinese public, and in particular the political elite in the Communist Party who have seen their leadership, under Mr. Teng, turn dramatically to the West for economic and political support.

The suddenness with which China and the United States normalized relations after desultory talks since President Nixon's trip to China in 1972 had made no progress probably surprised the Chinese as much as it did Americans.

The verbal assurances that Mr. Teng and others have given on the Taiwan

issues are seen by Administration officials as potentially troublesome for Mr. Teng. If he goes further to meeting Congressional demands for more specific pledges on Taiwan, he runs the risk of being further criticized in China.

Chinese who may question the value of such a close relationship to the United States will also be asking just what they can expect to receive from it, a question that will also be asked by Americans in reverse.

Crucial to Mr. Teng's policies are commitments by the United States to take a leading role in helping the Chinese modernize their economy and to ease their concerns about the Soviet Union. Statistics released by the Central Intelligence Agency last week showed that Moscow now has more armed forces opposing China than it has on the western front.

What Mr. Carter does to meet Mr. Teng's concerns are critical not only to how the trip is perceived in China, but also by the third audience of concern to the United States — the Soviet leadership.

Evenhanded Treatment Is Aim

At the strong urging of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Mr. Carter has gone out of his way in recent days to emphasize that he intends to keep relations with China and the Soviet Union in balance and to follow what amounts to an evenhanded policy toward the Communist rivals.

In his State of the Union message last week, Mr. Carter stressed the importance of the Senate's approving the projected strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union. He said such an accord could open the way to improved relations in other fields and he repeated his hope that Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, would come to this country for the signing, something already agreed to in principle by the Kremlin.

But Mr. Vance and some other officials have expressed concern that if the Russians perceive the Chinese-American relationship as directed against them, they might react by adopting a more menacing posture and seek less cooperation instead of more with the United States.

A senior official said that it was probably useful for the Russians to be worried about the Peking-Washington ties, but that it would be tragic if Moscow became convinced that the United States was willing to either play a "China card" or let China play an "American card" against the Soviet Union.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 January 1979

China's difficult leap forward

Vice-Premier Teng faces modernization problems at home (below), where there now is a change in internal direction to gain popular support (Page 5). Meanwhile, the Asian leader's visit to the US continues to dramatize the vastly different global views of both nations (Page 10).

By John Dillon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The China of Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping faces formidable, long-range economic difficulties.

The smiling Mr. Teng, currently in the fourth day of his US tour, has been among the Chinese leaders championing a vigorous, growth-oriented pragmatism to overcome his nation's monumental problems in agriculture and industry.

A report by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, says the ambitious 10-year economic plan mapped by China's leaders looks feasible "only under the most auspicious of conditions."

The plan is an integral part of China's hope of transforming itself into a "front-rank" economic power by the year 2000.

Western industry — including steel mills from Japan, oil rigs from the United States, and nonferrous metal facilities from Europe — is expected to play a major role in the modernization of China.

Even if China falls short of its specific goals, the CIA says, the new political climate there should help the Chinese come "reasonably close" to their targets.

Progress will be most vital, in economic terms, in six broad areas:

- **Technical skills.** "Perhaps the major obstacle to the fulfillment of China's goals," says the CIA study, is the ongoing "crisis" in education and science.

- **The Cultural Revolution,** which elevated ideology over expertise, set China back. Now China is resuming post-graduate education (initial enrollment, only 9,000 students), and will urgently send thousands of students abroad for graduate and undergraduate training.

- **Management.** Control of industrial plants

is being shifted from "revolutionary committees" to individual managers, who will be under the direction of local party committees.

The change was mandated by declining quality of goods and falling productivity. Chinese visitors have also shown surprising interest in management techniques in other countries, including such capitalist capitals as Japan and Western Europe.

- **Basic industry.** China's 10-year plan calls for building or expanding 120 large-scale projects. These are believed to include 10 iron and steel complexes, nine nonferrous metal operations, eight new or modernized coal mines, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, 6 new trunk railways, and 5 harbors.

Achieving these goals will require major Western involvement, including purchase of entire factories from Japan and elsewhere.

- **Agriculture.** Seventy percent of China's workers labor on the farm. Yet loss of farm workers to industry has begun to crimp the output of food.

To move agricultural production ahead by 4 to 5 percent annually (a goal the CIA says is within reach), China will emphasize more machinery, more fertilizer, and land reclamation.

- **Transport.** Railroads will get great emphasis, with more use of diesel and electric locomotives, new heavy-duty rails, computer controls, and mechanization of cargo handling.

- **Wage reform.** Worker unrest has stalled economic progress, especially after real wages were slashed as much as 10 percent in the late 1960s.

China's leaders have a big problem on their hands here, the CIA says. Concessions are absolutely necessary.

Even if China's current 10-year plan (1976-85) proves a success, and the goals for the year 2000 are met, that nation will remain well behind the West.

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Parsley

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E3THE NEW YORK TIMES
28 January 1979**A True Spy Mystery**

John A. Paisley, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst of Soviet military strength, supposedly put a bullet in his head last fall while sailing in Chesapeake Bay. But the sensitive nature of his job, plus the fact that he continued to advise the C.I.A. after his retirement in 1974, produced doubts about whether he really committed suicide. Last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee asked the Justice Department to try to resolve "troubling questions" left unanswered by its own investigation. While the committee would not be specific, one source said it was convinced that the body was Mr. Paisley's. "We don't think that he's going to show up in Red Square," he said.

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ON PAGE 1-10THE WILMINGTON EVENING JOURNAL
24 January 1979

STAT

Senators Ask Bell For Probe Of Paisley

By JOE TRENTO
and RICHARD SANDZA

"Troubling questions about the fate of former CIA official John A. Paisley yesterday led the U.S. Senate intelligence committee to ask the Justice Department to investigate the case."

Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., committee chairman, made the request to Atty. Gen. Griffin Bell because of "the FBI's primary jurisdiction over counter-intelligence matters within the United States."

"Based upon all available information, a number of troubling questions remain," Bayh said.

Paisley's mysterious disappearance has raised serious national security questions, including the possibility that he was a KGB double agent who left the CIA with valuable secrets, or that he was murdered because he had discovered who had penetrated the CIA as a "mole" or double agent.

Paisley's total access to the CIA computer system and the most important agency secrets also has raised questions about the successful enforcement of the upcoming SALT agreement with the Soviet Union.

"I have instructed our staff to see that all of our information is made immediately available to your people," Bayh wrote in a letter to Bell. Bayh read the letter to Bell last night over the telephone.

Because of the relationship between Congress and the executive branch, Bayh can only request that Bell conduct an investigation. It is not known whether Bell will agree to Bayh's request.

Justice Department spokesman John Russell said this morning he did not expect any decision from Bell today.

The CIA, meanwhile, refused comment on this new development

in the Paisley case. Spokesman Dale Peterson said the CIA was not aware of the committee request until questioned by a reporter this morning.

In his letter to Bell, Bayh also laid out the scope of the committee's Paisley investigation. "Our efforts have included briefings from the Coast Guard, the Maryland State Police, the CIA and the FBI, as well as interviews of several of Mr. Paisley's friends and associates and members of his family."

"I would appreciate your keeping me apprised with respect to your inquiry, so that we will not be duplicating any investigative steps you might wish to take and so that we may determine what additional steps the committee should take," Bayh told Bell in his letter.

Sources close to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said the decision came under extreme pressure from members of Congress and the press who have raised questions about Paisley, a retired senior CIA official who disappeared Sept. 24.

Much of the pressure has been generated by articles in the News-Journal papers that reported Paisley's role in the nation's intelligence network and later revealed discrepancies in the methods used to identify a body believed to be that of Paisley.

The committee wants to monitor the Justice Department investigation to make sure the committee "doesn't leave the fox in the henhouse totally unguarded," as put by a source privy to the committee discussions.

Such a cooperative arrangement is considered unique since the FBI is part of the executive branch and the General Accounting Office normally investigates for the congressional or legislative branch.

The committee's probe came at the urging of Sen. William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., who cited the News-Journal articles.

Roth said today the "Paisley affair was destined to be swept under the rug" had it not been for the "conviction, sound investigative reporting and tenacity" of the News-Journal papers and its re-

porters. He added that he will monitor the progress of the Justice Department and congressional probe.

The committee investigation began in October, a few days after a body was found floating in Chesapeake Bay near the site where Paisley was last seen sailing his sloop Brillig. The man had been killed by a single, close-range gun shot to the head.

The body was identified as Paisley's, and Maryland State Police ruled he probably committed suicide.

The committee investigation was aimed at looking into whether there was a connection between Paisley's death and a series of security breaches related to the K-11 spy satellite system. Paisley was one of the men who was involved in the development of that system, the keystone of the nation's strategic surveillance system.

The Paisley affair began with the CIA refusing to identify Paisley as anything more than a low-level analyst. Actually, Paisley, 55, retired in 1974 from the CIA as deputy director of the office of strategic research — one of the CIA's top 100 posts.

In a short time after he retired, Paisley was back working for the CIA, this time as a contract employee. When he disappeared, Paisley was preparing a highly sensitive report about the strategic capability of the Soviet Union.

At the time he vanished, Paisley was working for the Washington office of the international accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand. He was about to finish a six-month contract when he disappeared in Chesapeake Bay.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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WILMINGTON MORNING NEWS-DEL.
25 January 1979

Panel's Paisley probe findings to go to FBI

By RICHARD SANDZA
and JOE TRENTO

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Attorney General Griffin B. Bell yesterday ordered the FBI to review the information obtained during the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation into the fate of missing CIA official John A. Paisley.

Bell's order to the FBI came in response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which has become bogged down in its four-month-old investigation of Paisley's Sept. 24 disappearance.

"It just doesn't all hang together as neatly as it should," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., a member of the committee and one of the members to push for the Justice department probe.

"There may be logical explanations for some of the things I view to be troubling dilemmas," Biden said. "But there's no way we can determine that unless we carry our investigation on much more thoroughly than we've been able to do."

"The most logical and, I think, fruitful way is to have the Justice Department pursue the investigation for us," Biden, a Delaware Democrat added.

Also yesterday, Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti acknowledged for the first time that this will not be the FBI's first entry into the Paisley affair. Civiletti told reporters that the FBI has been "monitoring" the Paisley case since Paisley disappeared.

FBI spokesman Tom Harrington said yesterday that the FBI has been "monitoring the Maryland State Police probe and had also been searching for new leads on Paisley."

"We have been looking to see if a federal crime has been committed and we are still looking," he said.

The FBI had repeatedly denied News Journal Newspaper accounts of its involvement in the case.

As a result of Bell's order, in some cases the FBI will be in the position of analyzing its own work.

The FBI played a key role in the identification of the body purport-

ed to be Paisley's. The methods used for the identification — and, therefore, the results, — have come under suspicion by members of the committee and Paisley's wife, who isn't convinced the body was that of her husband.

Biden agreed that in the case of the identification the FBI would, in effect, be investigating itself. But, he said, that "will produce at last for the first time a detailed statement, an explanation, as to what did transpire."

The CIA, caught unaware by the intelligence committee's shifting the probe to the Justice Department, yesterday refused comment on the Paisley case. Spokesman Dale Peterson yesterday referred all questions to the Justice Department and said no further Paisley-related inquiries will be entertained by the CIA. He refused to say who gave that order.

Justice Department spokesman Terry Adamson said Bell and Civiletti met on the committee's request yesterday morning. He said the information obtained by the committee will be turned over to the FBI for "analysis."

"No new investigative work will be undertaken," Adamson said. Rather, the FBI will do its analysis of the committee material and then compare that data to the material uncovered by the FBI, and report the status of the probe to Civiletti.

Civiletti is head of the Justice Department's criminal division. Civiletti will then tell the FBI what to do for the committee. Adamson would not speculate on whether the FBI would eventually do more investigating.

The request for assistance in the Paisley investigation came in a letter from intelligence committee chairman Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind. Bayh asked Bell to help resolve some "troubling questions" that remain unanswered.

The committee asked Justice to intervene. "In view of the FBI's primary jurisdiction over counter-intelligence matters within the United States," Bayh said in the letter to Bell.

The FBI has been placed in the role of helping the legislative branch in the past. In 1975, the Senate turned to the FBI to conduct an investigation into alleged

payoffs of members of Congress by Korean government agents.

Spencer Davis, spokesman for the committee said the decision to turn the investigation over to the Justice Department came "largely because we didn't have the capability to conduct the investigation."

The decision to send the case to Justice was not unanimous, however.

One Democratic senator on the committee, who asked to remain anonymous, refused to go along with the idea.

"All they want to do with this case is get it out of the way before SALT II comes up," he said.

Biden disagreed with that senator's conclusion, saying, "If anything, this brings it out into the open." He said the committee could have merely closed the matter, saying that it "doesn't feel there's any need to pursue this any further."

"I was not comfortable with it lying the way it was. We had some of these dilemmas and then we had to make a decision about whether we were going to make a major investigative effort to resolve them, just write it off, or ask for investigative assistance," Biden said.

Paisley, a 55-year-old retired deputy director of the CIA's office of strategic research was an expert on the nation's capability to monitor Soviet military and strategic activities.

As one of the CIA's top 100 officials, he had access to the nation's most intimate secrets, including the inner workings of

the satellite system the United States plans to use to monitor Soviet compliance with a future SALT agreement.

When Paisley disappeared aboard his sloop Brillig last September, and a body purported to be his was found floating in Chesapeake Bay with a bullet in its brain, there was immediate speculation about whether his disappearance was related to his role in the intelligence community.

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Foes of SALT could seize upon the unanswered questions about Paisley's fate when the treaty comes before the Senate for approval later this year. Press accounts about the most recent developments in the case have mentioned the possible ramifications on the SALT treaty vote. Some senators have told the Associated Press that they are concerned that Paisley may have been a double agent or may have removed secrets from CIA headquarters.

It was Delaware Republican Sen. William V. Roth Jr., who expressed fears about the SALT implications of Paisley's fate, who called upon the Senate intelligence committee to start its probe. Bayh agreed and started the probe on Oct. 8.

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CIA is accused of Paisley cover-up

By JOE TRENTO
and RICHARD SANDZA

WASHINGTON — Under orders from director Stansfield Turner, the CIA is trying to cover up the vital role John A. Paisley played in the agency and the nation's intelligence community, according to sources at the highest level of the CIA.

One of the top officials at the Central Intelligence Agency who received the oral coverup order, said Turner told agency officials not to cooperate with the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Among information vital to the Senate investigation that the agency did not disclose is that the CIA had a set of Paisley's fingerprints in its files since 1970 and that Paisley had direct access to Turner in the months before Paisley either disappeared or died.

A decomposed body identified as Paisley's was fished from the Chesapeake Bay in October. The CIA prints would have helped identify that body. Instead the FBI used prints that it said were mailed into its Phoenix office in 1940 by a "Jack Paisley."

Paisley's role in the agency was constantly downplayed by CIA spokesmen and officials until News-Journal articles disclosed he was involved at the highest levels of intelligence, particularly as it related to the satellite spy system.

After those News-Journal articles, Turner ordered several of his top officials, including those in public affairs, to take lie detector tests to see if they had been leaking information.

The Turner coverup order was apparently aimed at concealing the following information about Paisley which would be vital to the Senate probe, according to sources in the CIA and close to the committee:

- Fingerprints were taken of Paisley before he left to go on a trip to England in 1970. The FBI has insisted it searched government files and found no prints later than 1940. The CIA has never volunteered its own prints.

- Four years after he allegedly retired as deputy director of strategic research, Paisley still held a pass to enter the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., any time he desired.

- Paisley had direct access to Turner and the two men conferred on the KH-11 spy satellite system and U.S. tracking of Soviet and Chinese military operations.

- Paisley helped write the manual for the KH-11 and instructed its operators on which sites in Israel, China and the Soviet Union should be kept under surveillance.

- Until his death or disappearance, Paisley had a top-secret "libretto" or list of code words that gave him access to almost every facet of CIA secret information.

- So many of the documents Paisley signed out from CIA headquarters could not be located that the CIA chose to say he had no secret documents.

At the time of his disappearance, one of Paisley's roles was to evaluate the report of a team of outside experts advising the CIA on Soviet military capabilities. A draft of that report was found on Paisley's sloop, the Brillig, when it ran aground without him in the Chesapeake Bay on Sept. 24.

The CIA last week cut off all comment on the Paisley case, referring inquiries to the Justice Department, which has taken over the Intelligence Committee probe. In accordance with that, the CIA refused Friday to comment on Turner's orders or any other aspects of this story.

The Justice Department has agreed to let the FBI investigate the case because that agency has jurisdiction over counterespionage. Capitol Hill sources said they could not recall any other time when the FBI was, in effect, investigating the CIA.

"From the start they (the CIA) have not cooperated. They have lied, misled and refused us what we wanted," said one angry member of the Senate committee.

The failure of the CIA to cooperate was also cited by a spokesman for the committee yesterday when he was asked if the intelligence agency had volunteered the information before News-Journal articles disclosed new elements in the Paisley probe.

"We had first thought we were getting cooperation," the spokesman said. "As your articles kept appearing it became clear we were getting the runaround. It was an inability to verify what they were telling us that caused us to go to another outside agency."

The Turner "stonewall" orders were disclosed to the News-Journal papers by high-level CIA sources who said they were angered by the directive. The sources insisted they not be identified, even by the type of department where they work.

According to those officials, however, Turner's orders were passed down orally by Robert D. "Rusty" Williams, the director's special assistant on counterintelligence.

After Paisley's sloop was found, and the body identified, the CIA insisted he was a low-level analyst who had retired in 1974. Paisley, in fact, was one of the top 100 people in the agency. Despite Turner's orders, information about Paisley has continued to surface since his disappearance.

The body identified as Paisley had a single gunshot wound above the left ear and had two scuba diving weights strapped around it. With the help of the 1940 FBI prints, the Maryland state medical examiner identified the body as Paisley. Maryland police said he probably committed suicide but continued their investigation.

The identification came under suspicion when the FBI said it could find no prints later than 1940. It also said a large number of prints that could have included Paisley's had been destroyed some years ago.

The medical examiner also used a dentist's identification of an upper plate. The dentist later said the plate could have belonged to a million people and that he had no dental charts to compare it with.

Sources close to the CIA and intelligence committee said that Turner's assistant, Williams, became so incensed at News-Journal revelations that he twice ordered persons suspected of leaking information to be questioned by the CIA Office of Security. At least three "suspects" were given lie detector tests.

The agency also gave special briefings to other reporters in an effort to discredit stories that the intelligence committee later found to be correct. CIA officials eventually conceded that Paisley was a "brilliant analyst" who reported

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to Turner even after his official retirement.

In fact, Paisley was apparently referred to, although not by name, in an interview. Turner gave a year ago to Newsweek editors for a cover story on the CIA. At the time Turner said:

"I see nothing wrong with getting in specialized areas the very best talent the country can bring to bear on a national intelligence estimate . . . This is only one little piece of the Soviet estimate. We went out and hired a fellow who worked for us a few months ago. He was working on this before he left."

Sources familiar with the U.S. intelligence community speculate that Turner's "stonewall" order was given to avoid disclosure of CIA security breaches. Last summer a 23-year-old watch officer was arrested — and later convicted — for stealing a highly classified manual for the KH-11 satellite and selling it to the Russians.

During a tour of CIA headquarters after that incident, President Carter reprimanded workers at the agency, calling on them to close the security leaks.

The security leaks — and the Paisley mystery — could not come at a worse time. Carter is trying to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

If Paisley's disappearance was related to his role in the intelligence network, or if the information he kept in his head is suspected of having been learned by the Soviet Union, foes of SALT II are likely to have plenty of ammunition to kill the treaty when it comes up for Senate ratification.

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"Intelligence Failure"

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2 February 1979

John P. Roche

Failure of intelligence

The failure of our intelligence agencies to predict the downfall of the Shah was not a run-of-the-mill snafu, comparable, say, to being caught flatfooted by the 1967 Greek military coup. Spotting an impending coup requires greater knowledge of the players than that held by local intelligence organs.

Indeed, in Athens the generals who launched the coup were promptly themselves couped by a crew of colonels. But what occurred in Iran was the internal disintegration of authority over a period of years. Life imitated art: when the crunch came the emperor had no clothes.

The standard explanation for this disastrous performance by the CIA is that its agents were forbidden to meet with members of the various oppositions. Their sole source of intelligence on the stability of the regime was the Iranian Secret Police (SAVAK). If true, this was absurd. In Saigon, where the formal rule was no contact with the opposition to Ky and Thieu, I met in 1966 with a wide range of dissenters with the covert aid of the American embassy. There was always deniability: who could object to John Burke and John Roche going to mass and then having tea with a dissident Catholic priest?

But beyond the foolishness of seriously ordering American intelligence officers in Iran to keep away from the Shah's critics, there seems to be an assumption that the United States is the only nation in the world with an intelligence apparatus. Leaving aside the

ubiquitous KGB, we can assume the British, French and Israelis had intelligence assets in Iran. The last time I checked our list of friends, all three were among them. When I was in the government, we used to communicate and cooperate with them. What did their "Sit-Reps" (Situation Reports) on Iran say?

Diligent inquiries among friends acquainted with such matters drew a complete blank on the British reading. Perhaps they too avoided the sensitive subject because it would make the Shah unhappy. Perhaps, like all other British, they were on strike. The most likely possibility is, assuming the CIA was on the account, they didn't waste time and effort on it.

From long experience I know it is virtually impossible to find out what French intelligence (SDECE) is up to. In fact, the French government has the same problem on occasion: a few years back it accidentally came to light that cabinet ministers' phones were routinely bugged. Yet the behavior of the French throughout the Iranian crisis, alluded to here a while back, provides some fertile basis for speculation on SDECE's evaluation of the situation. Moreover, unlike the British, they habitually look on American behavior with a cold, appraising eye.

Thus one explanation for President Giscard's hosting the Ayatollah Khomeini's virtual Iranian government-in-exile could be the following evaluation of the situation both in Washington and Iran: President Jimmy Carter would welsh on the

Shah, and the myth of the Shah's power would vanish to be replaced by a general uprising of malcontents from every quarter of the compass, Thomas Hobbes' "state of nature." Once the dust settles, Khomeini and his followers may not be the dominant force, but they will surely have a piece of the action and an I.O.U. to France. In short, writing the Shah off, the French have kept their further options open.

What about Mossad, the extremely sophisticated Israeli intelligence organization? Material in Israeli newspapers indicates Israel's intelligence officers had the raw data to make a realistic assessment of the Shah's chances, but — in contrast with the unsentimental French — they backed away from predicting disaster because they were convinced the United States would not let it happen. It is taking a while for a number of friendly nations to realize that under our current leadership being an American ally is a high-risk enterprise.

Admittedly this is highly speculative, but the French appear to have hit the intelligence jackpot by focusing not on Teheran, but on Washington. Backstairs information indicates the urbane Giscard and his entourage consider the Carter administration to be a bad joke. So the French went their own way, and President Carter sent a squadron of unarmed F-15s to stiffen Saudi morale. Simple decency should have required one of those "Eagles" to peel off and deliver an ornate wreath to the Shah.

AMERICA

3 February 1979

The Failure of Intelligence

The failure of the U. S. Government to foresee the upheaval in Iran has proved to be embarrassing for President Carter and the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). The White House is blaming the C.I.A. while the agency is pointing the finger at the President's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. According to agency officials, Mr. Brzezinski killed attempts last spring to review the social and economic problems caused by large arms sales to Iran. In addition, the C.I.A. says that for the last 10 years, Government policy forbade contact with opposition groups so that it had to depend on information received from SAVAK, the Shah's secret police.

Bureaucratic attempts to shift blame are common in Washington, but a recent article in World Politics, reprinted by the Brookings Institution, shows why intelligence failures are inevitable. The Iran fiasco is not unique. One need only recall Pearl Harbor, the North Korean attack and the Chinese intervention of 1950, the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the 1974 coup in Portugal.

These lapses, together with well-known failures during the Vietnam War, make intelligence gathering an important area of concern. Richard K. Betts, the author of the article, concludes that "in the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services." In the face of frequently ambiguous data and ambivalent analysis, a decision maker fastens on what supports his predispositions.

What is most discouraging about the Betts article is that the author sees few solutions to the problem of intelligence failure. Proposals for reorganizing the intelligence services usually solve one problem while creating others. Changes in analytic processes still face the problem of ambiguous data, and more rationalized information systems still must confront the predispositions, perceptual idiosyncrasies and time constraints of policy makers. He does endorse three values to guide the choice of marginal reforms in the intelligence system: anything that facilitates dissent and access to authorities by intelligence producers, anything that facilitates skepticism and scrutiny by consumers and anything that increases the time available to principals for reading and reflection. He sees these values as somewhat wistful and suggests what he admits is an outrageously fatalistic conclusion: tolerance for disaster.

THE WASHINGTON POST

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Article appeared
on page A-23*Daniel Yergin*

Two Intelligence Failures

We are now in the midst of a second oil shock as a result of the OPEC price rise in December and the interruption of Iranian oil production (a loss on the world market equal to that lost at the height of the 1973-74 embargo). This second shock dramatizes another kind of intelligence failure, in its own way as serious as the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to anticipate the current turmoil in Iran.

In the last few years, too many of the oil analysts to whom policy-makers and the public have been listening have been handing out Valium, saying that a serious energy crisis is a

The writer, a lecturer at Harvard, is co-author of "Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School."

thing of the past. Only two months ago, one of the ablest analysts was declaring that "the energy crisis we have all been talking about can be avoided. . . . We don't say unquestionably that it can't happen, only that it is not very likely, particularly when you look at the resources and technologies available."

Their views were presented to the public under such headlines as "Experts Dispute Administration, Doubt Energy Crisis in the '80s." Their reasons were various—low economic growth rates, domestic U.S. energy prospects, Mexican oil, technological breakthroughs, etc. And they told us that the real problem actually was a glut of oil. Obviously, these have been most comforting assessments, through wholly inadequate.

Perhaps the most important weakness in such assessments has been their lack of political analysis. Certainly, political factors cannot easily be quantified, despite the earnest labors of a certain breed of social scientist, and so they get left out of the assessments. Thus, many analysts have ignored the fact that the OPEC price is a political price, that an international oil system that depends so heavily upon a few fragile

Middle Eastern countries is a crisis-prone system, that the possibilities for American production from conventional sources has been consistently overestimated.

Preferring to leave out such awkward considerations, many analysts have instead turned to econometric models for guidance. In general, the predictive power of those models has proved very low. Their conclusions about prices and supplies have often been misleading.

Yet policymakers and the press, awed by mathematical models, afraid to say that the computer has no clothes—and trying, of course, to make sense out of so much that is uncertain—have often uncritically accepted the authority of analyses devoid of political content.

But assessments of energy prospects that did try, however roughly, to take political realities into account would have been more consistent and also would have better prepared us for the current situation, better prepared us for the uncertainty with which we now live—and perhaps pointed to more intelligent courses of action.

But people prefer to believe that the energy situation is a rational situation under rational control. To say, as many continue to say, that Iranian oil constitutes only 10 percent of U.S. imports is to miss the point—we are highly integrated with the world market, and tightness in one part of that market means tightness everywhere else.

Indeed, it is altogether possible that we are in the grip of a situation that—without putting a date on when it will come undone—is basically irrational and out of the control of governments and companies.

In October, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger warned that U.S. oil imports could hit 10 million barrels a day by 1985. In the week ending Dec. 29, America's oil imports exceeded 10 million barrels a day. There were some special factors at work. Still, the basic point is clear—the United States is becoming more dependent on imported oil at a time when the shakiness of the world of imported oil is becoming all too visible.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Making Peace and Keeping It

By Alfred Wohlstetter

LOS ANGELES — For more than a decade, it has been plain that of all the disasters of the Vietnam War the worst might be the lessons we would draw from it. Our political élites, recoiling from that remote ambiguous struggle, concluded that improving our ability to project force into distant places was a danger to the world and to us. If we improved our force, we'd be more apt to use it and become mired down.

Arms spending, so the lesson runs, is worse than useless. It provokes adversaries to spend more in turn in an unending spiral. Distant troubles are largely indigenous, generated by local injustice and corruption and, in any case, no part of some Soviet or other Communist conspiracy. We are not engaged in a simple bipolar contest with the Soviet Union. Neither superpower can dominate the world. Instead of playing policeman to the entire world, we should — in the President's phrase — be making peace for the world.

But is that the lesson? Can we make peace anywhere if we cannot reliably promise the necessary force to keep it?

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance was right to reject the stark bipolar picture recently. But if we are not locked in a simple duel with the other superpower, its interests do oppose ours in many essentials. Nor are they likely to be reconciled in any foreseeable arms agreement, least of all in SALT II, which has preoccupied the Administration as one apparently unconnected distant disaster after another has taken it by surprise.

The multipolar world is no less dangerous because it is more complicated. Some changes besides an increase in Soviet control are hostile to our purposes. Few today hold that everything bad happening in the world must stem from a Soviet conspiracy, yet the notion that nothing bad can happen to us if it is not inspired by the Russians is an enduring relic of the bipolar view.

That a multipolar world can be unpleasant is shown by the lethal disorder that would follow a wide dispersal of nuclear weapons. But among the countries most likely to acquire nuclear weapons are those increasingly isolated by the weakening of the American-alliance system: Pakistan,

Iran, South Korea, Taiwan. Getting The Bomb may seem the only alternative as the American military guarantee becomes less convincing.

Third-world countries are not dominoes, all falling inevitably if one falls. But adverse changes in one, even if purely "internal," can generate instabilities in chain.

The chaos in Iran has ominous implications for Pakistan, for Oman, for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, for Israel, and for our critically placed ally Turkey. Pakistan had the support of Iran against threats of further dismemberment, this time by a Baluchistan liberation movement aided by the Afghans and the Soviet Union. Oman had the Shah's help in putting down a Yemeni and Soviet-supported rebellion in Dhofar; trouble may start there again. Both the Saudis and the Israelis have been disturbed, not only by the turn of events in Iran but also by the patent American inability to do anything about it. For the Israelis, the giving of buffer territory in return for an American guarantee looks considerably riskier.

According to President Carter: "We have ... neither ability nor desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. And we certainly have no intention of permitting other nations to interfere ..."

But if we have no ability to intervene ourselves, can we prevent others from intervening? If we are unclear about Soviet interference in these ambiguous deadly quarrels, the Russians are not. Their military guarantees, embodied in "Friendship Treaties" with India and with Vietnam, assured India that it could dismember Pakistan and Vietnam that it could invade Cambodia, free of concern about China. And that is hardly the end of the matter. An extension of Soviet intervention or control far short of "world domination"

could do us and our allies grievous harm. And even where Moscow is not gaining control, we seem to be losing it.

Our major intelligence failures come when analysts keep their eyes shut tight to unpleasant trends. Two decades ago, the Russians had no ability to match American or British forces in the Persian Gulf or Mediterranean. They could not overfly Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran or Pakistan. Today, we have the problems with overflights and the use of overseas bases. But this is no inevitable "decline of the West."

We have the resources to reverse these trends and the technological base to do it efficiently rather than by merely multiplying armies. We and our allies have had other priorities. Between 1960 and 1977 we more than doubled the percentage of the gross national product made up by Federal outlays on "social welfare," while cutting almost in half the fraction devoted to the common defense — which could mean we shall all fair badly.

But to choose to reverse the decline, we need at least to notice it.

Albert Wohlstetter, University Professor at the University of Chicago, is a guest columnist.

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NEW YORK TIMES
29 JANUARY 1979

U.S. Seeks Ways to Gauge Foreign Nations' Stability

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — The Carter Administration is assembling a comprehensive plan to upgrade its ability to forecast political turbulence around the world, a step that senior Government officials said today could result in sweeping changes in existing methods of intelligence collection and evaluation.

The officials said that since early December, a high-level interagency task force has been examining ways for intelligence agencies to improve their ability to predict political instability in countries of critical importance to the United States.

The task force, they said, was created after President Carter expressed his displeasure in November about the failures of the agencies to anticipate the crisis in Iran.

The task force was not expected to issue its formal recommendations to the President until next month, the officials said, but a high-ranking intelligence aide in the State Department said that the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department had already been ordered to determine if other strategic nations might be susceptible to events similar to those in Iran, and to suggest ways in which the United States might respond to such future situations.

The intelligence aide declined to name the countries under study, but other offi-

cials said they included Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Philippines, Indonesia, Egypt, South Korea and Brazil.

Some officials believe that opposition groups in each of these countries could threaten the viability of their governments, which are friendly to the United States. In essence, the intelligence aide said, the Administration wants to know more about the aims and strengths of such opposition groups so that the United States will not be surprised by events similar to those in Iran.

Efforts to enhance political forecasting have been given special priority by the Administration. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the adviser on national security, and others have stressed that military intelligence alone was no longer adequate.

The intelligence aide said that the United States "can no longer just bludgeon its way into situations."

"As our relative power declines," the aide said, "we must learn, like the British did years ago, to become more discriminating, alert and skilled in political intelligence."

Memorandum From Carter

Other officials traced the task force's origin to a handwritten memorandum sent by Mr. Carter in November to Mr. Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence. In the note, Mr. Carter said that he "was dissatisfied with the quality of political intelli-

gence" that he was getting and told his aides to work on together to upgrade such information.

Shortly thereafter, officials said, Mr. Carter's aides formed the task force and put each of their top assistants in charge. They are: David L. Aaron, Mr. Brzezinski's deputy; David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for political affairs, and Frank C. Carlucci, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. According to the officials, the task force has met regularly since December.

The intelligence aide said that the task force has identified several shortcomings of existing intelligence practices. One such problem, the aide said, was that American diplomats and intelligence agents have ignored social changes in key countries during the last decade, and have focused instead on what the ruling elite was thinking.

This has meant, officials said, that in contrast to the early 1960's, American officials abroad have had little contact with forces outside governments, such as youth groups, intellectuals and religious leaders. Within the Central Intelligence Agency, the officials said, this trend was reinforced in the 1970's when more reliance was placed on technical means of intelligence collection than on human sources.

BALTIMORE EVENING SUN

24 January 1979

Brophy O'Donnell

'Bad Intelligence'? Theirs Too, Lately

CONFRONTED with his administration's failure to anticipate the upheaval in Iran, Jimmy Carter laid the blame on inadequate performance by the intelligence agencies. So what excuse does Leonid Brezhnev make when unforeseen developments in client states threaten to upset Moscow's appellation? Does he apply the lash to the KGB, his counterpart of the CIA?

In this connection there are six countries in the Middle East and Africa where the Soviet Union seems to be riding high but is nevertheless vulnerable to forces that could prove beyond control — as the U.S. was in Iran. Consider:

Angola — In the civil war that followed the Portuguese departure in 1975, the Soviets sent in Cuban troops to carry their man Agostinho Neto to victory over the forces of Jonas Savimbi. Neto had generally been considered the frontrunner in the elections that were scheduled but never held. He has now been in power for three years, but Savimbi's guerrillas are still fighting in the south while thousands of unhappy Cubans are wondering if they'll ever see Havana again. Along with that, the economy is in collapse, and the Neto government would hardly last ten minutes if left on its own. Maybe Brezhnev had poor intelligence.

Ethiopia — Here, too, Soviet-Cuban power saved a tottering regime from certain defeat in two wars — the conflict with neighboring Somalia and the civil war in Eritrea province. Yet neither war is really ended. Eritrean and Somali guerrillas fight on, and other lesser insurgencies also help to destabilize this area.

(Somalia was the Kremlin's protege and Indian Ocean power base until the relationship was ruptured by Moscow's military aid to hated Ethiopia. Now Somali President Siyad Barre frets over the refusal of the West to arm him adequately against his Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban foes. If in frustration he does an

aboutface and rejoins the Soviet fold — an emerging possibility — will the CIA get the White House shaft?)

Afghanistan — The Kremlin is underpinning the pro-Moscow regime that was put in power by a bloody coup last April. The underpinning includes T-62 tanks and MiG-23 fighter-bombers. The Soviet muscle is flexed against internal opposition — successful attacks by guerrilla forces in Kunar province, other hit-and-run engagements by disaffected tribesmen who hole up across the border in Pakistan, and the danger of a counter-coup by elements whose leaders participated in the April coup and were later purged. The Chinese are reported to be supplying small arms to guerrillas in their border areas. Didn't the KGB tell Brezhnev this might turn into a messy operation?

South Yemen — This pocket of poverty, strategically located at the entrance to the Red Sea, has been ruled by Marxists with Moscow leanings since independence in 1967. Last June the Soviet position was enhanced when the government faction closest to the Kremlin seized power, with the help of Brezhnev's Cuban mercenaries.

East German and Ethiopian troops also came in to bolster the new regime in the face of internal resistance which, reports indicate, has not yet been suppressed. At least one attempt has been made to assassinate Moscow's stand-in, President Abd al Fattah Ismail. Tension and border skirmishes mark relations with neighboring Saudi Arabia and North Yemen where some resistance elements take cover between forays. Brezhnev wants to know why the KGB wasn't talking to the opposition.

Syria and Iraq — Both are heavily armed by Moscow and have been important recipients of Soviet economic aid. Despite these ties, all is not hunky-dory along the Moscow-Baghdad-Damascus axis. Each of these small clients has had the temerity to op-

pose the Soviets' high-priority assistance to Ethiopia against Somalia and the Eritreans. There have been other disagreements.

The latest flap with Damascus occurred in November when the Syrian chief of staff angrily broke off talks with Soviet defense officials in Moscow after accusing them of reneging on earlier promises of advanced arms deliveries. The dispute was calmed following intercession by Hungarian leader Janos Kadar, and at the end of December the Syrians were back in Moscow with amiability apparently restored. Still, the flareup must have reminded Brezhnev of his failure to bring the Syrians to heel two years ago when they intervened against the Palestinians in Lebanon.

The Iraqis have turned out to be even more uppity than the Syrians. In Damascus, Communists are permitted a few cabinet positions, but in Baghdad they are barely tolerated as a political party and occasionally some are hanged. Thirteen were strung up last May. Then at the beginning of January more executions were reported, and these less than a month after Iraqi strong man Saddam Hussein had a meeting in Moscow with Brezhnev. Perhaps the KGB is not reading Hussein's mind.

Some of these are situations where Washington could and possibly should exploit Soviet difficulties. The "should" involves a consideration of whether inaction beats action. Is it better to let the Russians screw up unassisted, as they sometimes do? On the other hand, left to themselves they may work out of their difficulties.

If the latter is how it works out, where will be the fine line between the inaction option and plain indecisiveness? President Carter had better keep the inadequate-intelligence ploy in reserve.

• Mr. O'Donnell sits up nights in Catonsville, watching the Kremlin.

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SALT

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5 February 1979

Growing Soviet Threat— Even With an Arms Pact

Russia is outpacing the U.S. across the board—in military spending, weapons production, recruiting, even research. And the Pentagon sees no sign of letup in the future.

In advance of a momentous debate over a new strategic-arms-limitation treaty with Russia, the Pentagon is sending this cautionary message to Congress—and the nation:

The pact offers no cut-rate escape from critical defense problems facing the Carter administration. In fact, the U.S. actually will have to increase spending on its strategic forces to prevent the Soviets from gaining a potentially dangerous advantage in the next decade.

This candid assessment is spelled out in the annual defense "posture statement" that Defense Secretary Harold Brown presented to Congress on January 25. The statement is designed to support the Defense Department's request for a 122.7-billion-dollar budget for the fiscal year beginning October 1.

Brown advocates the signing of an arms treaty on the ground that over all it will contribute to "greater stability and predictability in the strategic challenges we face."

But he emphasizes: "It would be a mistake to believe that a SALT II agreement . . . will solve all our defense problems or end the strategic nuclear competition."

On the contrary, the Defense Secretary calls for a stepped-up effort to modernize America's strategic forces. Even with a SALT treaty, Brown points out that outlays for these forces in the next fiscal year must be increased by more than 20 percent—from 8.8 billion to 10.8 billion dollars.

Why boost spending on nuclear weapons if an arms-agreement treaty is signed?

This is the explanation that comes through in the Pentagon report and a new Central Intelligence Agency study:

A determined bid by the Soviet Union for strategic superiority over the United States, far from losing momentum, actually appears to be accelerating—and will continue even with a

new SALT accord. The buildup of Russia's strategic forces has gone even faster than predicted by the Defense Department a year ago.

For example, the total number of warheads that Soviet missiles and bombers can launch has increased at twice the rate that had been predicted a year ago—1,000 against an expected 500. This means that Moscow is narrowing America's advantage in this field at a quicker pace than even the pessimists had anticipated.

Big spenders. Even more disturbing for Pentagon planners is the magnitude of the overall Soviet military buildup. Russia, according to the CIA, is outspending the U.S. on defense by 25 to 45 percent. Soviet military out-

lays, according to the intelligence agency, have passed America's every year since 1971.

Investment in Russia's strategic forces is estimated by the CIA to be three times that of the U.S.

Most alarming, in the view of Defense Department officials, is the Soviet challenge to America's superiority in technology. The Pentagon's posture statement speaks of the "considerable—and not unjustified—dismay" caused by the fact that Russia may be spending 75 percent more on military research and development than this country.

"And this," says Defense Secretary Brown, "when we are supposed to be—and are—depending on our technology to overcome their numbers."

How will this Kremlin drive to outstrip the U.S. in military power be affected by SALT II?

The Pentagon report leaves little doubt that the pact may change the direction but not the pace of the Soviet buildup—even in the strategic-arms field.

For example, the accord will not prevent the Soviets from developing forces capable of a knockout attack against America's 1,000 Minuteman missiles early in the 1980s.

The Pentagon report emphasizes the need for a new intercontinental-ballistic-missile system in the 1980s to replace the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman force.

The Defense Department is set to embark on full-scale development of a new, mobile missile. Still to be decided is how this weapon is to be protected to enable it to survive a first-strike attack by the Soviets.

The cost? Pentagon estimates range from a minimum of 20 billion up to 30 billion.

Additional billions will be needed to build a replacement for the aging B-52 bomber force. Advanced design work will begin later this year on a wide-bodied aircraft to carry air-launched cruise missiles.

The Pentagon posture statement focuses on another strategic threat that will not be mitigated by SALT and that the U.S. must counter on its own. This is Russia's so-called nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes the threat posed by the Soviets this way:

"They have a doctrine which considers nuclear war as think-

Soviet Buildup That Worries the Pentagon

Russian military forces in the past 15 years—

	1964	Now
Troops	3.4 mil.	4.4 mil.
Strategic Arms	450	2,500
Tactical Aircraft	3,500	4,500
Army Divisions	148	170

Defense spending—up 3 percent a year, on average, in real terms

Note: Strategic arms include intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers.

Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense



able.... We have considered nuclear war as unthinkable and have generally directed our efforts toward a spasm war."

The Pentagon report makes this point: The Soviets might assume that in the event of a limited nuclear attack on military targets in the U.S., the President would have to choose between all-out nuclear retaliation and no response at all.

To quote the posture statement: "The temptation [by the Soviets] to exploit this loophole in our deterrent would be minute, but it could be real in desperate circumstances."

In an effort to close this "loophole," a subtle but significant shift in U.S. strategic planning is under way. The aim is to convince the Russians that the American President has ample options to respond in a controlled manner to a limited Soviet nuclear attack.

In practical terms, this shift involves vital improvements in the command, control and communications system and changes in targeting of missiles and bombers. This shift is intended to insure maximum flexibility for the President in directing the use of all or any segment of the American strategic forces.

Why is the Soviet Union devoting so much of its resources to maintaining and even intensifying the momentum of a massive military buildup?

Defense Secretary Brown, who describes this as a "most troubling" phenomenon, offers up three explanations that he thinks are possible.

One is "bureaucratic inertia"—the strength of Russia's "military-industrial establishment."

A second is "Soviet fear, however misplaced it might be, of their neighbors—especially NATO and the People's Republic of China."

Third is an effort "to use military power to increase their influence and to gain political advantage, whether by direct application of military force, through intimidation, through proxies or through arms transfers."

Defense Secretary Brown maintains

that the Russians' "failure to compete successfully in other areas can increase their incentive to use their military power" in bidding for influence around the world.

The crisis in Iran could offer the Soviets an opportunity for such an operation—one which the Defense Secretary indicates could lead to a confrontation with the U.S.

At present, Russia has 20 divisions and about 400 tactical aircraft in a position to mount an invasion of Iran. These forces, according to Brown, have remained at a low state of readiness and "the Soviets have been relatively restrained and cautious in their policy toward Iran."

If Moscow shifts course and embarks on an invasion of Iran—an operation that the Pentagon estimates would take several weeks of preparation—Brown warns that "their intervention could well require a U.S. response."

What is the outlook now for the defense of Europe, which gets top priority in U.S. defense planning?

Here, too, the Pentagon notes a continuing Soviet buildup despite a clear-cut Warsaw Pact superiority over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To support this buildup, Russia is building new tanks, guns and aircraft at two or three times the rate of the U.S.

Beefing up NATO. The administration is concentrating now on a program to beef up NATO in collaboration with European Allies. The 3.1 percent increase that the President is seeking in the defense budget is intended basically to finance the plan for NATO.

The purpose is to convince the Soviets that they can not hope to win a quick victory in a blitzkrieg attack on Western Europe. Toward this end, the U.S. already has increased its forces in NATO, with the equivalent of six divisions now stationed in Europe.

And a plan for fast, large-scale reinforcement of these forces is being pushed. When this plan is fully implemented in the 1980s, the U.S. in a crisis will be able to triple the number of combat planes in the NATO theater within a week and increase troop strength from 200,000 to 350,000 within two weeks.

Secretary Brown is exceedingly cautious in assessing NATO's capacity to cope with a Russian attack. He says only that "the Soviets cannot be confident of a rapid conventional victory in Europe."

To sum up: A SALT II agreement with Russia may be at the top of President Carter's 1979 agenda. But the Pentagon sees no evidence that the pact will dilute the Soviet drive for military superiority over the U.S. □

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
31 January 1979

Article appeared
on page A-10

SALT Verification Information

Sensitive Intelligence Data Made Available to Senators

By Vernon A. Guldry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Carter administration has given the Senate a half-inch sheaf of papers that contain some of America's most sensitive intelligence secrets.

An administration official claims that the papers contain an unprecedented profusion of details and descriptions of intelligence-gathering satellites and ground stations like those now imperiled by civil strife in Iran.

This wealth of information has been passed on in hopes of creating a climate for Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty being negotiated with the Soviet Union.

The material was requested by Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, a former astronaut who has been particularly concerned about U.S. ability to monitor Soviet strategic might.

"I ASKED THEM to put down each and every treaty requirement and the means of verifying it," Glenn said. The point, he went on, was to show the Senate the "blanks and weak spots."

Glenn said the SALT process "is a confidence-building thing. That means verifying what they do."

Glenn has asked for an update of the material to take in account treaty language negotiated with the Soviet Union last month in Geneva. In the meantime the senator says he is withholding judgment on administration claims that the treaty is verifiable.

The material provided Glenn was turned over to the Senate Intelligence Committee where any senator may examine it.

"It's prepared in sort of a matrix," says one Senate staff member. "A senator can look at the treaty provisions and then almost run his finger

down the line to see how that translates into a specific requirement and how that requirement is met, by satellites or whatever."

CRITICS AND proponents alike have focused on verification as a key issue in the SALT debate. One particularly troublesome element has been the Soviet practice of putting information from missile tests into code. Critics say U.S. negotiators have failed to remedy this problem in negotiations at Geneva.

The coding — or inscription — issue is one that also troubles potential SALT supporters such as Glenn.

The Senate Intelligence Committee is conducting its own assessment of the adequacy of SALT verification. And its report will likely become an important factor in the debate. Treaty talks broke down last month in Geneva because, most American officials suggest, the Soviet Union decided to hold off on conclusion of the pact until the events surrounding the dramatic U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China played themselves out.

In the meantime the administration has been following a pattern that was established in earlier difficult foreign policy issues concerning the Congress. President Carter has been meeting with a number of key senators while other aides have conducted a series of briefings at the White House for Senate staff members.

The White House also is reviving a congressional stroking technique it has used to good effect in the past. Beginning tomorrow, the White House will have a series of dinners for members of Congress that will be followed by a three-hour, Cabinet-level presentation on U.S. foreign policy.

Members of the Senate leadership and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are due this week.

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
26 January 1979



NEWS FOCUS

The Wrong Way To Sell SALT

By Cord Meyer

WASHINGTON — President Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, are so committed to the achievement of a SALT agreement that they are being disconcertingly slow to criticize Soviet misbehavior.

With the signing of SALT II as their overriding objective, both men have tended to overlook abundant evidence of Soviet involvement in Iran and Cambodia.

As Iran slides into chaos, Carter has warned Brezhnev not to intervene. But he has politely refrained from calling the Russians to account for the inflammatory broadcasts of their clandestine radio. Beaming from Baku inside the Soviet Union, the Russians have been calling in Persian for the immediate expulsion of all Americans from Iran.

The Soviet support of the Vietnamese assault on Cambodia was so blatant that even communist Rumania was compelled to protest bitterly the Russian role. However, Vance has claimed that the evidence of Soviet involvement is not yet clear and Carter has made only equivocal comments.

Carter and Vance have given similar explanations for their reticence in recent interviews. Vance said he was concerned by rising anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States. He said he would "resign tomorrow" rather than participate in reviving the passions of the Cold War.

For his part, Carter said he was "concerned about the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment particularly among the elites and experts." However, he feels reassured by polls that show a majority to be with him on the arms control issue. The implication of these statements is that the American public should not be exposed to too much unpleasant Soviet reality for fear of provoking irrational overreaction.

IN PRACTICE, THIS self-imposed restraint leads to an extreme version of Vance's familiar position that there must be no "linkage" between SALT and Soviet behavior on other issues. Not only will the United States refuse to make a SALT agreement conditional on cessation of Soviet interventions, but it will go further and refrain from strenuously objecting to such moves in order to keep the SALT dialogue going.

However, geopolitical reality has a way of intruding upon the rarefied atmosphere in which the two superpowers conduct their SALT negotiations. Ironically, even as Carter presses

for an arms control agreement, the Iranian revolt has endangered two ground sites operated by American intelligence on Iran's border with Russia. Information collected from these sites is crucial to American ability to verify that the Soviets comply with SALT limitations on the number of missile warheads.

At great expense and considerable delay, alternative intelligence collection systems can be devised to recover part of the vital information that would be lost. But there is no really adequate substitute for the line-of-sight coverage of Soviet test ranges provided by the mountainous terrain on Iran's border.

The Soviets will celebrate the closing of this window on their research and development, but the American critics of SALT have been given a new and serious reason for questioning the adequacy of our verification procedures.

AS THE CARTER administration begins to realize the strength of Senate opposition to SALT II, there is a growing tendency to portray the defeat of the treaty in apocalyptic terms. In reality, SALT is at best a useful method of placing a verifiable limit on certain types of strategic armament, and reasonable men can differ on whether it is wise to accept the specific terms of the proposed treaty.

But Carter has begun to argue that rejection by the Senate will destroy the credibility of the American presidency, "deal a severe blow" to U.S.-Soviet relations and do irreparable damage to America's peaceful reputation in the world. With these rhetorical excesses, Carter is taking a huge gamble. If the treaty is rejected, he will have given the Soviets a powerful propaganda weapon by exaggerating the implications of defeat.

Mounting suspicion of Soviet intentions at home and growing concern among our allies abroad are not invented by an elitist cabal of experts, as Carter has suggested. They are the direct result of increasing Soviet military strength and the adventurous uses to which it has been put.

Carter's State of the Union message was strong in its support of SALT but had not one word to say about the expansion of Soviet power in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Carter can't sell SALT by ignoring this geopolitical reality. The Senate debate on ratification will force him to explain what he intends to do about the steady erosion of American influence.

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NEW YORK TIMES
1 FEBRUARY 1979

U.S. Warns Russians to Stop Encoding

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 — The Carter Administration has warned the Soviet Union that an attempt to impede American efforts to monitor a Soviet missile test on Dec. 21 has jeopardized the ability of the United States to verify Soviet compliance with the terms of a projected treaty limiting strategic arms, Government officials said today.

The Administration, they added, has also told Moscow in recent days that if the Soviet Union, under a new treaty, tried to conceal test data in this manner, the United States would consider it a serious violation of the agreement.

The officials said the unusual warning was prompted by a test firing of Mos-

cow's new SS-18 missile, the largest and most lethal rocket in the Soviet arsenal. During the test, Moscow is said to have transmitted electronic messages from the missile to Soviet ground stations in code in an apparent effort to conceal the signals from American listening posts on the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Since the test information, known as telemetry, is viewed by the Central Intelligence Agency as vital to verifying Soviet compliance with a new accord, the December missile firing has complicated last-minute efforts to complete the arms negotiations. It is also seen as raising new problems for the Administration in convincing the Senate that the United States could detect a Soviet effort to evade parts of the proposed agreement.

So far, officials said, Moscow has not responded to the warning.

Meanwhile, the Administration's handling of the telemetry issue is being debated in the United States Government. Some aides charge that Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, has exaggerated the importance of the test data in verifying a new accord, thus setting back chances for a treaty with Moscow.

The officials said that in a number of conversations with President Carter, Admiral Turner had pushed for a firm American position on Soviet attempts to encode test data despite the fact that other agencies doubted the utility of such a stand.

A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman refused to discuss the issue.

Encoding first emerged as a serious issue in the arms talks after an SS-18 test

Missile Data

in July when much of the missile's telemetry was sent in code.

Last fall, American negotiators tried to get Moscow to accept a ban on such encoding but failed. In late December at Geneva, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko agreed to an ambiguous provision in which Moscow was permitted to encode only missile test data that would not hinder American verification of a new accord.

However, the provision evidently does not specify what information is necessary to monitor an accord. Some officials say this omission could allow Moscow to continue to withhold key information about new missiles. In an effort to remove this ambiguity, the Administration officials said, the United States has told Moscow that the encoding of the Dec. 21 test is an example of what would be banned by the new provision.

New Soviet tests called cloud on arms limitation

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Soviet Union has begun test-launching long-range cruise missiles from its controversial Backfire bomber in a move that could complicate arms control negotiations and pose new defense problems for the United States, authoritative government sources reported yesterday.

While new intelligence reports were said to state flatly that there have been eight such tests, some defense officials contended that there was a lingering uncertainty as to whether the Backfire was the launching airplane.

There was no dispute, however, about the missile tests themselves, or that the winged vehicles were launched over distances more than twice as great as were estimated for Soviet cruise missiles as recently as this week in congressional testimony by Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense.

The significance of the Backfire as a launching aircraft is that the Soviets have stubbornly refused to have it included under the numerical ceilings for strategic weapons in the prospective strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT).

They contend it is not a strategic weapon and American negotiators accept that its primary mission may be to attack targets in countries bordering the Soviet Union as well as naval fleets. It is seen as an imposing threat to the U.S. Navy, even without cruise missiles.

American negotiators also argue that the Backfire has the range, especially with its in-flight refueling capability, for strategic missions against the United States.

Against the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Carter administration is prepared to accept side assurances from Moscow that basing restrictions and production limitations will prevent the Backfire from threatening the United States. The new intelligence reports could complicate matters for negotiators and surely will complicate the administration's problem in winning Senate endorsement of an eventual treaty.

Secretary Brown told the House Armed Services Committee Monday that the Backfire would have to be counted under SALT weapons ceilings if it turned out to be a carrier of long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Long-range in the case of such weapons is defined as more than 600 kilometers (373 miles).

Mr. Brown's comment was in response to a speculative question from Representative Robin L. Beard, Jr. (R., Tenn.) about the Backfire's potential for launching 1,500-kilometer-range cruise missiles. Mr. Brown said, without elaboration, that the Russians "have some new ones under development."

The defense chief's prepared statement said: "Both the Bear [an aging Soviet bomber] and the Backfire can carry air-launched cruise missiles with ranges of about 500 kilometers. As yet, there is no evidence that the Soviets have developed a cruise missile comparable to [America's] although they may be developing a long-range cruise missile of their own design." Some sources suggested that the secretary's statement may already have been overtaken.

According to the intelligence reports, the Russians have launched eight test missiles from Backfire bombers and the average range has been 1,200 kilometers (745 miles). The estimate was that the missiles have fuel capacity to reach farther. The latest test was said to have been within the past two weeks.

Under the emerging U.S.-Soviet SALT treaty, each side would be allowed 2,250 strategic vehicles—land and submarine-based missiles and heavy bombers. No more than 1,320 could carry multiple warheads or air-launched Cruise missiles.

As matters stand now, the Backfire fleet—expected to number 400 planes by 1985—would not be counted under those ceilings, a matter severely criticized by a House Armed Services Committee panel on which Mr. Beard served.

It was Secretary Brown's contention that any arming of the Backfire with long-range cruise missiles would automatically bring the plane under the treaty ceilings. Whether the Russians would agree with that was not discussed.

If they maintained that their missiles

had 600-kilometer range, and remained excluded, considerable problems could arise for the administration. In any case, the emergence of long-range cruise missiles in the Russian air forces—enabling them to fly long ranges and launch missiles toward targets hundreds of miles away—poses new problems in verifying compliance with SALT agreements. What planes carry short-range and what planes carry long-range missiles?

The American missile development has long since handed the Russians that problem. Significantly, they dropped their insistence on range limitations late last year.

Under SALT terms, heavy bombers with cruise missiles are supposed to have what the negotiators term "externally observable differences" from other aircraft of the same type.

1 February 1979

Article appeared
on page A-2

Teller Calls for Release Of All Spy Satellite Photos

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

Dr. Edward Teller, the onetime hawk and nuclear physicist often described at the "father of the hydrogen bomb," yesterday called on the United States to release to the entire world its spy satellite photographs of earth.

"I am aware such a suggestion runs completely counter to present practice," the Hungarian-born Teller told the Senate Commerce subcommittee on science, technology and space, "but I believe such a move would contribute to the peace and stability of the whole world."

Teller said U.S. reconnaissance satellite photographs should be made available on a routine basis to most countries. He said that if the United States did not want to do it, an international consortium should be formed to put up a spy satellite and distribute its photos to everybody.

"It is very important that verification of treaties and intentions be made public knowledge everywhere," Teller said. "Otherwise, people in power will continue to call each other liars and the people in general will continue to be confused by these public statements."

Teller's call for an "open space" policy is the most recent in a series of suggestions he has made to do away with the world's military secrets. Previously, he has called for a law requiring declassification of scientific secrets, including those pertaining to the development of nuclear weapons.

Teller said he would like to open up all U.S. space secrets to the world but he recognizes that revealing the results of electronic eavesdropping might be impractical.

"I will confine my proposal to photo reconnaissance because countermeasures against it are very difficult."



DR. EDWARD TELLER

"from an angel's point of view"

Teller said. "And to the extent that the Russians might learn something from the publication of pictures alone, I think these pictures would be of little help to them."

Testifying before Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson's subcommittee, which is seeking advice on how the space shuttle should be used, Teller said he thought its first priority should be weather forecasting and its second one crop forecasting.

"The shuttle could take up a small satellite once very week that could watch wind velocities at almost all levels of the atmosphere," Teller said. "Using a combination of radar and lasers we could get a real comprehensive view of the atmosphere from an angel's point of view."

The one thing he would never use the shuttle for, Teller said, is a solar power satellite to supply Earth with electricity by microwave transmission.

"My own estimate," Teller said, "is that solar space energy will cost for the rest of this century at least 30 times what we pay each year for our national fuel bill." The national oil bill alone comes to more than \$60 billion a year.

Teller said that anyone who pays for it should be allowed room aboard the space shuttle but that the privilege should be denied to anyone who wants to conduct research in secret aboard the shuttle.

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"Mind Control"

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on page A-6

CIA Mind Control

There is evidence that CIA mind-control research continued into the 1970s even though agency officials indicate most of it ended in 1963, says the author of a new book.

John Marks says that in response to a Freedom of Information Act request aimed at specific behavioral research topics, the CIA informed him it has identified 130 boxes of papers expected to contain related documents.

"I was astounded by the amount of this undisclosed material," said Marks, a former State Department intelligence officer. "The agency says it is reviewing the material, and I expect it to be released within six months."

THE WASHINGTON POST

29 January 1979

Article appeared
on page A-2**Work Went On Into 1970s, Author Says**

Book Disputes CIA Chief on Mind-Control Efforts

By Bill Richards

Washington Post Staff Writer

Despite assurances last year from Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner that the CIA's mind-control program was phased out over a decade ago, the intelligence agency has come up with new documents indicating that the work went on into the 1970s, according to a new book.

John Marks, the author of the book, said the CIA mind-control researchers did apparently drop their much publicized MK-ULTRA drug-testing program. But they replaced it, according to Marks, with another supersecret behavioral-control project under the agency's Office of Research and Development.

The ORD program used a cover organization set up in the 1960s outside Boston headed by Dr. Edwin Land, the founder of Polaroid, who acted as a "figurehead," said Marks in his book. The project investigated such research as genetic engineering, development of new strains of bacteria, and mind control.

The book identifies the Massachusetts proprietary organization headed by Land as the Scientific Engineering Institute. The CIA-funded institute was originally set up as a radar and technical research company in the 1950s and shifted over to mind-control experiments in the 1960s, according to the book. Land could not be reached for comment yesterday.

In testimony last year before a Senate committee, Turner indicated that most of the CIA's mind-control work ended in the 1960s with the exception of a few scattered programs. According to Marks, however, the ORD program was a full-scale one and just as secret as the earlier MK-ULTRA project.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday that the intelligence agency had not reviewed Marks' book and would make no comment until it did.

In his book, Marks said he learned of the program last year when the

CIA notified him that it had located 130 boxes of material on the project after he filed a Freedom of Information Act request.

Marks, a former State Department intelligence officer and frequent CIA critic, is the author of "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate," which is scheduled to be released next month. The book is based on about 16,000 pages of information on the MK-ULTRA and other mind-control experiments that were released in 1977 and 1978.

In researching the material, Marks said he found that CIA mind-control researchers trained secret police in Uruguay and South Korea, and funded an extensive program of LSD and shock-treatment research at McGill University in Canada.

According to the book, Dr. D. Ewen Cameron, at the Allen Memorial Institute at McGill, ran the experiments which were paid for by the CIA. Cameron, who died in 1967, received the money through the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, another CIA front. It is unknown if Cameron was aware that the money came from the CIA.

Marks said the experiments at McGill included giving unknowing subjects with mental problems massive doses of LSD and subjecting them to long-term shock treatment in an effort to "depattern" them and plant new-behavior methods in their minds. About half of the subjects were left with long-term amnesia from the treatment, which had little beneficial effect, Marks said.

In addition, the CIA, under its MK-SEARCH project, funded a Baltimore biological laboratory run by an ex-CIA agent to insure that the agency had a "quick delivery" germ warfare capability, the Marks book reports. The project was kept secret even from the Army, which had its own germ warfare center at Fort Detrick where the CIA was also doing research.



JOHN MARKS

... frequent critic of CIA

According to the book, the CIA's far-reaching drug-research program, which eventually involved 80 universities and other institutions, was set off in part because of a mathematical error by an agency analyst.

In 1951, the author says, word reached the CIA that the Soviets had purchased 50 million doses of LSD from the Swiss Sandoz company. In fact, the Soviets bought only 50 doses of the hallucinogen. But Marks said CIA officials were so alarmed at the potential of the purchase they stepped up their own fledgling drug program and rushed two agents to Switzerland with \$240,000 in a black bag to buy 100 million LSD doses for themselves.

The deal fell through, the book says, because startled Sandoz officials admitted they didn't have enough LSD to meet the CIA request.

Marks, along with former CIA agent Victor Marchetti, wrote "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," which was heavily censored by the agency before publication.

THE BOSTON GLOBE
30 January 1979

Article appeared
on page 23

Dirt report at 12:30 a.m.

By William A. Henry 3d
Globe Staff

LOS ANGELES — There's no poster, no T-shirt and no doll, but there is an intricate marketing agreement tied to ABC's documentary tonight about the CIA's 30 years of experiments at brainwashing, consciousness-altering and "mind control."

The program is airing 12:30-2 a.m. on Channel 5 rather than in prime time so that its early-morning timing will coincide with the release of a book by the show's principal consultant, John Marks.

Marks was paid \$7500 for sharing the knowledge he has accumulated in four years of research. More important, he was promised that the show would appear when his book did, and that he would be prominently mentioned on air.

Because the program's time slot fell into the crucial February ratings "sweeps," when no network will risk the low audience of a prime time documentary, the 90-minute show was pushed back to a low-viewership spot opposite "The Tonight Show."

The decision about timing was made by Pamela Hill, the executive producer who last year re-recorded young hoodlums on a sound stage for another documentary because their actual street utterances were blurry or inaudible.

Hill was also the producer who approved an hour documentary about Palestinian terrorists that gave them an uninterrupted platform and presented no opposing view.

Under Hill, ABC has become the most inventive, flashy, and experimental network. Its documentaries are the broadest-ranging, but its techniques are the most controversial.

"Mission: Mind Control" will likely provoke more controversy, from both left and right.

Much of the 90 minutes details the CIA's experiments with LSD. The people who received it were unaware of what they were taking. Most were drunks, derelicts, prostitutes, mental patients — people at the fringe of society who could not retaliate or "go public" if they discovered what had been done to them.

Some weep on camera tonight as they relive their suffering. Most claim they were permanently hurt. Some say their lives were wrecked.

Although the documentary makes fleeting reference to the counter-culture and quotes Timothy Leary, it will leave all but the most cautious viewer thinking that LSD routinely causes insanity even when taken knowingly as a recreational drug.

Television

The effects of LSD are suggested in snippets of a 20-minute film of ever-changing hallucinations. The vivid footage is interspersed with flatly-told horror stories of, for example, an experiment in a public health hospital: drug addicts who took LSD were also given the drug of their addiction, primarily heroin, driving them back to their old habits and making them even less able to reveal or prosecute the CIA's actions.

Reporter Paul Altmayer caught many former CIA officials and academic researchers lying or distorting. One, Robert Lashbrook, is accused of having perjured himself before a committee of Congress. The Congressional witnesses as a group are charged with having conspired to lie and sustain a cover-up.

Documentaries rarely make headlines. Usually they pursue them. "Mind Control" originated with the much-reported case of Frank Olsen, a CIA employee who leaped from a tenth floor window to his death in the early 1950s. His family was not told he had been given LSD without his knowledge, and they lived more than two decades with the feeling of guilt and responsibility for his death. Mrs. Olsen appears on camera. She is quiet and reasonable, and she makes an audience share her calm contempt.

Conservatives can justly complain that the documentary never focuses on the Cold War, the Russian experiments in mind control, the fear engendered by the leak of nuclear technology and later by Sputnik. It dismisses the possibility of a "Manchurian candidate," a "programmed" assassin, without mentioning the case of the man Stalin trained to murder Leon Trotsky.

Altmayer's belief, and Hill's is that good ends such as national security cannot justify immoral means. The evidence is overwhelmingly on their side. How distant from humanity we are when we hear or read the words of a researcher's memo that his work "occasionally may result in unavoidable fatality" — fatality of helpless, unknowing and innocent people.

The network has promised a follow-up report as the CIA begins to release some 130 boxes, a whole roomful of papers about its experiments in the early 1970s. For the diligence we all should be grateful. If our government must be dirty, we cannot be allowed to wash our hands.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-10NEW YORK TIMES
30 JANUARY 1979

TV: An 11:30 P.M. Look At Mind-Control Studies

By JOHN J. O'CONNOR

ABC NEWS documentaries these days are exhibiting pronounced schizoid symptoms. Those tackling sensitive issues from fresh angles, both technical and interpretive, have been encouraging. Two outstanding examples were "Youth Terror" and a portrait of the Palestinians. But those dabbling in inherently sensational subjects, such as the occult, have generated understandable nervousness.

Tonight's example, "Mission: Mind Control," falls somewhere in the uneasy middle. Scheduled outside prime time, the 90-minute documentary begins at 11:30 P.M.

The producer and writer is Paul Altmeier, whose television record is certainly solid, particularly in the area of investigative reporting. And the stated purpose of the program is certainly legitimate: to pull together the bits and pieces of stories involving the United States Government in the last 30 years in various experiments aimed at perfecting mind control.

For the most part, the experiments involve drugs, most of them, such as LSD, hallucinogenic. Much of the story has already been covered in the general press. There are the distressing tales of unwitting guinea pigs. There are the cases of covered-up suicides, most notably those of Frank Olson and Harold Blauer. Extensive experiments were conducted on relatively powerless types — prostitutes,

drug addicts — living on the fringes of society.

This ABC-TV compilation touches on all these aspects and more, getting exclusive interviews with former officials and consultants to the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies. At the same time, however, the program's methods provide both too much and too little in the way of substantial content.

While much of the material would seem to suggest a staggering ineptness in American efforts in these areas, the documentary insists on emphasizing the more outrageous statements of some obvious oddballs. Much is made, for instance, of George White, a bizarre consultant to the C.I.A. who once wrote, "It was fun, fun, fun... where else could a red-blooded American lie, kill, cheat and rape with the sanction of the all-highest?" Well, yes, but the truly dangerous villains of this scenario were considerably more proper in tone and behavior.

Two devices are especially irritating. Clips from the film "The Manchurian Candidate" are shamefully overused. A scene in which a brainwashed Laurence Harvey, under orders from the enemy, shoots his Army buddy in the face is shown not once but twice. One explanation may be that the documentary owes an obvious debt to "consultant" John Marks, whose new book will be entitled "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The C.I.A. and Mind-Control."

In addition to this, evidently in an effort to get away from "talking heads," the proceedings are regularly inter-



John Gittenger, retired chief psychologist for the C.I.A.

rupted to show an experimental film's conception of an LSD "trip." Now, of course, there is no such thing as a single trip. Different people react differently to hallucinogenic drugs. Some trips are pleasant, others terrifying. But nevertheless, "Mind Control" insists on wasting considerable time on these tedious versions of a "simulated LSD experience."

In the end, piled atop a mound of intriguing material and ominous declarations, an expert is brought on to conclude that as far as the average human mind is concerned, "predictable, absolute control is not possible." The point is made clearly, but one can't help wondering what viewers will remember longer: the unsensational expert or those scenes of Laurence Harvey blowing off his friend's head.

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30 January 1979

Mind Control Study Continued for Decade After CIA Said It Was Ended, Book Claims

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The CIA sponsored scientific research into methods of controlling the human mind for almost a decade after it ended its previously disclosed experiments with LSD in 1963, author John Marks says in a new book.

Citing documents released by the agency under the Freedom of Information Act, Marks, a former State Department intelligence officer, said the CIA continued at least until mid-1972 to search for exotic ways to dominate the brain and control behavior.

Ultimately, the agency admitted that its experimentation, which began in 1950 in the midst of the cold war, was a failure—the human mind was either too resilient or too unpredictable to be molded with the reliability required for espionage operations.

The book, "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate," quotes a CIA document as saying that the mind-control programs finally ended

July 10, 1972, when the chief of the project, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, wrote its bureaucratic epitaph.

"The Clandestine Service has been able to maintain contact with the leading edge of developments in the field of biological and chemical control of human behavior," Gottlieb wrote. "It has become increasingly obvious over the last several years that this general area had less and less relevance to current clandestine operations."

"On the scientific side, it has become very clear that these materials and techniques are too unpredictable in their effect on individual human beings, under specified circumstances, to be operationally useful. Our operations officers have shown a discerning and perhaps commendable distaste for utilizing these materials and techniques."

The materials and techniques included LSD and a wide variety of mind-altering drugs, sexual entrapment, electric shock, electrodes implanted in the brain, radiation and

hypnosis. The program was conducted under such code names as Bluebird, Artichoke, MK-ULTRA, MK-NAOMI, MK-SEARCH and Project Often.

The objectives were to develop a foolproof truth serum to be used in questioning agents, defectors and enemy prisoners; to determine if brainwashing was possible; to devise ways of producing amnesia so that agents could not disclose secrets if captured; and to develop a variety of ways of killing and incapacitating enemies.

It was once the CIA's deepest secret. The public did not get its first glimpse of the mind control program until 1975, when a commission headed by then-Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller reported that an Army civilian employee—since identified as Dr. Frank Olson—had committed suicide in 1953 after having been given LSD without his knowledge.

The Rockefeller report provided no details, but in the last three years additional information has seeped out. In his book, Marks pulls the story together, showing for the first time its scope, placing previous disclosures in context and filling in some of the blanks.

For example, he reports that in the 1960s Dr. James Hamilton, a San Francisco psychiatrist, received CIA funds to conduct "clinical testing of behavioral control materials" on inmates at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville. Although the records do not indicate the precise nature of the experiments, they show that in 1967 and 1968 Hamilton spent more than \$10,000 in CIA funds to pay volunteers. At prison pay scales, that means he probably experimented on between 400 and 1,000 inmates.

Marks says that in the late 1950's the CIA paid some—although not all—of the expenses of Dr. Ewen Cameron's unorthodox psychological programs at a hospital in Montreal. Cameron used massive electric shock treatments combined with long periods of sleep in an effort to "depattern" schizophrenic patients.

According to Marks, the CIA's interest in LSD in the early 1950's created much of the international market for the drug. Marks speculates that without CIA experiments—most of them carried out on college campuses—the drug-oriented counterculture of the 1960's might never have started.

CIA role in LSD research told

By Eleanor Randolph

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency, which in the 1950s began experimenting with ways to control the mind, may have unwittingly introduced LSD to what became the "acid generation," according to a new book by CIA critic John Marks.

Marks, a former State Department Intelligence officer, said in a book to be released next month that the agency promoted and paid for much of the LSD research that provided the first acid trips to hundreds of American young people in the 1950s.

"No one at the agency apparently foresaw that young Americans would voluntarily take the drug — whether for consciousness expansion or recreational purposes," Marks said. "It would become a supreme irony that the CIA's search for weapons among drugs would wind up helping to create the wandering, uncontrollable minds of the counterculture."

MARKS, WHOSE book — "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate" — is named after the well-known movie of the early 1960s, spent the last year poring over 16,000 pages of CIA documents on mind control. He received them through the Freedom of Information Act.

A spokesman for the CIA said Monday that the agency will not comment on the book, which covers mind-control programs through 1963.

Marks said agency officials have told his lawyers that by June they will release 130 more boxes of documents concerning other mind-control projects by the agency into the 1970s.

FROM DOCUMENTS already released, Marks said the agency has disclosed that:

The CIA carefully watched, and to a large extent controlled, during the 1950s and 1960s the production of LSD — lysergic acid diethylamide — by the company that originated the drug, Sandoz of Switzerland. At one point in 1951, CIA

officials became alarmed that the Soviets had purchased 50 million doses of the hallucinogen. But the diplomatic official who passed on this information confused milligrams with kilograms; the company had sold the USSR 50 doses.

● The CIA's chief drug research program, MKULTRA, also entered other areas, such as chemical sabotage. A Houston chemist backed by the CIA found a bacterium that destroyed oil, and CIA agents used this in 1967 to sabotage French shipments of oil to Cuba. The idea was to neutralize all the working vehicles on Castro's island.

● The CIA funded a prominent psychiatrist, Dr. D. Ewen Cameron, who was testing ways to "depattern" mental patients. At the Allan Memorial Institute of McGill University in Montreal, Dr. Cameron tried to wipe clean the brains of mental patients by keeping them asleep for days or even weeks using electroshock treatments and drugs. According to Marks, Dr. Cameron also kept one woman in a sensory deprivation "hex" for 35 days without light, smell, or sound.

THE LSD tests by the CIA and tests with hallucinogens by other military intelligence agencies contributed to two deaths, according to Marks and numerous other reports. They were Frank Olson, a CIA agent who committed suicide several weeks after an associate slipped him a dose of LSD; and Harold Blauer, a New York professional tennis player who died when he was injected with mescaline derivatives in 1953 by doctors at the New York State Psychiatric Institute.

Word of LSD research in another project called ARTICHOKE was spread by such groups as the Macy Foundation — which Marks says is CIA-backed — to intellectuals in the mid- and late 1950s. Because of this, according to Marks, such counterculture celebrities as poet Allan Ginsberg and Ken Kesey received LSD through research projects in California.

Marks, who coauthored a heavily censored book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" with ex-agent Victor Marchetti, said the documents showed that

even extreme efforts at brainwashing and mind control so far have been unsuccessful.

"So far, at least, the human spirit has apparently kept winning," Marks wrote. "That — if anything — is the saving grace of the mind-control campaign."

THE WASHINGTON POST

30 January 1979

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The TV Column

Late News Special

"ABC News Closeup—Mission: Mind Control" Features interviews with former intelligence officials and consultants to the CIA and other agencies as well as the "unwitting victims" of truth drug and mind-control experimentation by the government over the past 30 years.

This 90-minute program also probes two cases that resulted in deaths. Consultant to ABC News for the show was John Marks, author of the forthcoming book, "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control" (Channel 7, 11:30).

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501340001-8

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Dan".

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501340001-8

Shah or sham? CIA won't comment on tape

Washington (News Bureau)—CIA Director Stansfield Turner disclosed yesterday that his agency has obtained a copy of a tape-recording purporting to contain instructions from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to his army to foment a civil war in Iran as a means for him to return to power.

In an interview, Turner declined to discuss whether the CIA had concluded that the tape — broadcast on Los Angeles television station KNXT Wednesday night — actually contained the voice of the shah or was a cleverly doctored fake.

The voice on the 15-minute tape — which KNXT said had been verified as that of the shah by three experts on "voiceprints" — said that by "creating hostility and hatred between the army and the people, by ordering the soldiers to shoot freely... we shall gradually proceed to shore up our powers."

Karl Fleming of KNXT said that he had been told that a participant at a meeting with the shah in Tehran a few weeks ago had secretly taped the meeting and forwarded the tape to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Paris. It was then given to Khomeini's followers, who visited several major news outlets a few weeks ago. Only KNXT concluded that the voice on the tape was really the Shah's.

If the tape is authentic, it may present new problems for the CIA, which has been criticized for failing to predict the turmoil in Iran.

There is considerable dispute among audio experts as to the validity of the tape. According to one source, while KNXT's experts vouched for the authenticity of the tape, citing voiceprints and other technical means, experts hired by other news organizations thought it doubtful.



Stansfield Turner

Says CIA has tape

Turner declined to discuss the Iranian situation in detail. He did say that, generally, the agency realizes that in some countries the regime might think CIA conversations with the opposition mean the U.S. is trying to overthrow the government.

Turner did not say he was talking about Iran where the CIA did help the shah overthrow the Mossadegh regime 25 years ago.

The shah reportedly said on the tape that the U.S. had helped in the shah's effort to suppress the rebellion.

Fleming told The News of an unconfirmed report — not discussed on the tape — that a KIA agent had attended the taped meeting. The CIA was not mentioned on the tape.

Home Thoughts from Abroad

A "vacationing" Shah puts the blame on Jimmy Carter

Far from the madding crowds of Tehran, the Shah whiled away the second week of a "vacation" that many expect will evolve into permanent exile. Part of the week was spent absorbing touristic distractions in Egypt and Morocco. But his major occupation was reflecting on events in Iran, and deciding on his own future course.

In an abrupt change of plans, the Shah apparently will not be visiting the U.S., even though Washington had already arranged special security measures for him at the Palm Springs, Calif., estate of Mil-

toast at the Niavaran Palace in 1977, the Shah claims that he was subsequently plagued by continued sniping from Washington. As the crisis worsened, the Shah was made to feel unsure about U.S. support if he took strong action to control the disorders. His failure to act decisively encouraged his opposition in the belief that he was vulnerable; his belated granting of concessions was perceived as weakness. Ultimately, the Shah contends, Washington attempted to force his abdication. When he refused to step down, the CIA was ordered to undermine him.



Egyptian First Lady Jihan Sadat (left) and Shah visiting temple of Philae near Aswan

Time to adjust to events, assess blame for what happened, and hope for another chance.

lionaire Publisher Walter H. Annenberg. One reason given was that the Shah wanted to stay near Iran until the consequences of the Ayatullah Khomeini's return home became clear; if events went against the Shah, he might then take up residence somewhere in Europe. Privately, the Shah fears that he might be treated in the U.S. as a rich refugee rather than a visiting head of state. He also believes that he would be politically compromised by fleeing to the U.S. More than that, he is so outraged by what he feels was the betrayal of the Carter Administration that he has no wish to seek sanctuary in the U.S., a country that, in his view, helped force him off his throne.

The Shah directly blames President Carter for the collapse of Iran. He told one high-ranking foreign visitor, *TIME* has learned, that he was appalled by Carter's statement that the U.S. no longer needs a policeman in the Persian Gulf. Although the President pledged the Shah undying brotherhood in a New Year's Eve

American ineptness, the Shah also complains, applies not only to Iran but to the entire Middle East. In one conversation with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at Aswan, the Shah spread out a series of maps to prove that "the Americans do not grasp the dimension of Soviet moves throughout the area." Later, addressing a joint session of the Egyptian and Sudanese parliaments in Khartoum, Sadat inserted a sword-rattling reference to Soviet "conspiracies in the dark" around the Horn of Africa. Aides said that Sadat had been prompted by the Shah's remarks.

In Egypt, where the Shah had flown his Boeing 707 jet after leaving Tehran, Sadat was a gracious host. He and his wife Jihan flew in plane loads of guests for formal dinners at Aswan's Oberoi Hotel in honor of the Shah and his glamorous, chain-smoking Empress Farah. By day the royal couple toured the nearby temples of Philae and listened politely to lectures on Egyptian archaeology. Sadat

saw the Shah off to Morocco, on the next leg of his hastily drawn itinerary, with a kiss on each cheek and a 16-gun salute.

The welcome in Marrakesh, winter capital of King Hassan II, was noticeably less effusive. Hassan, fearful of provoking dissidents at home and angering radical Arab neighbors by consorting with a pariah, had reluctantly invited the Shah to visit him for a day or two of "conferences." The press was barred from covering the royal arrival, and the Shah was whisked off to a palatial but isolated guest house called Jinan al-Kabir (the big garden), hidden by orange, olive and date trees in the immense palm grove that surrounds Marrakesh. Moroccan officials were dismayed when the Shah arranged for his four children to fly in from Texas, and when members of the Iranian entourage hinted that the Shah's "day or two" might stretch into an indefinite stay.

The Shah made no public appearances in Morocco, more at his host's insistence than his own. The local press was commanded to ignore the royal visitor. At the urging of foreign newsmen, the couple appeared for an informal picture session, at which mint tea, almond milk, and cookies were served. At first the Shah, natty in gray slacks and blue blazer, greeted the press wanly. He cheered visibly after spotting several old acquaintances among the correspondents. But Moroccan security guards shooed the reporters away before a full-scale press conference could develop.

In Marrakesh, as in Aswan, the deposed monarch appeared to be slowly adjusting to events. He still seemed to suffer periods of uncertainty and depression, but insisted that he was "relaxed and well" and in no need of a major medical check-up. Between scheduled activities, he read newspapers, listened to radio reports and took long walks.

In moments of introspection, observers say, the Shah becomes particularly angry at the aides who surrounded him. Out of misguided loyalty, he now senses, they shielded him from reality. "My advisers built a wall between myself and my people," the Shah bitterly told Sadat at Aswan. "I didn't realize what was happening. When I woke up, I had lost my people. Don't let that happen to you."

What surprises listeners most about the Shah is his belief that he can still go home again. The Ayatullah Khomeini, in his view, is a crazed man, a transitory figure. A successful military coup is unlikely, since junior officers and most of the army would not support it. The Bakhtiari government has no popular base and is bound to fail. The prognosis, then, is chaos; the only solution is the Shah. After all, the tide of history turned against him with unexpected swiftness; it could as swiftly turn in his favor. "I deserve another chance," he says. "And if I get it, my people will not regret it."

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27 JANUARY 1978

Moscow Gambles in Iran

Surprised by the Turmoil on Its Southern Border,
Soviet Sides With Moslems in Belief They'll Win

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 26 — If the Soviet Union emerges with increased influence in Iran after the struggle between opponents and supporters of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi is over, it will be through little effort of its own.

Even as an imperfect mirror, the Soviet press has reflected the Kremlin's considerable indecision over the last three months about where events in Iran were moving and whom the Soviet Union should back.

Only now is it clear that Moscow has decided that the Shah is finished and is gambling that the key leader in the immediate future will not be Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar but rather the exiled Moslem leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Russians seem as surprised as the Americans at the explosion of resentment and opposition that drove the Shah from his country last week. The Russians also seem to be maneuvering into a position that will give them hope of being on friendly terms with the Ayatollah if he becomes Iran's dominant figure.

Their Good Neighbor the Shah

For months, the Soviet press treated the enlarging protest as a passing social phenomenon — justified resentment against capitalist exploitation, perhaps, but not the fault of their good neighbor the Shah.

It was not until early December, well after the opposition to the Shah had reached the critical point, that the official Soviet press began reporting that he had fallen into disfavor at home.

It was not until Dec. 29 that Moscow radio's Persian-language propaganda broadcasts to Iran began reporting that the Shah had become the target of the rioters.

And it was not until Wednesday — a week after the Shah's departure — that Izvestia, the Government newspaper here, made the final break and denounced the Shah as a corrupt dictator who had brutally repressed his people.

Shivering for Lack of Gas

"The Shah of Shahs," it said, was "propped up for many years by American dollars." And, it could have added, by trade and economic agreements with the Soviet Union. Deprived of their normal supplies of Iranian natural gas, Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia are shivering this winter.

The degree to which the Kremlin prized stability over subjugation in Iran has been obscured recently in its public posturing. On Nov. 19, the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, warned against "outside interference, especially military interference," in Iran by the United States.

This month, the dominant theme in the Soviet press has been the supposed threat of an American-supported coup by the Shah's army, and as if to remind the United States that the Soviet Union was also capable of intervening, Izvestia noted on Jan. 5 that Soviet-Iranian relations were still governed by the Soviet-Persian treaty of Feb. 26, 1921.

A Reminder, Not a Warning

He did not say, and Soviet press reports have not pointed out, that the treaty provides that "Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense" if "a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use such territory as a base of operations against Russia."

Soviet officials have also raised the point, almost academically, in private talks with American journalists here.

"The general feeling around town," a Western diplomat said, "is that these references are not a warning but a sort of reminder that the United States is not the only country with formal interests in Iran. It's not taken as a real threat to intervene with Soviet troops, even indirectly."

To the United States, the most offensive aspect of recent Soviet propaganda is its anti-Americanism. Reports on Moscow radio, in the Moscow press, and on a clandestine Persian-language "National Voice of Iran" beamed from Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan have accused the Central Intelligence Agency of sending in scores of agents to try and prop up the Shah, and have also charged United States Army generals with conspiring in a coup to restore him.

The American Embassy here protested that Soviet news accounts were misrepresenting United States policy, and diplomats said the clandestine radio broadcasts to Iran from Baku were "inflammatory." But the Soviet press has continued to highlight supposed United States interference.

No Evidence of Agitation

The impression has been fostered abroad that all Iran listens breathlessly for its daily instructions from Soviet radio, which broadcasts 45 minutes a day.

But a recent Western intelligence report noted that there is no evidence that the broadcasts incited Iranians to violence. "No material has been monitored," the report said, "providing instructions on organization of demonstrations; lessons in the manufacture of guerrilla weapons, or other guidance of that nature."

The Baku radio called on Iranian soldiers this week to establish "revolutionary councils" and resist "treachery" by their commanders. But the outlawed Iranian Communist Party's call for an "armed struggle" against the Bakhtiar Government was not even mentioned.

Moscow's activities in Iran cannot be determined here. But the best-informed Western diplomats do not believe the Russians stirred up the trouble that brought down the Shah. The official Soviet position seems to be one of acceptance. A reading of the situation in December apparently persuaded the Soviet leaders that no one could reverse the tide against the Shah, so they have ridden with it.

Siding With Eventual Winner

Now they have gambled that the Ayatollah will eventually win. Religion hardly occupies a privileged position in the atheistic Soviet state, and the roots of the Ayatollah's Shiite Islam have withered in the region near Iran after years of Marxist drought.

Yet even the local press there began last week to praise the Ayatollah for his years of battle against "imperialism" and for social justice in Iran.

On Wednesday, the Soviet youth newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, published an analysis that took the final step and gave official blessing to the religious movement in Iran as a key element in the Shah's overthrow.

The Ayatollah, the paper said in columns otherwise reserved for denunciations of religious superstition among Soviet youth, "has boldly thrown down a challenge to tyranny and foreign dictatorship that expresses the wishes and aspirations of the Iranian people."

How long the 78-year-old Moslem leader will remain in Moscow's good graces probably depends on how long he manages to embody these "wishes and aspirations." Whatever the Kremlin does to influence the course of the movement against the Shah, up to now it seems to have had little more influence than the United States.

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Most Americans Ordered by U.S. To Leave Iran

10,000 to Fly Out As Trouble Mounts

By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States yesterday ordered its citizens to leave Iran immediately, as concern mounted in Washington over signs that discipline and command structure is beginning to crumble in the Iranian military.

In the largest and most dramatic movement of U.S. personnel since the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, the State Department authorized the U.S. embassy in Tehran to order almost all of the estimated 10,000 Americans still in Iran to leave "temporarily at the earliest feasible date."

Iranian soldiers are deserting their units in increasing numbers, according to intelligence reports reaching the State Department. Losses previously counted in dozens are reaching hundreds from some units.

In an incident that deeply concerns the Carter administration, Iranian forces acting on their own have banned U.S. advisers from entering an Iranian air base where highly sophisticated F14 fighters are located, State Department working groups have been told.

The administration is not only concerned over a potential breakdown in the Iranian command structure, but also that one of the 78 Iranian-owned F14 fighters and its advanced Phoenix missiles could fall into Soviet hands unless stringent security precautions are maintained.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Ben H. Read, who headed the Iran working group subcommittee that reviewed the evacuation order issued yesterday, confirmed that the growing number of army desertions had been "one of many factors" that went into the decision.

Read also said that a "slowly increasing number of incidents" involving violence directed at Americans had figured prominently in the talks over the order, which had been under discussion in exchanges between Washington and the embassy in Tehran "for weeks."

Portraying the move as "a cumulative decision" that was not triggered by specific incidents of the past few days or because of fears of immediate new violence, State Department

spokesman Hodding Carter said the order was issued because of "the uncertain security situation" in Iran.

Other U.S. officials acknowledged, however, that the move would be widely seen as an open statement of declining confidence in the ability of the government of Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar to restore order as he faces the promised return this week of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from exile.

The evacuation order was also the most convincing evidence yet of the sharp decline of American ability to influence events in a country that, until a few months ago, was considered the strongest pillar for Western interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions.

Until October, roughly 45,000 Americans had been drawn to Iran's oil fields, factories and military bases. But as the social and political protests that drove Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from his throne this month began to mount, U.S. companies started pulling out dependents and many workers.

In contrast to the sharp debate within the administration over a December decision to authorize government payment for official U.S. dependents to leave Iran—at a time when the White House wanted to do nothing that indicated a lack of confidence in the shah—yesterday's decision was reached without dissent, according to several State Department officials.

Bakhtiar was informed Monday that the announcement would be made, Carter said. He declined to characterize the prime minister's reaction to the politically sensitive decision, which may trigger similar moves by European countries.

The 10,000 Americans still in Iran include 880 military advisers, 267 of whom have been declared nonessential and who will be leaving, Carter said. A Defense Department spokesman said that earlier this month the Pentagon began not sending replacements for service personnel whose tours of duty were finished.

Carter emphasized that U.S. companies should bring their employees back, since few were able to work in the severely disrupted Iranian economy. He said that about half of the U.S. civilians in Iran are expected to depart on regular commercial flights or charters in the next few days.

Carter sidestepped questions on whether the administration had received assurances from the Bakhtiar government that it would keep the country's airports open long enough to permit the evacuation. The government closed all airports for the past week to keep Khomeini out, and the airfields were reopened only hours before the embassy announcement of the evacuation was made in Tehran.

Four U.S. consulates outside Tehran will continue to operate, the State Department said, although the total of 144 U.S. embassy personnel and dependents will be pared.

Defense contractors are moving quickly to airlift out their employees. Grumman Aerospace Corp. and Bell Helicopter are to send charter flights today into Isfahan, where anti-American sentiment is reportedly growing more violent each day. Reports that the companies are also preparing efforts to evacuate helicopters and other equipment on lease to the U.S. government or to Iran could not be confirmed immediately.

Defense Department spokesman Tom Ross told reporters yesterday that none of the F14s owned by Iran has been removed from that country, and Defense Secretary Harold Brown said Monday that he was satisfied that there was adequate security for sophisticated weapons in Iran.

Under existing agreements, however, the Iranian government is totally responsible for the security of the bases on which the F14s are located. The agreements require the Iranians to establish stringent security measures, but some U.S. officials fear that the administration has no effective way of making the Iranians observe those agreements to the letter in light of the continuing radical changes occurring there.

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
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Khomeini is the future in Iran

By Richard Falk

Developments in Iran over the past year have been viewed with alarm by most Americans. Our friend, the Shah, has been driven from Iran and the leader of the opposition, Ayatollah Khomeini, is widely perceived as anti-American and politically dangerous.

Khomeini has been variously portrayed to the American public as "a religious fanatic," "a xenophobic nationalist," or even as "a theocratic fascist."

Having just returned from Iran and Paris, with an opportunity to meet many of the leading figures in the opposition movement, including Khomeini, I am convinced that the American public is being misled about what is taking place in Iran.

To begin with, we have approached the explosive events in Iran without any proper perspective. Taken by surprise at the depth and breadth of the Khomeini-led movement we have only begun very recently to acknowledge its power and likely capacity to shape the political future of Iran.

Even the American Ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, now acknowledges that the Khomeini movement "... is a genuine revolution."

The prime ministry of Shahpur Bakhtiar seems doomed to early failure. Bakhtiar has been unable to win any popular following, nor is he able to assert any civil authority. It was Khomeini's initiative that restored oil production up to the level of domestic needs, drawing sharply for Iranians the distinction between formal and effective political power.

Whether fairly or not, Bakhtiar is seen as tainted by owing his appointment to the Shah and by being the choice of the American Embassy.

The military is all that holds back the Khomeini tide, and more precisely, the upper echelons of the military together with such elite units as the Imperial Guard. The bulk of the regular army consists of conscripts who seem increasingly reluctant to shoot fellow Iranians.

Evidence also suggests that most junior officers are now ready to abandon the generals in a show-down.

On the other hand, the generals remain dangerous. "They're like a wounded animal," according to Sullivan, and still capable of causing a lot of bloodshed by turning battlefield weaponry on unarmed crowds of civilians.

In effect, the Shah turned the military loose on the movement in the autumn months of 1978, perhaps most dramatically on Bloody Friday (last Sep. 8) when soldiers and helicopter gunships fired at large crowds of unarmed demonstrators inflicting numerous casualties, including perhaps as many as 3,000 deaths.

Indeed, it is this failure by the military to beat down the opposition despite its calculated tactics of over reaction that needs to be noticed and explained. The perseverance of the Iranian people with their unarmed struggle is a powerful expression of popular motivation and discipline.

When more than one million people march in enthusiastic unison, despite some continuing threat of attack by the army, as has been the case several times recently in Tehran, we have overwhelming evidence of a popular mandate.

Our most sober middle class contacts in Iran agreed that 99 percent of the Iranian people supported the minimum goals of the Khomeini revolution. Some estimated that the Shah's remaining core of support had narrowed to 5,000.

The numbers are not important, except to accent the point that to oppose such a mobilized popular movement at this stage would be both foolish and could only be done by relying on an ever greater scale of governmental terror, which would drive the opposition toward armed struggle and might discredit the Khomeini leadership and put the movement in Communist hands.

Vital also is the realization that the Khomeini movement is the first Third World revolution that owes nothing to Western inspiration. The movement in Iran is completely indigenous, owing its energy, depth, and specific character to Shi'ite Islam.

So far the United States has failed to relate positively to developments in Iran. The Shah was brought back to his throne in 1953 with CIA help and kept there ever since.

Every Iranian man, woman, and child is aware of this U.S. government role, and resents it deeply. Khomeini told us that he still believes the CIA is involved with the generals, that it is only American support that props up Bakhtiar, and that "it is outside interference that keeps the situation dangerous for our movement." But Khomeini is quick to add that "it is not too late for the American people to realize

what has happened in Iran and for friendship to develop between our two countries."

Of course, friendship will presuppose mutual respect and genuine non-interference, that is, something quite new in Iranian-American relations.

I think none of these earlier policies made much sense for Iran, given its own needs and priorities.

But all is not lost from an American point of view. The Khomeini movement is especially alert to its need to be secure against the Soviet Union. The Russians and British preceded the American role in Iran, and there is a real concern, even at this stage, to avoid losing their victory over foreign domination by allowing Soviet influence to supplant that of the Americans.

Furthermore, American policymakers should in a sense welcome a strong anti-Communist movement in the Third World, especially if its priorities center on alleviating the miseries of its impoverished mass. And finally, there is every indication from Khomeini's economic advisers, of an intention to continue to produce oil for the world market.

We have a real challenge directed at the Carter Administration. It calls for courage and a proper explanation to the American people. Past errors need to be admitted, and the new reality accepted as an expression of the overwhelming will of the Iranian people.

I think there are reasons to be hopeful about a Khomeini government. Its political program is likely to be a mirror reflection of what the Shah's regime has done. All the ayatollahs emphasize the Shi'ite commitment to social justice as the essence of good government.

It may be especially fortunate that Medhi Bazargan, leading candidate to be Khomeini's Prime Minister, has been prominently identified with the work of the Iranian Human Rights Committee. This committee worked courageously and effectively under exceedingly severe restraints.

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Finally, it remains to be seen whether a new government in Tehran can liquidate its dependance on the United States without succumbing to Soviet domination. These are imponderables that cloud the future.

At least, Khomeini offers great hope to a population yoked for a long period to cruel tyranny. And the idea of a religious, non-Marxist, social revolution that builds on indigenous strength has great potential for the peoples of the world currently deeply disillusioned by both Soviet-style socialism and Western-style capitalism.

(Richard A. Falk is Albert G. Milbank professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. He is also chairperson of the U.S. Peoples Committee on Iran. He recently completed a fact-finding tour of Iran, along with former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Don Lucas of Clergy and Laity Concerned, an inter-faith peace organization.)

Hal Gulliver

Failure Of Intelligence In Iran

Down with the shah!

Long live the shah!

The confusing signals from Iran in the past months confuse still.

The shah of Iran, who believed that his dynasty would last for generations, was only a few short months ago viewed as one of the most stable American allies in the Middle East or in any other part of the world. Viewed, too, in that light by others. Israel has for years received a steady supply of oil from Iran, though officials from Iran and Israel both did not often talk about the arrangement, a supply of oil uninterrupted even by the clashes in battle in the Middle East. The shah in a word felt secure enough on the Peacock throne to maintain his solidarity and ties with the Arab world and yet also consistently supply oil to Israel. His Arab neighbors in fact also considered the shah secure in this fashion, never challenging his actions even in the most bitter of Arab-Israeli controversies.

Today? The shah has left Iran and the Peacock throne, probably never to return, probably to live in Egypt or the United States for an indefinite period.

A white-haired old religious man living in the outskirts of Paris can virtually dominate the public turmoil in Iran by what he says or what he does not say.

The army in Iran can continue seemingly to be loyal to the shah and yet be helpless to maintain order or maintain the shah in power.

The squares in the cities of Iran are scenes of open warfare. Soldiers and civilians exchange gunfire casually, sometimes trying to kill, sometimes visibly shooting over people's heads. There are scenes on television of other religious men, not the white-haired leader in Paris, moving through crowds in an effort to make peace. There was one scene on the television news of a group of peacemakers locking arms across an entire square and trying to keep soldiers and civilians apart.

Americans find it hard to make much of a consistent pattern from all of this. The shah is criticized vigorously both for being a man of the old world and one of the new. He ruled his own country apparently in autocratic fashion, without an overly nice sense of the way secret police should behave or how you handle political enemies. He also struggled to bring his nation, virtually a feudal society in many ways, into the modern world. Some of the shah's most bitter



critics consider his highest crimes to be elevating the status of women in Iran and permitting such works of the devil as movie theaters. Put all that aside for a moment. The politics of Iran, of a changing society, one in transition between an old culture and whatever form its tomorrows may take, are hard enough even for Iranians themselves to fathom. The most disturbing aspect of the turmoil in Iran for Americans may be to some extent the failure of American intelligence sources really to understand what was going on.

It was just one year ago that President Jimmy Carter visited Iran and toasted the shah in the highest terms, asserting how the shah's government made for stability in his own country and in the region and praising the shah for the love and affection in which he was held by the people of Iran. The comments by Carter appear ludicrous 12 months later. More disturbing, officials of the National Security Council were insisting as recently as two months ago that the shah could and would maintain power in Iran. Good intelligence amounts simply to good information, not a question of pro or con anything, but simply a reasonable understanding of the factors in a situation. How could American intelligence have been so totally and incredibly blind in the unfolding turmoil in Iran?

1 February 1979

Article appeared
on page A-16

A Voice Identified as Shah's Says Civil War to His Benefit

LOS ANGELES, Jan. 31 (AP) — A voice identified as that of the shah of Iran says in a secretly recorded conversation that his advisers should see that civil war is started to ensure the survival of his reign, a Los Angeles television station said today in a copy-right story.

Station KNXT said it obtained the tape, also broadcast on CBS, from a dissident Iranian student it did not identify. The recording was in Farsi, the language of Iran.

The voice on the 15-minute tape has been verified by three top voice-identification experts as that of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, according to KNXT. The station said the tape was of a meeting between the shah and group of his advisers "within days" before he left Iran two weeks ago.

One of the experts consulted by KNXT was George Papcun, a voice expert at the UCLA Phonetics Laboratory. He told KNXT the voice on the tape is the same as that on known recordings of the shah's voice.

"I would say that in a court of law, and I would say it if somebody's life depended on it," Papcun told KNXT.

KNXT said the recording's quality was good "once you got the hum out of it," and that it found no evidence it had been edited or tampered with.

By stirring up a war, the voice said on the tape, he hoped to gain time to consolidate his forces and return to total power.

KNXT said the person purported to be the shah also condemned his secret police for not being brutal enough. That police force, known by the abbreviation SAVAK, has been criticized by anti-shah forces as having brutalized Iranian citizens.

And the speaker vowed that a new security force would be created that would never again allow the Iranian people any freedom.

"Through creating hostility and hatred between the army and the people by ordering the soldiers to shoot freely and kill, you could throw these two weighty forces against each other. A long civil war, thus created, will gain us enough time during which we could devise countermeasures, perhaps by introducing a government which would appear to some extent acceptable to the people," said the recorded voice.

The speaker continued: "In this manner, and in light of acquired experiences, we shall gradually proceed—God willing—to shore up our powers.

"I mean, people should not be allowed too much freedom, as they proved they did not deserve this blessing which I had granted."

Later, talking about SAVAK, the speaker added: "We will create a more extensive security force to replace the SAVAK. Because, in spite of all our orders to the former chiefs of this organization to arrest and eliminate all those who oppose the monarchy, we have been witnessing the increasing growth and consolidation of these very forces which caused all of these recent mishaps.

"This time, we won't allow the people any chance even for the slightest moment for a spark of enlightenment, for that matter."

The taped voice said "a thorough purge" of the army would be necessary to rid the army of all dissenters.

"We should also secure the favor and loyalty of the remainder of the army, especially through the financial means. We must extend our favors to them and pretend that our interests and theirs are one, and that the people are their enemies."

Dr. Oscar L. Tosi, director of the Institute of Voice Identification at Michigan State, and head of the International Association of Voice Identification, began analyzing the tapes Monday.

Asked how certain he was of his research on the tape, Tosi told KNXT: "I could send somebody to the [electric] chair on this evidence." He said he has testified in more than 40 court cases as an expert in voice identification.

The station said the identity of the person speaking on the tape was also confirmed by Robert Clark, a private investigator in Los Angeles who has worked for the Los Angeles Police Department and for private industry.

1 February 1979

Article appeared
on page A-9

Shah Urged Military to Unleash Prolonged Civil War, Tape Claims

New York Times News Service

In a tape purporting to record the final remarks of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran to top military leaders just before he left the country Jan. 16, the Iranian army was urged to "create a prolonged civil war" to give the shah an opportunity to return and regain power.

A copy of the tape of the purported secret speech was given to The New York Times, which has not yet authenticated it, by Bahman Sholevar, an Iranian member of the executive council of the Iranian National Front in the United States. The front opposes the shah. Sholevar also provided two transcripts, one a translation into English.

Copies of the tape also were distributed to other news organizations. One of them, CBS, said last night that three voice experts had

verified that the voice was that of the shah. Sholevar said the tape had come indirectly from an Iranian general who said he had received the tape and identified the voice as the shah's.

SINCE IT REVIEWED a copy of the tape Saturday, The Times has made several attempts to verify that the voice, which spoke Farsi, the Persian language, was indeed that of the shah. Two ranking diplomats at the Iranian embassy here said that the voice could be that of the shah, but they could not be certain.

Officials of the State Department and the CIA declined to attempt to authenticate the tape. A State Department official said last night that the department had no knowledge that any such speech had been made.

The points expressed in the purported speech, said to have been made the week before the shah and his

family left Iran, included the following:

- A state of civil war should be created "to give us an adequate opportunity to bring to power a government that is in some degree acceptable by the people, so that, God willing, we may take hold of the power again, gradually."
- Savak, Iran's secret police, will be replaced by a "more extensive secret police."
- A purge of the army is needed "to clean the army of dissatisfied elements."

According to the transcript, the speech began by referring to the troubles in Iran, saying this was "not the first time they have happened during my rule."

"You have been aware of, and you were able with the lessons learned from my father's experiences and the hearty cooperation of the U.S. government, to crush and destroy all these events and rebellions undertaken by the people to overthrow the imperial system," the speaker told the generals and high-level Savak officials, according to the transcript.

"HOWEVER, THE present situation is somewhat different from the past, and this time we are faced by a vaster and freer force," it continues.

The speaker — in a passage that differs sharply with the line taken publicly by the shah — says that "signs of split and discord" have appeared in the army, that "dissatisfied elements" must be purged and that the army "must be given complete freedom to shoot and kill the people," to help create a situation of civil war. This action, plus an attempt to woo soldiers with material incentives, will both keep the army under control and end attempts by elements opposed to the shah to undermine the armed forces, the voice on the tape says.

Article appeared
on page 10-13

3 February 1979

Two foreign policy camps prepare for a vicious game of "Lessons of Iran."

High Noon

Ayatollah Khomeini is preparing to return from exile as this is being written. Iran is facing its hour of maximum crisis, a kind of middle-eastern High Noon. By the time you read this, Khomeini's people may be running the country. Or they may all be dead or in jail as a result of a pro-shah military coup. Iran may be ablaze in civil war and in danger of disintegrating as a nation, creating opportunities for Soviet intervention. It is even conceivable that Iran's contending parties could be working out their differences peacefully. Not only Iran's future is in the balance, however. We seem to be approaching High Noon in Washington, too, between contending schools of American foreign policy. For weeks, they have been jabbing at each other with fingers of blame in a contest everyone is now calling, "Who lost Iran?" Within weeks, depending on how things work out, one side or the other may be declaring victory in a new contest—"the Lessons of Iran"—and claiming the right to set the future course of American foreign policy.

Before sorting out where each side stands, it is important to note some lessons of the Iran crisis that seem indisputable regardless what happens there and which side is vindicated in the US debate. The US never should have agreed to limit its sources of information to pro-shah elements in Iran and to avoid contacts with opposition groups. Now, to avoid being surprised again, we should end such arrangements in other countries where they exist. For example, since 1974, when diplomatic relations were resumed, the US has severely restrained its information gathering in Egypt so as not to offend President Anwar Sadat. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger apparently agreed initially to restrict the size of the CIA station in Egypt to assure Sadat there would be no new internal meddling of a type that took place during the Nasser era. US policy since then has been so restrictive, however, that military attachés are confined to official liaison duties with the Egyptian military and forbidden to seek what information they can in the ranks. Diplomatic officials do mix socially with Cairo's Marxist intellectuals, but they are not allowed to contact such sources of potential trouble as the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood. Congressional sources say that US embassy officials stay away from Communists in Italy and Japan, and information gathering also seems to be limited in Saudi Arabia. The US reportedly does no covert intelligence collecting in Israel, either, for fear of having its sources exposed by friends of Israel in the US government.

Other lessons of Iran surely are that US diplomats and intelligence agencies must be more sensitive than they have been to social and economic developments in other countries. Iran's stability was undone as much by urbanization, inflation and social dislocation as by rage against the shah. The CIA is rather late in beginning to study implications of the fundamentalism sweeping the Muslim world. It is true that students, religious groups and the military are hard to gather information about first-hand, but the US has to make more of an effort. We need to expand and improve information analysis at the CIA and elsewhere. But the White House also has to be willing to listen to bad news about its favorite regimes, as apparently was not the case with the shah's regime in Iran.

Some other lessons concern public diplomacy. An open administration is a welcome relief after years of secrecy, but it can be carried too far. President Carter has made a point of publicly blessing the shah, and then the shah's appointed interim government, of publicly condemning Khomeini and then appealing to him. None of it has worked. US blessings are not necessarily influential in Iran. Carter's appeals and condemnations have been so counterproductive that it's downright embarrassing. The president should have stated what *principles* the US supported—peace, democracy, stability—and kept quiet about personalities.

But all of these factors are tactical. When "Lessons of Iran" is played in earnest, the issue will be one of strategy. The captain of one side—call it the Hang Tough team—is Henry Kissinger. Ironically, he used to be leader of the other side—the Detentists, now led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—but he switched after leaving office. Kissinger is so articulate and smart that he seems to become the principal voice of whatever school he joins. Now he is arguing (as he did in an interview with *Time* magazine) that the crisis in Iran is part of a "progressive collapse of pro-Western governments" which can be arrested only "by a firm, purposeful and consistent American policy" that involves "imposing penalties and risks" on Soviet advances. Kissinger believes that the Soviets are responsible for Iran's oil worker strikes and that a Khomeini-dominated Islamic Republic would be radical, allied with Iraq and Libya and anti-Western, if not openly pro-Soviet. Kissinger does not say what the US should be doing in Iran, but his record as secretary of state was one of total support for the shah and he has criticized the Carter administration for pressuring the king to ease up on his dictatorial control of Iran.

Kissinger has many influential allies. Columnist Joseph Kraft has been calling for the United States to unleash the Iranian military for a coup, and he has been

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accusing the administration of being "flabby" and "goody-goody" for not doing so. Irving Kristol argued in *The Wall Street Journal* that "the world is just not now of a mind to give birth to new liberal-constitutional regimes" and said he thinks it is time to abandon "decadent Wilsonianism" in foreign policy (characterized by legalism, idealism and "guilt") and shift to a new "national interest" approach, by which the US would employ the CIA, the military—whatever it takes—to get its way. "The nations of the world admire winners, not losers—not even nice losers," Kristol wrote. Most of the Republican party seems to be on this side of the great foreign policy divide. Some "moderate" Democrats of the Jackson-Moynihan stripe proclaim a dedication to democracy in the third world; but when it comes to real choosing, they opt for "realism." Columnists Evans and Novak and William Safire are ever-available as conduits for leaks from the Hang Tough team, and George Will will give its outlook a high intellectual gloss from his well-worn copy of Barlett's Quotations.

Within the administration, the Hang Tough approach is championed by Energy Secretary James Schlesinger and President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Both of them have as their first foreign policy priority assuring US advantage over the Soviet Union. On Iran, Brzezinski originally favored absolute US support for the shah and continuation of the Kissinger-era policy of having no contact with the shah's opponents. Since the king's departure on "vacation," Brzezinski reportedly has been the chief advocate of undiluted US support for the shah's anointed successor, Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. It was Brzezinski's influence, according to administration officials, that prevented the US from having direct contacts with Khomeini up to the moment of his planned return to Iran.

On the other side, Cyrus Vance, the State Department bureaucracy and some liberal Democrats in Congress are holding to the old verities of detente and Trilateralism: that US-Soviet rivalry is only one facet of the modern world, and should be kept under control. Vance says that the Kissinger-Brzezinski outlook in the Mideast-to-Africa "arc of crisis"—that is, it's Soviets win, we lose—is "overly simplistic." Vance argues for steadiness, restraint, understanding, cooperation. He and his aides usually oppose naked displays of American power; at the same time, they seem less fearful that the US is perceived as powerless. In Iran, Vance favored distancing the US from the shah and trying to encourage negotiation between all the contending forces. His State Department subordinates established contacts with opposition leaders, including aides to Khomeini, and have been looking for solutions in Iran beyond the Bakhtiar government.

The great mystery figure in the administration is Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who is a member of the highest-level inner council making administration

policy on Iran, but who has given not the slightest public hint of what he personally favors. One indication of Brown's position, though, is the role being played in Iran by US Air Force General Robert E. Huyser. Huyser ostensibly is there to consult on weapons-purchase matters, but his chief task reportedly has been to keep the Iranian military unified so that it can act concertedly when and if it chooses to act. Since the top level of Iran's officer corps is devotedly pro-shah and probably fears being purged in the event of a Khomeini takeover, the effect of Huyser's mission is to keep the option open for the United States to encourage a military coup.

Should President Carter authorize a military coup? With Khomeini on the verge of returning to Iran, the pressures from each side must be enormous. The shah surely has been urging Carter to give a go-ahead, so that the military could take charge, suppress the opposition and restore him to his throne. A successful coup would prove to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and other US allies that President Carter is capable of decisive action, much as President Eisenhower was in returning the shah to power in 1953. Any coup attempt, successful or unsuccessful, will be blamed on the United States anyway, so why shouldn't the US do what it can to make an attempt successful (while denying it played any role at all, of course)? On the other hand, a coup would have to be terribly brutal because the anti-shah opposition in Iran includes practically every element of society. How many would have to be killed? Thousands, certainly, and, for that, the military might not be able to hold together. Carter's conscience, presumably, would urge him against authorizing a coup. So would Vance and other State Department professionals, whose case is that Khomeini, however obscurantist, however bigoted, would still be anti-Soviet and would need to sell oil to the West.

A disastrous outcome for the US in Iran—a leftist takeover, especially—is bound to produce a shift in US policy-making influence toward the Hang Tough group, at the expense of the moderates. We are likely to see most restraint taken off the CIA's covert operators—as well as its intelligence-gatherers—and a step-up in tension between the US and the Soviet Union. Further damage will be done to the chances for Senate ratification of a SALT treaty with the Soviets. Some "favorable" outcomes could produce similar results. A US-backed bloody coup producing the shah's return would signal that hanging tough had won the day in Washington. The only hope for the moderates to be vindicated would seem to lie in a negotiated compromise leading to elections and a stable government. It is worth hoping for and worth the administration's working for. We should know reasonably soon whether it's possible to be nice and a winner, too.

Morton Kondracke